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Rav Shagar – Chapter 1

I’m excited about a new book that I recently bought. It is called “Faith Shattered and Restored: Judaism in the PostModern Age”. It contains excerpts from Rabbi Shagar’s writings. Reading the introduction, it is clear that the intent is to speak to people for whom the “old” ways of being religious don’t work – but can’t find a new way.

Chapter 1 deals with the Akeda. The title of the chapter is: “Uncertainty as the Trial of the Akeda”. Rav Shagar does not focus the question of the Akeda as Abraham’s being asked to obey an ostensibly unethical divine command. Rather, his focus is on the injustice of God ordering a trial involving the sacrifice of one’s son. “Can God act unjustly?” is the question the Midrash asks. The question begs comparison to Job, whose ordeal was caused by Satan. Would it be correct to assume the same of the Akeda?”

Rav Shagar quotes the Gemora Bava Batra 15b as follows: Greater praise is accorded to Job than to Abraham. For of Abraham it is written “For now I know that you fear God”. Whereas of Job it is written “That man was perfect and upright and feared God and eschewed evil”.

Additionally, Rav Shagar notes that “the Rishonim (including the Rambam) used the Akeda to prove the absolute certainty of prophesy. Abraham never would have been willing to slaughter his son, they posited, were he not absolutely certain of the authenticity of the divine command. In many ways, such a portrayal of the ordeal renders it irrelevant to us, for we have not been granted the privilege of prophecy.”

Rav Shagar notes, however, that the Akeda is saved from irrelevance because many midrashim portray Satan as being the one who commands Abraham; or at least Satan claiming to Abraham that it was his idea. “Hazal’s approach is far from simplistic, eschewing the view that God’s voice is clearly apprehensible and that the focal point of the ordeal is Abraham’s willingness to obey it. The question of Abraham’s capacity to know whether it is indeed God’s voice speaking to him – and that he must obey – or whether it is Satan’s, is posed in all its starkness. Perhaps that is the essence of the ordeal – the ability to distinguish between the two voices.”

So, what is God saying and what is Satan saying? How did Abraham react to injustice and how did Job react? Job protested while Abraham did not. Which reaction is preferable? Rav Shagar quotes Gemora Sanhedrin 89b which, says Rav Shagar, implies that God preferred Job’s reaction.

Rav Shagar says “The lesson is clear: A conceited, all-knowing religious stance renders the trial, and with it the entire religious endeavor, a sham. The trial, along with a religious lifestyle and a connection to God, can exist only in the context of a humble personality that is content in not knowing. A conceited stance stems from pride, and it is the voice of Satan. The trial will forever be associated with a subject who by nature is in the dark.”

Parshat ויגש – Bereishit 46:1 – Is There a Commandment to Honor Grandparents?

Bereishit 46:1 And Israel and all that was his set out and came to Beer Sheba, and he slaughtered sacrifices to the God of his father Isaac.

Midrash Raba: It doesn’t say “to the God of his father Abraham”. Rabbi Yochanan said regarding this that a person is obligated to honor is father more than the obligation to honor his father’s father. The Rama states in his commentary on Yoreh Deah (Section 140) that we see from here that a person is obligated to honor his father’s father, but the obligation to honor is father is greater.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #1:

The above quote is the opinion of the Rama. The Mahari has the opposite opinion: a person is not obligated to honor his father’s father. Many later commentators wrestled with this question and brought proofs for each of the opinions. The Gra, in his commentary on Yoreh Deah writes a new idea on this topic. The Gra states that the grandson is certainly not obligated to honor his mother’s father. The Gra brings a proof from Midrash Bereshit Raba (Section 98) where it states explicitly that the sons of one’s daughters are not referred to as one’s children.

I have doubts, however, whether the Gemora itself agrees with the Midrash Raba on this question. Note that there are many places in the Gemora where it states explicitly that one’s daughters’ children are referred to as one’s children. For example, in the Gemora Yevamoth 66b the Gemora explains the verse in Deuteronomy 33:9 “Nor did he know his children” as referring to his daughter’s children.  Another example is in the Gemora Yevamoth 70a where it comments on the verse in Leviticus 22:13 “if the kohen’s daughter has no children…” and states that it is understood that the verse must include “children’s children”. There it is explicitly discussing a daughter’s children. Another example is in the Gemora Kedushin 68b where it discusses the verse in Deuteronomy 6:4 “if he will turn your son from following Me…” and concludes that this includes the children that your daughter may have even with a non-Jewish father. There are many other Gemoras that prove the same point. We additionally see the same with Lavan’s statement in Genesis 31:43 that “the sons are my sons” when speaking about his daughters’ children. Therefore, it seems probable to say that the Gemora disagrees with the Midrash Raba quoted above. The Gemora’s opinion is that the children of one’s daughters are referred to as one’s children. Thus, the view of the Gra would have to be investigated further in terms of its halachic ramifications.

Consequently, in general, it is logical to state that one is obligated to honor one’s father’s father. We see that the father’s father is [himself] obligated equally to the father. As it states in Gemora Kedushin 30a “how do we know that a grandfather is obligated to teach his grandchildren Torah? From the verse in Deuteronomy 4:9 “But beware and watch yourself very well, lest you forget the things that your eyes saw, and lest these things depart from your heart, all the days of your life, and you shall make them known to your children and to your children’s children”.

If so, the logical conclusion is that since the father’s father has the strictness of the obligation regarding educating his grandchildren, similarly the grandchildren have the strictness of the obligation regarding giving him honor.

There is, in actuality, nothing new in this conclusion. We find similar statements by the Rif and the Rosh and other halachic commentators in their comments on the Gemora Kedushin 44a regarding the obligation of a person to make a blessing if a miracle occurs for him. The commentators state that this obligation occurs not only if the miracle happens to the person himself, but also to his children and his children’s children. The reason for this derives from the Midrash Raba’s statement regarding the verse in Genesis 21:23 [And now, swear to me here by God, that you will not lie to me or to my son or to my grandson; according to the kindness that I have done with you, you shall do with me, and with the land wherein you have sojourned.”] The Midrash Raba comments there that father’s have mercy onto their children up to the 3rd generation of descendants. If so, then the reverse is also true that the son and the son of the son have mercy on their father and grandfather. Thus, since according the measure of feelings of the son of the son and the father of the father are the same and we obligate them equally to make a blessing with God’s explicit name, so to it is logical to obligate them to honor [the father’s father].

Editor’s Note: In this note, the Torah Temimah disagrees with the Gra (The Vilna Gaon) and states that it is an obligation to honor one’s father’s father. Additionally, the Torah Temimah digresses slightly to show that the Gemora and the Chumash consider one’s daughter’s children to also be included.

 

Parshat תולדת – Genesis 28:9 – When We Don’t Have to Listen to Our Parents

Genesis:  28:9 – So Esau went to Ishmael, and he took Mahalath, the daughter of Ishmael, the son of Abraham, the sister of Nebaioth, in addition to his other wives as a wife.

Babylonian Talmud – Megila 17a: From the fact that the verse mentions that Mahalath was the daughter of Ishmael, we already know that she was the sister of Nebaioth. What is the purpose of telling us this fact that is already known? To teach us that immediately after Ishmael betrothed her to Esau, he died. It was then Nebaiot who completed the marriage process [in Ishmael’s place].

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #4

Look at Rashi’s commentary on this verse as it pertains to the above quoted Gemora.

Also note that Rabbi Yosef Karo in Section 167 and also cited by the Ramah in Yoreh Deah (section 140) in the laws of honoring one’s parents that in matter of marriage, the duty of honoring one’s parents does not apply. That is to say, if the father is pushing his son not to marry a specific woman, the son is not obligated to obey him. See also the Vilna Gaon’s comments on this issue.

If this is so, this entire Torah section requires further explanation. How could Yitzchak then command Yaacov to not marry a wife from the daughters of Canaan? (Genesis 28:1) If the law is that Yitzchak does not have the ability to command his son in this matter, how could he command Yaacov? Perhaps he could have used the phrase “request” but certainly not the phrase “command” as was actually the case.

Perhaps there is room to say that if a father commands his entire household not to marry into a certain family (as was the case with Yitzchak) then he would have authority. We find similarly in the Gemorah in a variety of issues that the children of a family can be pressured not to change the custom of their family. In this case, here, the family of our forefathers were commanded not to marry from the daughters of Canaan. As Abraham said to Eliezar (Genesis 24:3) “don’t choose a wife for my son from the daughters of Canaan”. As the Gemora in Pesachim states, Abraham was warning Eliezar regarding Yitzchak not to select a wife from the daughters of Canaan. Thus, it is clear that there was a tradition [in their family]. This is the reason why Yitzchak had authority to command Yaacov regarding his family custom/tradition.

It is a wonder that no halachic authorities have pondered this question [in terms of its ramifications for our time].

Translator’s Note:  It seems clear that the inference from the Torah Temimah’s note is that, as a rule for our times, parents do not have the authority to dictate to their children who they can or cannot marry.

 

Parshat תולדת – Genesis 27:1 – Why Were Isaac’s Eyes Weak?

Genesis:  27:1 – It came to pass when Isaac was old, and his eyes were too dim to see, that he called Esau his elder son, and he said to him, “My son,” and he said to him, “Here I am.”

Babylonian Talmud – Megila 28a: Rabbi Eleazar said, “ Anyone who stares at the face of an evil person will cause his eyes to be damaged. This is shown by the verse: It came to pass when Isaac was old and his eyes were too dim to see”.  This was due to Isaac’s staring at Esav, the evil one.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #2

See above in Parshat Vayera (Genesis 20:16) that Abimelech cursed Sarah that she should have children with weak eyes. This curse was fulfilled through Isaac. The Gemora asks was it through looking at Esav or due to the curse of Abimelech. The Gemora responds that both reasons contributed.

Prior to this discussion, the Gemora discusses the point that one is forbidden to stare at the face of an evil person. It must be that the phrase “forbidden” is not precise; rather, it is not a good personality trait to stare at the face of an evil person. The proof that it is not literally “forbidden” is from the story that the Gemora tells relating to this issue. The story is that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha is asked “In what merit have you earned to live a long life?” Rabbi Yehoshua replied that he had never stared at the face of an evil person. Note that if it were literally forbidden, what would be special about not having committed that particular sin?

 Also, do not be concerned about the phrase “forbidden” that is used in the Gemora. We find many examples of similar exaggeration. For example, the Rosh writes at the end of the first chapter of Avodah Zarah that it is forbidden to have a [business] partnership with a non-Jew. Behold, this is not at all forbidden, not even rabbinically. Rather the Rosh meant that it is praise worthy trait. Also see Tosafot’s comments in Gemora Bechorot 2b.

As a general observation, also note that the word “stare” refers specifically to depth and emotional looking not to superficial “seeing”. The proof for this is that we have a well know law that one who sees a rainbow should make a blessing upon seeing it. How would this law be possible given that we also state in the Gemora (Chagiga 16a) that anyone who stares at a rainbow will damage his eyes. One must conclude that “staring” and “seeing” are two different levels of looking at something.

 We see the same point from the Gemora there regarding the saying that anyone who stares at the face of a prince, will cause his eyes to be weakened. On the other hand, the law is that when a prince passes by, one should stand up and look at his face with awe (Horayot 12a).

Translator’s Note:  This note stood out to me because the Torah Temimah states that sometimes when the Gemora or later rabbinic texts state “forbidden”, it is not literally forbidden.

Parshat ויצא – Genesis 28:19 – The Mountain of God Is a House

Genesis:  28:19 –And he named the place Beth El, but Luz was originally the name of the city.

Babylonian Talmud – Pesachim 88a: – Rabbi Eleazar said: what is meant by the verse, “And many people shall go and say: ‘Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, To the house of the God of Jacob’” (Isaiah 2:3)? Why does it say the God of Jacob, but not the God of Abraham and Isaac? But [the meaning is this: we will] not [be] like Abraham, in connection with whom ‘mountain’ is written, as it is said, As it is said to this day, “In the mount where the Lord is seen” (Genesis 22:14). Nor like Isaac, in connection with whom “field” is written, as it is said, “And Isaac went out to meditate in the field in the evening” (Genesis 24:63). But [let us be] like Jacob, who called Him “home”, as it is said, “And he called the name of that place Beth-El [God is a home]” (Genesis 28:19).

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #19

The Beth-El referred to here is not the same Beth-El referenced in Hoshea Chapter 7. Rather here is a reference to Jerusalem. Jacob called it Beth-El due to the fact that in the future the House of God would be built there. This is the same location referred to as Mount Moriah where Abraham prayed (Genesis 22:14). It is also the same location as the field that is mentioned where Isaac prayed (Genesis 24:63). Thus, the statement in the Gemora is that by referring to the location as a ‘house’ the intention is to contrast it with ‘mountain’ and ‘field’ which are open, non-status laden locations. Rather, the intent is to refer to it as a ‘house’; a location that is well-guarded and status laden.

What is stated just above is the general explanation given by the classic commentators, but the matter is not entirely clear to me. Behold, we find many places where a mountain is referenced as a very high, lofty location. There are references to “the Mountain of God” (Isaiah 2:3), to “Mount Zion” (Psalms 48:3), “the Holy Mountain” (Isaiah 27:13), etc. Why, here, are they denigrating the term “mountain”?

Therefore, were it not for the prior explanations offered by the commentators, I would state that this Gemora is referring that what which is stated in the Zohar in the section on Parshat Yitro (Section: 69:2). The Zohar there states: Why did Abraham refer to it as a mountain and Jacob refer to it as a house even though they are referring to the same place and represent the same [spiritual] level?  It is a mountain because a mountain is in reference to the nations of the world and represents a place for them to come under the wings [of the Divine Presence]. [Its holiness is open to everyone, whoever wants may come and receive it[1].  So too, the holiness of this mountain is open to all.]  On the other hand, it is called a home in reference to the Jewish people being in relation to God as a husband and a wife together joyfully in their home or as a mother bird laying on her nest. [End quote from the Zohar.]

Thus, we see that the advantage of a house over a mountain is not related to status. Rather, mountain is a [universal] symbol directed at the nations of the world while house is a [more intimate] symbol directed at the nation of Israel.

Translator’s Note:  The Torah Temimah is explaining why the same location is called both a house and a mountain. Instead of the explanation given by the classic commentators, he chooses an explanation in the Zohar.

[1] This addition is from the fuller text of the Zohar as pointed out by the commentary “Meshivas Nefesh”.

Parshat בראשית – Genesis 17:13 – May a Woman Perform a Circumcision?  

Genesis:  17:13 –Those born in the house and those purchased for money shall be surely circumcised (המול ימול), and My covenant shall be in your flesh as an everlasting covenant.

Babylonian Talmud – Avodah Zara 27a: – It was taught as follows: From what verse do we know that it is invalid for a non-Jew to perform a circumcision on a Jew? From the verse that states “shall be surely circumcised…”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #36:

It is possible that the exegesis is from the word “ המול” and is taken to allude to the idea of  “מהול“– one who is circumcised. This is done by swapping the first two letters of the word with each other as we find is sometimes done in rabbinic discussions. Thus, the meaning would be “one who is circumcised should perform the circumcision”. In a previous verse (Genesis 17:9) a similar lesson is learned from the phrase “And you, my covenant shall you keep” – “you and people similar to you”. See there for a fuller explanation.

The Gemora explains that there is a practical halachic ramification that depends on which verse is used as the source. The halachic difference being whether women are allowed to perform circumcisions or not. If you deduce the rule from the verse “And you, my covenant shall you keep” – then a woman would not be allowed to perform circumcisions because she isn’t included in the “covenant of circumcision”. However, if you deduce the rule from our verse of “shall be surely circumcised (המול ימול)” – then the principle of “woman are considered as circumcised” would apply. Look over there are the pertinent Gemora and Tosafot.

Note that we hold as a matter of law that women are permitted to perform circumcisions. This is the conclusion of the Gemora based on the verse in Exodus 4:25 “Tzipporah took a sharp stone and cut off the foreskin of her son”. (Note that according to those of the opinion that women are not allowed to perform circumcisions, they understand this verse to mean that Tzipporah began the circumcision, but Moshe completed it.)

In Yoreh Deah section 264 [Yosef Karo] states explicitly that a woman is permitted to perform circumcisions with the condition that if there is a Jewish man of greater stature who knows how to perform circumcisions, then that person would have preference. The Ramah [famous Askenazic early halachic authority] states there, “there are those who say that a woman should not perform circumcisions and our custom is to seek a man to be the mohel.” The Shach and the Gra wonder about the comment of the Ramah and believe that his comment was self-evident and wonder why he commented.

It appears that the intent of the Ramah’s comments is that one is obligated to seek a man to be the mohel even if there is not one close by. This would be in contrast to the opinion of Yosef Karo who would only give precedence to a man if he were present and able to perform the circumcision but there would be no obligation to seek out a man as a mohel.

The logic of the Ramah is that he [essentially] was of the opinion that a woman is not allowed to perform circumcisions. However, the obligation of performing the circumcision on the 8th day takes precedence since the core halacha is that a woman is allowed to perform the circumcision. In spite of this fact, the Ramah’s opinion is that one should seek out a man to perform the circumcision in order to comply with the stricter opinion that a woman may not perform the circumcision.

Additionally, regarding the Shach’s comment that the Ramah stated an obvious fact “we are accustomed to seek a man to perform the circumcision” since a woman is not commonly found who can perform circumcisions, that is not a valid critique by the Shach. If it were decided that a woman is allowed to perform circumcisions even in a situation where a competent male was present, then it is probable that then more woman would learn this skill. From the decision that they are not allowed to perform circumcisions, that is why they have not learned this skill.

Translator’s Note:  I appreciated the Torah Temimah’s analysis of the Shach’s observation that there are very few women who have this skill.

 

Parshat וירא – Genesis 21:4 – May a Woman Perform a Circumcision?  

Genesis:  21:4 – And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he was eight days old, as God had commanded him.

Babylonian Talmud – Kedushin 29a: – A woman is not commanded to circumcise her son. This is derived from the verse “as God commanded him”. God commanded him, not her.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #6:

Tosafot ask why a verse is needed to teach this law. Could it not have been deduced from the general concept that women are exempt from all commandments which are time-bound. Since circumcisions may only be performed during the day, we would know that women are not commanded in this mitzvah even without a verse to teach this point.

Tosafot answer this question by stating that there are some opinions that circumcisions that occur after the optimally mandated period of 8 days may be performed either during the day or at night. [Thus, according to those opinions, one would need a verse to explicitly teach that women are not commanded to perform circumcisions.] Most rabbinic opinions, however, are that circumcisions even after 8 days must be performed during the daytime.

This may be the reason that the halachic authorities have omitted explicitly mentioning women’s exemption from this commandment even though the Gemora [cited above] explicitly mentions it. Since we follow the ruling that even circumcisions after 8 days should be performed in the daytime, we can automatically deduce that women are exempt from this commandment. That is why the halachic authorities did not need to record this explicit ruling.

We should also consider the question of why the Gemora taught women’s exemption from our verse rather than from the verse in Genesis 17:13 “You should surely circumcise…”. From that verse is taught the law that a non-Jew should not perform a circumcision because from the word “surely” [in Hebrew it is actually a doubling of the verb] we learn that circumcisions should be performed by one who is circumcised. This same approach is used to teach that women may not be scribes and write tefillin. This is deduced (Menachot 42b) from the verse “you should tie…you should write” – all who are obligated to tie are obligated to write.

Perhaps the answer to this question is based on what Tosafot write in Berachot 20b. There they write that women are obligated to say during the recitation of the blessing after meals the phrase “we than God…for the covenant in our flesh…”. Tosafot state that the reason why women are obligated to say this prayer is because since circumcision is not possible with women, there is no reason to exclude them from the general category of people saying the blessing after meals. This same approach is used (in Gemora Avodah Zara 27a) when discussing whether a woman may perform circumcisions due to the fact that she is in the [legal] category of circumcised people.

We see therefore that it is not possible to exclude women from the obligation to perform circumcisions from the verse “you should surely circumcise…” [since woman would actually fulfill this requirement.]

 Translator’s Note: This Torah Temimah note does not actually address the issue of whether women may perform circumcisions. This note here just addresses the topic of whether women are commanded in the mitzvah or not. The question of whether a woman is permitted to perform circumcisions is addressed by the Torah Temimah in his note on Genesis 17:13, note #36. That comment is located here:  http://temimahblog.com/2017/10/31/parshat-%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%AA-genesis-1713-may-a-woman-perform-a-circumcision/

 

Parshat וירא – Genesis 22:3 –  Why Should We Get Up Early To Do Mitzvot?

Genesis:  22:3 –And Abraham arose early in the morning, and he saddled his donkey, and he took his two young men with him and Isaac his son; and he split wood for a burnt offering, and he arose and went to the place of which God had told him.

Babylonian Talmud – Pesachim 4a: – The whole day is a valid time for performing circumcisions, but one should [optimally] perform circumcisions earlier in the day. This is because of the dictum “Zealous people should perform mitzvot with alacrity otherwise physical aspects will present themselves to prevent performing the mitzvah” [Zrizim makdimim l’mitzvot]

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #7:

Note what is written above in Genesis 21:4 to explain the phrase “Abraham performed the circumcision [in the manner] as God had commanded him”. According what is stated in Gemora Kedushin 29a: that the commandment of alacrity for circumcision is biblical in nature [not rabbinic] and applies to all of Israel. [If that is so], then the phrase “zealous people should…” is problematic. In the book Ravid HaZahav, the author asks why the issue of “zealous people should perform the commandment early” is not deduced from the verse in Parshat Bo (Exodus 12:17) “and you shall zealously observe my commandments”. There, on that verse, the Gemora and the Mechilta do deduce that if an opportunity comes into your hand to do a commandment, one should not be lax / lazy in performing it.

The answer appears to me that here, the Torah is commanding to perform the mitzvot and the Gemora is bringing a proof that zealous people, due to their love of the commandments, will perform them sooner / earlier of their own initiative [rather than as a core part of the obligation]. It is this point that the Gemora here is trying to prove by quoting the verse of Abraham arising early in the morning [even though it wasn’t a ‘legal’ obligation to do so, per se.]

Regarding the legal details of “zealous people should perform the commandments with alacrity”, we will, with God’s help, delve more deeply into that topic in our comments on Exodus 12:17.

Translator’s  Note: The Torah Temimah is distinguishing between the times when getting up early to do a commandment is a legal obligation versus the times when doing so reflects our love of the commandments.

Parshat לך לך – Bereishis 17:14 – Do the Descendants of Keturah Need to Be Circumcised?

Genesis 17:14 – And an uncircumcised male, who will not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin-that soul will be cut off from its people; he has annulled My covenant.

Gemora Sanhedrin 59b: From the verb “annulled” we learn that this verse includes the sons of Keturah in the requirement to be circumcised.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #46

It is not clear how this verse alludes to the idea that the sons of Keturah are obligated in the commandment to be circumcised. Further, I haven’t seen any commentators who attempt to explain this, even superficially. It appears to me that [perhaps] it can be explained based on the grammatical meaning of the verb “annul”. According to grammarians, “annul” [הפר]  refers to something that is totally null and void. This can be contrasted with the word “invalidated” [בטל] which refers to something that is declared void for a given period of time, but might be renewed or return to be valid. See Tosafot in Gemora Shabbat 20b.

So, consider that a Jewish person who is not circumcised for whatever reason, is more referred to as invalid rather than annulled. Thus, for example, it is possible that he might circumcise his own sons and resuscitate the commandment of circumcision [in his family] for later generations. This is not the case with the sons of Keturah, according to Rashi. Rashi’s opinion is that the obligation for the sons of Keturah is only on the six sons of Keturah explicitly mentioned [in verse Genesis 25:2]. In other words, the sons of Keturah were not commanded to be circumcised in perpetuity, but rather just her immediate sons. Therefore, if for some reason they were not circumcised, whether by accident or with intent, then the commandment of circumcision would be wiped out [from that family]. There would be no further command to circumcise her [later] descendants. As we explained above, this complete nullification is what is referenced with the word ‘annul’ and thus we see how this verse alludes to the sons of Keturah.

However, the opinion of Maimonides in Chapter 10, Halacha 10 in the Laws of Nations states that the sons of Keturah are obligated in perpetuity to circumcise their sons. Thus, according to his point of view, it does not make sense to say that the verb “annul” refers to the sons of Keturah. One could perhaps say that the reason the verse is teaching regarding the sons of Keturah is not due to the verb “annul” but rather due to the word “et”. [Editor’s note: this connecting word has no translation, it is used to indicate a direct object for a verb.] Thus, according to Maimonides the use of the word “et” [which is optional] refers to an additional inclusion in the command. The additional inclusion being the other wife of Abraham. Normally, the children of the maidservant [secondary wife] would be considered her children rather than the father’s children. [That would be why a special command was needed to state that the sons of Keturah are included in the commandment of circumcision in perpetuity.]

The core disagreement between Rashi and Maimonides is whether the sons of Keturah are commanded in perpetuity or not. The Shaagas Arye wrote at length on this issue. It appears to me a slight proof to Rashi from the Midrash concerning Yitro {Moshe’s father-in-law]. The Aggadah (Section 94:1) states that when the verse states that Yitro “joined” (ויחד) the Jewish people, he passed a sharp (חדה) sword over his flesh. {Meaning that he circumcised himself at that point.] Further, it is stated in Seder Olam Rabba and in Midrashim that Yitro was descended from Keturah. Thus, we see that Yitro did not circumcise himself until he decided to join the Jewish people. This would be a support for Rashi’s point of view.

Also note that Rashi exact phrasing is not entirely clear. Rashi states that this verse “comes to include the sons of Keturah, only those six alone and not in perpetuity. But Abraham was commanded for everyone who was born to him in perpetuity.” It is not clear what Rashi meant by adding the phrase “but Abraham was commanded…” In fact, this [additional] phrase is hard to understand. It appears that it was unclear to Rashi himself how it would be possible that the sons of Keturah were not commanded in perpetuity. The choice would seem to be either the sons of Keturah are from the seed of Abraham, then why would they not be commanded in perpetuity. Or, they they aren’t counted as “seed of Abraham”, then why would they themselves be obligated to be circumcised? It is for this reason that Rashi explains that they are not considered as “seed of Abraham”. If you would then ask why then do they have to be circumcised themselves, the answer would be “Abraham was commanded for everyone who was born to him…” This answer seems a little forced.

Editor’s Note: I think that it is interesting that Rashi and Maimonides have different opinions as to whether or not the sons of Keturah (and their descendants) are commanded to be circumcised.

 

Parshat נח – Genesis 6:16 – Was it a Window or a Rock?

Genesis 6:16 – You shall make a window (tzohar) for the ark, and to a cubit you shall finish it to the top, and the entrance of the ark you shall place in its side; you shall make it with bottom [compartments], second story [compartments], and third story [compartments].

Gemora Sanhedrin 108a: Rabbi Yochanan taught: God said to Noah, affix precious stones and pearls in the ark in order that there should be light as if it were noon.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #22

Rabbi Yochanan stated his opinion because ‘tzohar’ is from the same root as ‘tzoharaim’[afternoon]. Both these words are from the same root of zohar [shining]. The Hebrew letter tzadee (ts) can be exchanged with the Hebrew letter zayin (z) because they are from the same phonetic source. See also regarding this aggada in the Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim Chapter 1, Halacha 1.

Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion that the word ‘tzohar’ means a precious stone rather than the simple explanation of a window relates to another opinion of Rabbi Yochanan, in a different context. In Parshat Vayera (Genesis 19:17) the angels tell Lot [as he is fleeing Sodom} that he may not look back, behind him [at Sodom, as it is being destroyed.] The Midrash states that the angel actually told Lot, “you are not worthy of seeing the downfall of the wicked. Rather, you should be careful to pay attention to yourself”.

Also note that Noah is described as a “righteous person in his generation”. Rabbi Yochanan comments there and interprets this description as being a negative comment on the degree to which Noah was righteous. [In other words, “in his generation” is taken to mean, if he had lived in a different generation, his degree of righteousness would not have been remarkable.] If, for example, Noah had lived in the generation of Abraham, Noah would not have been considered especially righteous. Rabbi Yochanan also states in Midrash Rabba that Noah’s faith was flawed and he didn’t believe God’s word that He would soon bring a flood.

Thus, we see that it was clearly Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion that Noah was not fit to gaze upon the downfall of Sodom. Also, we know that if one places stones in doors and windows to let some light in – the explicit intent is to not permit looking outside. This is precisely what a window does, it allows light in and also enables those inside to look outside. It is for this reason that Rabbi Yochanan states that the tzohar was a stone rather than a window. It is consistent with his other opinion that Noah was not a perfect tzaddik. Noah was not so righteous that it was appropriate for him to be looking at the drowning of the evil men of his generation.

Editor’s Note: I like the idea that a person needs to be incredibly righteous to be permitted to look at (and presumably rejoice at) the downfall of evildoers. We, regular people, are not fitting for this. Also, note that the normal word for window is “chalon” not “tzohar”. It is for this reason that Rabbi Yochanan interprets the verse as he does.