Exodus 18:7 – Moshe went out to greet his father-in-law, and he bowed down to him and he kissed him, and the man asked after his friend’s welfare; and they came to the tent.

Mechilta: I do not know from the verse who bowed down to whom or who kissed whom. However, when the verse says “the man asked after his friend’s welfare” [we have a hint.] Who is called “man”? Moshe is, as in the verse that says “and the man Moshe [was very humble”.] So, from this we see that it was Moshe who bowed down and kissed his father-in-law. From here they [learn]/say that a person is obligated to honor his father-in-law.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #8:

It is not readily apparent why it is so good to be called “man” or what new thing is learned from this. After all, isn’t the word “man” a descriptive term used for all people? Also, behold the verse in Exodus 2:21 states “and Moshe began to dwell with the man”. In that verse the word “man” refers to Yitro. [So, how can we know that in our verse the term “man” applies to Moshe? Maybe it applies to Yitro as in Exodus 2:21!]

It appears that the intended meaning of the Mechilta is to say that when describing Moshe, the Torah [at times] uses the phrase “the man” in place of stating Moshe’s name. The intent at those times is to indicate someone on a higher level; one would not then need to also say the name of the person. It is only concerning Moshe that we find the combination of the description “the man” combined with his explicit name. The purpose of the Torah’s describing Moshe this way is to indicate a higher, more valued level of humanity of Moshe. This is similar to a phrase used in Gemora Yoma 18a, “Ishi – the high priest”.

Additionally, the fact that we learn from this verse that a person is obligated to honor is father-in-law requires greater investigation. It is not clear why the Halacha to honor your father-in-law is not derived from this verse. Rather the Halacha is derived from the Midrash Socher Tov from the verse in Shmuel I: Chapter 24. In that verse King David refers to his father-in-law Shaul as “my father”. See the comment of the Tur on Yoreh Deah (Section 240). Note the Rambam in chapter 6 of Mamrim doesn’t mention this obligation at all. This is amazing considering the phraseology of the Mechilta above implies that this is a well-known and clear Halacha.

 The Bach, commenting on the above Tur writes that the reason why many legal experts omit this law is because they have the opinion that King David was actually speaking to Avner not to Shaul, his father-in-law in the above cited verse. If so, then that would remove the whole source for this law. How can this be so given the above Mechilta whose source is explicitly clear in the Torah and which is taught as a general teaching without anyone disagreeing at all??!! This definitely requires further research.

Also note the opinion of the Bach in his comment on the Tur that even if a person were obligated to honor his father-in-law, the degree of obligation would not be greater than every person’s obligation to honor one’s elders and would not come close to the level of obligation that one has to honor one’s parents. The Bach’s proof for this view is from the wording of the verse in Shmuel I  which he believes implies a slightly less degree of honor than that due one’s father.

However, regarding the actual Halacha, this is not accurate. Behold, here in our verse it says explicitly that Moshe bowed down and kissed his father-in-law and that we should learn from here the obligation to honor one’s father-in-law. Certainly, it is not accurate to say that this is the same amount of honor as is due, in general, to one’s elders.  

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah says two points in this note that are worth emphasizing. First of all, the phrase “man” is a general term that applies to all humanity and in the Torah is used explicitly for Moshe and his non-Jewish father-in-law. Secondly, the Torah Temimah criticizes those legal experts who skip this opportunity to learn the law that one is obligated to honor one’s father-in-law.

Deuteronomy 1:13 – Prepare for yourselves wise and understanding men, known among your tribes, and I will make them heads over you.

Sifri: “They should be known to you”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #9:

The Sifri explains that it is not appropriate to appoint a judge when it is not known “who he is” even though he may be a great scholar. The Rambam in Chapter 2, Halacha 7 of Sanhedrin explains the phrase “known among your tribes” is in reference to the known saying that a judge must be someone who is pleasing to the people. This is according to the Gemora Sanhedrin 88b that states “Anyone who is wise and pleasing to the people may be appointed as a judge.”

However, it does need to be explained how the Rambam connects the idea of being “known to the tribe” to the idea of being pleasing to the people, especially since the Gemora itself does not use our verse to support this teaching. Perhaps one can say that the idea of “being known” is that people can see the content of his soul and can see his good actions and that through this the [potential] judge is someone beloved to the tribes. This is also alluded to in the previous note where it states that the word “men” means that a judge’s humanity is what needs to be known. [שבאנושיותם יהיו ידועים]  

In other words, the judges need to be righteous, beloved and pleasing to the people.

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah says that one cannot appoint a judge unless his “menshlichkeit” or humanity is known.

Deuteronomy 1:16 –And I commanded your judges at that time, saying, “Hear [disputes] between your brothers and judge justly between a man and his brother, and between his litigant.”

Sanhedrin 7b: Rabbi Yochanan said that [the command referred to here in the verse] was a [corresponding] warning to judges to be careful [zealous] regarding the stick and the strap

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #11:

It says in the book Chiddushei Aggadot that the reason why [Moshe needed to give a special command to the judges regarding punishing people with a stick [or lashes] was because in that generation [of the desert], the Jews then were more stubborn and prone to arguments and quarrels. This is consistent with the verse that mentions Moshe complaining to God (Devarim 1:12) “how can I alone carry their burden, their load and their quarrels”. For this reason the judges at that time were reminded about the corporal punishments with a stick or a strap.

This explanation doesn’t make any sense at all. Behold Moshe commanded many mitzvot at that time. Also the idea that specifically for this reason were the judges commanded then about the stick and the strap also makes no sense. The punishment of corporal punishment was not for just that generation but also for later generations. Also, that is the way of the world, that all court systems include punishments. Additionally, what does the Gemora mean to say when it adds that the judge needs to be extra careful or zealous regarding the stick and the strap? Wouldn’t it have been sufficient to just state that among the tools of a judge are a stick or a strap or a shofar or a sandal (as it is alluded to in the beginning of Parshat Mishpatim). Also, why is there no special care needed for the shofar or the sandal? Lastly, how is the word “corresponding to” appropriate here?

Rather the truth appears that the explanation is in line with that which it says in Psikta Rabbati, Chapter 33. Rabbi Shabbtai says “a judge must be according to the stick or according to the strap or according to whatever punishment he uses. The judge must not be suspect in any way while using a big stick or a big strap.”

The explanation of this is that the judge must not use corporal punishment to rule over others for his own gains. Additionally, it is forbidden for the judge to use a corporal punishment that is beyond the endurance of the convicted person. This is also mentioned in Midrash Rabbah Devarim Chapter 5 as follows “The actions must correspond to the stick and the staff, it must not be that it is the judge who has the need to hit.” In other words, when more lashes than are appropriate are meted out, or if the strap or stick is larger than it should be, then it is the judge, himself, who becomes liable for the punishments.

This idea is also mentioned in the Sifri on Parshat Ki Tetzei on the verse “forty lashes, not more”. [if the verse already mentions “forty” why does it also need to say “not more”?] It is explained there that there are two types of “overdoing” on the punishment. One type is on the number of lashes, and not going beyond thirty nine. The other type of “overdoing” is that if the judge sees that the person can only endure a given lesser number (such as ten) then it is forbidden to give more lashes than that lesser number. This type of extra caution and discernment by the judge is what required the extra degree of warning [mentioned in the Gemora].

Editor’s Note: One who is judging others needs to first measure himself and be sure that he is not meting out punishment for his own needs.

Bamidbar 25:13 – It shall be for him [Pinchas] and for his descendants after him [as] an eternal covenant of kehunah [priesthood], because he was zealous for his God and atoned for the children of Israel

Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin, Chapter 9, Halacha 7:  “One who has [public] sex with an Aramean, zealots are allowed to strike him.” This teaching is not in accordance with the will of the Sages and Pinchas [also] did not act according to the will of the Sages. Rabbi Yuda the son of Pazi said that they wanted to put Pinchas in cherem [excommunication.] They would have, were it not for a holy spirit that broke forth and said, “It shall be for him and for his descendants after him as an eternal covenant of priesthood.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #31:

The commentators toiled greatly to explain the above Gemora. However, the truth is that it is very easily explained in a straightforward manner. When the Gemora says that [Pinchas] did not act in accordance with the will of the Sages, it means simply that the law that a zealot can strike/kill one who is having public sex with an Aramean is, [itself], not pleasing to the Sages.

The rationale for the Sages not approving of this law is because the law depends on the zealot who is killing the perpetrator being filled with a genuine and true zealotry on behalf of G-d. That being the case, it is impossible to give a general permission to people to strike/kill someone who is having public sex with an Aramean.

Who would be able to judge the zealot? Perhaps he is doing this for some ulterior [impure] motive and just saying that he is doing this out of a being filled with a genuine zealousness for G-d? In the meantime, he will have killed a person who was not liable for the death penalty according to the law.

This is similar to the law in Gemora Yevamos 39b where it says that it is better to perform the chalitza ceremony rather than marry your deceased brother’s wife. The reason why it is better to do chalitza rather than fulfill the mitzvah of carrying on your brother’s name is because perhaps you would be doing the mitzvah for ulterior [impure] motives. If that were the case, you would then be transgressing the [severe] prohibition of having relations with your brother’s wife!

The question is raised “is it possible that the Sages would criticize a deed that Pinchas did?” The answer is “certainly, yes.” Had it not been for the heavenly spirit breaking forth and saying that Pinchas will have an everlasting covenant because he was a true zealot, they would have actually excommunicated him. Since the Divine Spirit testified on Pinchas’ behalf saying that he was a genuine zealot, he was then exempt from excommunication.

Note that this opinion in the Jerusalem Talmud is not according to the teaching in the Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 82a that teaches that Pinchas actually asked Moshe for permission first. Truly, in the Babylonian Talmud itself there are two opinions as to whether Pinchas asked Moshe permission first or not. The Jerusalem Talmud’s opinion is that he did not ask first.

Note that according to the opinion in the Gemora Sanhedrin [in the Babylonian Talmud] that Pinchas did not ask permission first before killing Zimri, the purpose of the divine spirit [heavenly voice] breaking forth was to show that Pinchas was also not guilty of the sin of “teaching halacha in front of his teacher.” [This is a highly criticized, disrespectful thing to do.]

We see in the Gemora Eruvin 63a that the punishment for teaching halacha in front of one’s teacher is to descend to hell without having any children and further that one is brought down from one’s high position. However, since the heavenly voice came out [and testified on Pinchas’ behalf], therefore he merited to have many children and also greatness. These rewards that Pinchas received correspond exactly to what would have been the punishments if he had been liable for the sin of teaching Halacha in front of his teacher. These two exact rewards are what show that the heavenly voice saved Pinchas from being found guilty of this sin [also].

Editor’s Note: Here the Torah Temimah is explaining to us his opinion as to exactly why the Sages looked down upon Pinchas’ zealotry in killing Zimri for having public sex with an Aramean. Perhaps genuine zealotry is praiseworthy as long as it does not involve injuring anyone else. In a legal system zealotry cannot be part of the equation in judging guilt or innocence. This is because the quality of being a genuine zealot cannot be judged by human beings. Someone who appears a zealot may actually have other motives.

Bamidbar 22:20 – God came to Bilaam [during] the night and said to him, “If these men have come to call for you, arise and go with them, but the word I speak to you-that you shall do.”

Gemora Makot 10b – Rava the son of Rav Huna said, “from this we learn that whichever way a man desires to go, they help him [go that way].  [We see this from the fact that] in verse 22:12 God says “Don’t go with them” and in verse 22:20 He says “Arise, go with them”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #7:

This is in accordance with the saying “Everything is in the hands of heaven except for the fear of heaven.” In this case here, God saw that in Bilaam’s evil heart he wanted to go with them, therefore God permitted him to go.

Look also in Rashi’s explanation on verse 22:18 where Bilaam states that even if Balak were to give him a house full of silver and gold, he [Bilaam] would still not be able to act against God’s will. There Rashi says as follows: “We learn here that Bilaam soul was wide and lusted after other people’s money.”

It is worthwhile to comment on the fact that we see in Pirkei Avot (9:6) as follows: “Rabbi Yosi Ben Kasma says: even if you were to give me all the silver and gold in the world I would not leave and go to a place that is not a place of Torah.” This being the case, how is it possible [for Rashi] to conclude something critical from Bilaam for using similar language?

Truthfully though, these two instances are not similar. In Pirkei Avot the situation was that a person was coming and enticing Rabbi Yosi to go and live in his city and he would be paid thousands of gold dinars for doing so.  Therefore it was appropriate for Rabbi Yosi to respond in a similar way and say that even if he were to be given all the gold in the world, he would not go. Thus we see that Rabbi Yosi responded appropriately and in the same phraseology as the enticement.

This is not the case here with Bilaam, however. In this case, Balak did not entice Bilaam with the enticement of making him rich. Rather he only promised him that he would be greatly honored as it says in verse 22:17, “I will certainly honor you”. Therefore, Bilaam should have responded in the same phraseology as the enticement and said that it wouldn’t matter how much honor Balak granted him, he still would not be able to go against the word of God.

So, why did Bilaam instead respond and say that even if he was to be given a house full of money he wouldn’t be able to go against the word of God? Certainly, this change of phraseology was because really Bilaam desired and lusted after other people’s money [and wanted to be rich.] This is according to the well-known fact that a person’s desires are often on his tongue [ie, people mention frequently the thing that they desire the most.]

Editor’s Note: I believe that the Torah Temimah here is interested in pointing out that the Gemora is not just gratuitously criticizing Bilaam.  Rather, the Gemora is pointing out how, from the wording of the Chumash itself, we see Bilaam’s lust for money.

Bamidbar 19:14: This is the law: if a man {adam] dies in a tent, anyone entering the tent and anything in the tent shall be unclean for seven days.

Gemora Yevamot 61a: We learn in a Beraitha that Shimon Bar Yochai says that the graves of non-Jews do not impart levitical uncleanness by an ohel [tent methodology], for it is said, [In Ezekiel 34] “And ye My sheep the sheep of My pasture, are men”; you are called men but the non-Jews are not called men.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #67:

Many commentators had difficulty explaining this Gemora. Tosafot additionally asks [how this Gemora can make sense] regarding the many places [in the Gemora] where the word “adam” specifically does include non-Jews. Further, Tosafot ask [a challenge to this Gemora] based on the Gemora in Sanhedrin 59a where it says that even a non-Jew who occupies himself with [the study of] is as great as a high priest (Cohen). We learn this teaching from the verse that says “these are the commandments that the man (ha’adam) should do, that he may live through them”. The teaching continues that the verse does not say, “That the Cohanim, Leviim or Israelim should do them rather it says “ha’adam” to teach that even a non-Jew who learns Torah is as great as a high priest”. Tosafot then answer their question by quoting Rabbenu Tam and stating that there is a distinction between the word “adam” [man] and the word “ha’adam” [the man] and they state that the word “ha’adam” [the man] would include non-Jews [but the word “adam” would not.] Apparently these words of Tosafot are only based on a tradition that they heard, since how can this distinction make sense logically? Many commenters have already tried to understand this explanation of the Tosafot; the commenters have toiled and labored to find a source for the Tosafot’s opinion.

It is [perhaps] possible to explain that the word “the” doesn’t apply [or make sense] when applied to a proper noun such as “the Moshe” or “the Aaron”. On the other hand the word “the” does make sense when applied to a word that includes a general category such as “the city”, “the river”, “the mountain”, “the valley”. This being the case it is possible to say that when “man” is written without “the”, it describes a particular noun, Israel [Jews] while when it is written “the man”, it includes a more general category such as the nations of the world. This explanation is a little forced.

This previous paragraph I have written just as an effort to explain and make sense of the words of Rabbenu Tam, which are apparently very astounding [and difficult to understand]. However, according to the truth, it appears that the simple understanding of the Gemora is not to imply that non-Jews are not included in the word “man”. How could that make sense? Behold this word is used to discuss the health of the body and the soul of the human species. Further, we find in many many verses where the word “man” even describes only non-Jews.

Rather, what our Gemora is saying is that in the places where God is speaking to the Jews regarding Torah and [ritual] commandments and He uses the word “man”, it is to be understood as meaning Jews and not non-Jews since they are not included in the [ritual] commandments. The Gemora then utilizes the verse in Ezekiel to say that the Jews are called “man”. However, this verse is not brought as a proof text rather as a hint or general allusion. This is also the opinion of the “Gritz Chiyut”. The particulars of the laws regarding levitical uncleanliness and non-Jews are explained in Yoreh Deah Section 372.

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah, in this note, discusses Jewish views regarding non-Jews. In other notes, he makes the point, emphatically, that the term idolaters used the Gemora does not apply to the non-Jews of modern times but rather to the “wild people of Africa and other faraway places” who have not accepted the Seven Noachide Laws. The Torah Temimah equates the Seven Noachide Laws as an acceptance of the basic social contract that binds society together. Thus, he makes the statement that for civil laws in the modern era, Halacha regarding Jews and non-Jews is equal. For religious laws, he says that it is logical that Jewish ritual law distinguishes between Jew and non-Jew.

Bamidbar 16:6 and 16:7:

6. Do this, Korah and his company: Take for yourselves censers.

7. Place fire into them and put incense upon them before the Lord tomorrow, and the man whom the Lord chooses he is the holy one; you have taken too much upon yourselves, sons of Levi.

Sotah 13b: “You have taken too much upon yourselves” – We learn in a Beraita that Rabbi Levi says: with the phrase “too much” Moshe informed Korah and with the phrase “too much” was Moshe himself informed. [In our verse] Moshe said “too much” to Korah. In [Parshat Vetechanan when Moshe is praying to God a lot to be allowed to enter Israel] HaShem responds to Moshe “you have prayed enough” [this is how God informed Moshe that he would not be allowed to enter Israel.]

Torah Temimah ColloquialTranslation on Note #7:

The commentators explain at great length the appropriateness of this “measure for measure” manner in which HaShem responded to Moshe when he (Moshe) asked to be allowed to enter Israel. HaShem responded by using the [exact same phrase] “too much” [and said to Moshe] don’t pray anymore, Rashi comments on this and says that God used the exact same phrase “too much”. God is very exacting with His righteous and punishes them in a ‘measure for measure’ manner. All the commenters agree that Moshe sinned by using this phrase but they don’t explain what the sin was.

It appears to me that Moshe did not sin at all in using this phrase with Korah. The implication of the phrase is to say “too much” to the sons of Levi [which both Korah and Moshe were descended from Levi]to basically say to them “you have enough honor and greatness”. Since Moshe himself was from the tribe of Levi, so he automatically included himself in the statement. That is why God, Himself, when Moshe was praying [too] much to God about himself that he should be allowed to enter Israel, God responded with the same phrase. That is, as though God were saying, “I have heeded you many times” and just as you, yourself, said, “too much [enough] is given to you, sons of Levi” therefore, don’t continue to speak and ask this of Me. We find similarly in the Aggada of CHALAK 111a that God used the thoughts of Moshe when Moshe went up to heaven, he saw God writing “be patient”. Moshe said to God, “Master of the world, be patient with the righteous.” God responded, “even with the evil-doers”. Moshe replied [quoting Psalms], “evil doers will perish”. Then when the Children of Israel sinned and Moshe prayed for them saying “God, God, be patient with them”, God responded “didn’t you tell me to [just] be patient with the righteous”? Here also when Moshe is saying that [the Bnei Levi] have enough, God reminds him of that.

Editor’s note: This is one of several places where the Torah Temimah quotes lesser known Gemoras that quote well known episodes in less than perfect light. In this Gemora, the well-known phrase that Moshe uses to critique Korah and his followers comes back to haunt him when Moshe prays to be allowed to enter Israel.

Bamidbar:15:23 – All that the Lord commanded you through Moses, from the day on which the Lord commanded and from then on, for all generations.

Gemora Kiddushin 29a: The School of R. Ishmael taught: whenever ‘command’ (צו) is stated its only purpose is to denote exhortation for that time and for all time. [Just for that time is shown by the verse in Parshat VeEtchanan:] “But command (צו) Joshua, and encourage him, and strengthen him.” Then and for all time [is shown by the verse in Bamidbar 15:23] ” as it is written, from the day on which the Lord commanded and from then on, for all generations.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #61:

The Gemora is not trying to say that the verb ‘to command’ (צו) implies that the command is an eternal command [as opposed to a command just for that time and place.] Behold, we see places where the verb “command” is used for just that time and place as in the verse “he commanded Yosef regarding his household” [Bereishis-44:1] or the verse “and Pharaoh commanded all his people”  [Shmos-1:22] and other many similar verses.

Rather, the Gemora is saying that when the verb “command” is used regarding laws and ordinances from God, then the verb “to command” is using to show that the commandment is eternal. The reason why the verb ‘command’ is different when used by God versus when used by a man is simple. A human being doesn’t have the power to command something forever; because he, himself, is not eternal. Additionally, over time the circumstances regarding whatever the particular person commanded will change and there will no longer be a need for that commandment. Or, on the other hand the circumstances would change and there would be a need to change the commandment. This, however, is not the case with the Holy One, Blessed be He. He exists forever and ever. Also, every single thing that emanated from His mouth [so to speak] is something that has eternal existence and strength.

It does merit further investigation, however, why the Gemora mentioned the verses that it does mention to prove its point. First it mentions the word “command” regarding Joshua that he should be encouraged and strengthened. Then the Gemora mentions our verse where it uses the word “command” and says explicitly “…for all generations”. [This is not a good proof because] it implies that if our verse had not added the words “…for all generations”, then the word “command” would not have  been sufficient for me to know that the commandment was for all generations. If this is the case, how can this verse be used as a proof for the statement that the word ‘command’ implies for all generations?

The explanation is that one time [is sufficient] for the Torah to reveal the fact that the word “command” when used regarding laws and ordinances [signifies forever] and it is leveraged to teach the use of the word in all other places. This teaching in our Gemora is using the “gezerat sheva” methodology as follows: “just as it says here the word ‘command’ and it means for generations, so similarly when it uses the word ‘command’ in any other place, it also means for all generations.

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah insightfully points out that the verse that the Gemora uses actually seems to prove the exact opposite of the Gemora’s point. It seems to me that the Torah Temimah thinks critically about every statement in the Gemora and accepts nothing at face value without analyzing it. In this case, he shows that the Gemora’s logic is comparable to a gezerah shavah and it is valid when viewed from that perspective.

Here is an excerpt from the Wikipedia article on gezerah shavah: The gezerah shavah (“Similar laws, similar verdicts”) is the second rule of Hillel and of Rabbi Ishmael, and the seventh of Eliezer ben Jose HaGelili. This may be described as argument by analogy, which infers from the similarity of two cases that the legal decision given for the one holds good for the other also. The term “gezerah shavah” originally included arguments based on analogies either in word or in fact. Before long, however, the latter class was designated as “hekkesh,” while the phrase “gezerah shavah” was limited to analogy in the case of two different Biblical laws containing a word common to both. The gezerah shavah was originally restricted to a δὶς λεγόμενον, i.e., a word occurring only in the two passages offering the analogy. Since such a word is found nowhere else, there is no reason to assume that it bears different meanings in the two passages. The gezerah shavah consequently attaches to the word in the one passage the entire sequence of ideas which it bears in the other.