Leviticus 25:36 “Take thou no interest of him or increase; but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee”

Bava Metzia 62a: “… that thy brother may live with thee – It was learnt in a braita: Rabbi Elazar says that one can demand a repayment of explicit interest in court whereas one may not demand repayment of that that hints of interest[i].  What is the reason for this?  Because the verse says Take thou no interest of him or increase … so that thy brother may live with thee.  Only that by which your brother lives can be demanded in court.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #192:

The specifics of the laws regarding interest, even though they are numerous and differ one from the other, they all stem from a single foundation as explained in Bava Metzia 65b:

The main principle of interest is: any payment for safeguarding [money] is forbidden.

This means, any extra payment regarding money whether it be a loan or a sale.  For example, it is forbidden for the seller to say to the buyer: “If you pay cash up front, it will cost you $100, but if you pay you up to such and such date[ii] it will cost you $120.  There is a difference, however, between the two types of interest. Charging interest by way of a loan is interest that pertains something fixed.  This type of interest, referred to as explicit interest, is forbidden by the Torah.  Interest by way of a purchase, however, is only forbidden rabbinically.  It is also called a hint of interest.  The law regarding this type of interest is that one is forbidden from charging this interest, but the court does not force the seller to repay any interest charged in this manner.  Thus if the buyer complains, the court does not extract payment from seller unless the seller wishes to go above and beyond.  This is what is discussed here.

It is well known that in recent times, it is permitted for one to charge interest with respect to business transactions as will be explained.  This is very perplexing for there is not even the slightest hint in the Torah for allowing this.  Furthermore, the basis upon which Chazal saw fit to permit this is unclear.

It appears that our Sages saw a basis and a need for permitting this on the whole.  They investigated the matter until the crux of the prohibition, its basis and essence in the Torah, built and founded upon the principle of “that thy brother may live with thee”.  In the time when Torah was given, the main livelihood and business of the Jews was working the land. This was the basis for their wealth and stature.  One who had a lot of produce[iii] was considered wealthy.  Money was not an integral part of one’s livelihood.  When they loaned money it was not for business nor for acquisitions rather to allow one who was lacking to procure food and clothing just as one would procure these from the profit of his field or his work.  It is understandable that the poor borrower had no intention to pay back the loan with interest.  There was also no recognizable loss to the wealthy lender who loaned without charging interest.  Because they had no financial business, the principle of  thy brother living with thee did not apply.  In the middle ages, when the Israel lost its portion in working the land,  it remained a nation that thrived only on finance.  They could no longer continue the prohibition of loaning without interest now that money was the main basis for their livelihood and commerce, making the matter of interest equal for both the borrower and lender..  Thus the Sages saw fit to permit this.  Because of this principle, they reasoned that the Torah did not completely forbid charging interest.  Thus it appear to me.

The practice for loaning with interest was to write in the legal document that the lender is giving the money to the borrow for the purpose of business as explained in Yoreh Deah 167:1 and 177:2.  The borrower is permitted to invest the money for the profit of the lender based on the estimated gains. The estimated gains went to the lender.  Any profit above the estimated gains would go to the borrower.  If the borrower lost money on the investment, it was forbidden for the lender to collect the estimated gains. 

On the other hand, interest by way of sale, as described above, is very commonplace despite the lack of any provision for a leniency.  This leniency is stated the Tosefta (Bava Metzia 6:4)

A buyer purchasing goods with the intent to pay within 12 months is allowed to ask the seller to reduce the price if the buyer pays the entire amount up front.  In this case there is no concern of interest.[iv]

It requires further study how this is permitted.  There is to say that valuating the transaction if sold immediately as opposed to on credit[v] transforms the sale into a business transaction.

The Nimukei Yosef writes: since “that thy brother may live with thee” is a positive commandment, the court forces the lender to return the explicit interest in the same way the court can force a person to perform any positive commandment.  This is done by beating the person until one agrees to perform the commandment. The court, however, does not have the authority touch one’s assets because subjugation of assets does not apply in this case.  Similarly, this is explained in Yoreh Deah 161:5.  I find it troubling that the court can physically coerce a person, but cannot monetarily coerce the person to return the interest.  After all, if all the ways of Torah are pleasantness (Proverbs 3:17), how can physically coercing a person until one’s soul departs be called pleasant when the court could spare the person at the expense of one’s assets?  I did not find this law in Maimonides code of laws.  The words of the RaN, as cited by the Nimukei Yosef that one physically coerces a person until one’s soul departs (he dies), but cannot touch one’s assets, are extremely troubling to me.  In the first chapter of Ketuvoth, the RaN writes the opposite:

Just as one can physically coerce a person to perform a positive commandment, one can monetarily coerce a person.

Also for charity, the rule is that the court can touch a person’s assets when a person refuses to give charity.  Therefore, it seems to me that this law as it pertains to interest requires in depth study.

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah was a bookkeeper by profession.  Thus the laws of interest were not only abstract halachah but part of his daily job.  Knowing the particulars of finance and halachah he demonstrates how and when loaning with interest is permitted in our day.  This note also shows his sensitivity.  He is troubled by the those authorities who rule that one may only physically coerce a person to return explicit interest whereas, with respect to fulfilling other positive commandments, one may coerce a person monetarily.  Out of respect to the Shulchan Aruch and the earlier authorities who rule this way he does not dismiss this halachah, yet he notes that further study is required.  There are opinions that hold the halachah represents the will of Hashem.  If one finds a particular law troubling, the problem is not with the halachah rather with the person’s understanding of the halachah.  Here the Torah Temimah shows that is acceptable to question when one finds a particular halachah troubling.  This is not grounds for amending or abolishing the halachah.  Further in depth study is required to make a decision.

Second editor’s note: In this note, the Torah Temimah quotes the RaN as saying that if you illegally took interest from a person, the court can force you to return the money through lashes, even to the point where you might die from the lashes. The RaN also states that in this instance, however, the court cannot put a lien on your property.

The Torah Temimah has two objections to this opinion of the RaN. First of all, it is said about the Torah that “all its ways are ways of pleasantness”. This isn’t pleasant at all! Secondly, the RaN actually contradicts himself in a comment on Ketubos, Chapter 10.

Personally, I find these two objections wonderful. I find it wonderful that the Torah Temimah objects to the RaN’s interpretation because it would violate a “meta” principle that the Torah’s ways must be ways of pleasantness. SECONDLY, there are various technical reasons for rejecting the RaN’s approach. The Torah Temimah is dedicated to promoting and projecting a vision of Torah that is just and “whole”.

[i] אבק ריבית literally the dust of interest

[ii] Whether the buyer pays in installments until the specified date or whether the buyer pays the entire sum at that date

[iii] תבואה literally wheat, but also biblically refers to all produce from the field

[iv] As noted above, the seller may not charge a higher price for paying on credit vs. immediate payment.  Here the buyer is allowed to ask for a reduced price if the seller agrees.  There is no hint of interest in that the seller is losing money on the sale.

[v] הקפה could also be translated as deferred payment

Parsahat צו Leviticus 6:2 –

Leviticus 6:2 “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: This is the law of the burnt-offering: it is that which goeth up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning; and the fire of the altar shall be kept burning thereby. ”

Megilah 21a: “all night unto the morning”.  This teaches that the entire night is fit for burning fats and entrails

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #7:

The Talmud learns this from the extra language in the verse (all night/until the morning).  It would have been sufficient for the verse to state “all night”.  If the verse only stated “all night”, one could infer that all night does not mean the entire night rather only a portion of the night. In truth we see examples where all (כל) indicates a part as in the verse referring to King Saul (Samuel I 28:20): “ Then Saul fell straightway his full length upon the earth, and was sore afraid, because of the words of Samuel; and there was no strength in him; for he had eaten no bread all the day, nor all the night.”  A later verse[1] explains that he did eat at night.  Thus we see that כל can refer to the entirety or to a portion.  Until the morning is not superfluous, rather it teaches us that the burning of fats and entrails is valid the entire night.  Refer to the commentary of the Taz to Orach Chaim Siman תקפח[2]. Refer also to what in written on verse 8.

Refer also to the first Mishnah in Berachot that lists all the things that are valid all night except that the Rabbis enacted a safeguard to prevent one from transgressing by only allowing one to perform these commandments until midnight.  Rashi comments on this Mishanh that the Rabbis did not make this decree regarding the burning of fats and entrails[3]. 

The reason why the Rabbis made an exception for the burning of fats and entrails is unclear.  A possible reason for this is the commentary of the Taz to Yoreh Deah Siman קיז and the Kesef Mishnah: “The Rabbis do not have the power to forbid anything that the Torah permits.”  Because the verse here explicitly permits it as it says “all night until the morning” as explained above, however, Rambam in Chapter four of the laws of sacrifices[4] disagrees with Rashi.  For further insight refer to the Tosafot Yom Tov and Shnot Eliyahu on the first Mishnah in Berachot.

It is clear that the burning of fats and entrails is not obligatory in that they must be burned at night, rather one is permitted to burn them at night for it is sufficient if they were consumed during the day.  Regarding what the Talmud says in the beginning of chapter four of Berachot (26b), that the three daily prayers correspond to the three daily sacrifices.  The evening prayer corresponds to the burning of fats and limb which could b done all night.  What was said above clearly explains why the evening service is optional because it corresponds to an optional sacrifice.  When it says that the fats and entrails are offered at night, it means that that one is allowed to offer them at night.  If they were consumed during the day, there is no obligation to leave them to be offered at night.

Another parallel between the evening service and the burning of the fats and entrails is that the time for both is the entire night.  The Rabbis did not enact a safeguard for the evening service as explained in the Talmud Berachot.  Similarly they did not enact a fence for the burning of fats and entrails to which the evening service corresponds.  See also the Beit Yosef to Orach Chaim 233.

Editors note: The Torah Temimah discusses a fundamental principle of rabbinic law.  The Rabbis do not have the power to forbid what the Torah explicitly permits as in the case discussed here.  Where the Torah does not explicitly permit something, the Rabbis have the power to enact safeguards to prevent one from sinning.  Even in such a case, they cannot prohibit the item or action on a biblical level.  They can place a limitation on the person forbidding them to benefit from the item or performing an action.  For example, when the Rabbis enacted the safeguard of not eating fowl and milk, they did not say that the Torah also refers to birds when it prohibits boiling a calf in its mother’s milk for that would violate the prohibition of adding a law to the Torah.  They placed a restriction on people not to eat fowl and milk together.  Another means, by which, the Rabbis prevent one from performing what the Torah permits is telling the person to refrain from doing the act (שב ואל תעשה) as in the case of not blowing the shofar when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  See Leviticus 12:3 note 14 where he expresses a similar idea with respect to circumcision on Shabbat.

[1] 28:23-25 But he refused, and said: ‘I will not eat.’ But his servants, together with the woman, urged him; and he hearkened unto their voice. So he arose from the earth, and sat upon the bed.  And the woman had a fatted calf in the house; and she made haste, and killed it; and she took flour, and kneaded it, and did bake unleavened bread thereof; and she brought it before Saul, and before his servants; and they did eat. Then they rose up, and went away that night.

[2] Halacha 5  note 5: referring to blowing shofar on Shabbat

[3] O.V. To distance a person from transgressing:  While the Mishnah lists the burning of fats and entrails, Rashi comments that this Mishnah cites it as example of something that is valid all night.  Thus is it not included in the list of acts, which that Rabbis forbade after midnight that follows.  The Talmud in Megilah (20b) also supports this.  Other commentators disagree with Rashi stating the Mishnah in Berachot includes it in the list of things that are forbidden after midnight.

[4] Halacha 2: Any animal whose enablers ( in Hebrew מתיריו) were offered during the day can be brought to the altar all night … In order to distance from transgression, the Rabbis said that one is not allowed to burn the entrails and limbs of the burnt offering until midnight.

Parashat שמיני Leviticus 11:7 – Calling a swine a swine

Leviticus 11:7 ” And the swine, because he parteth the hoof, and is cloven-footed, but cheweth not the cud, he is unclean unto you. ”

Hullin 59b: “It was taught in the beth midrash of Rabbi Ishmael: The One who rules over His world knows that the only animal that has split hooves and is impure is the swine.  This is why the verse says he (is unclean to you)”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #21:

See what was said in note 17 regarding a similar midrash referring to the camel and apply it to here.  See also the Aramaic translation of Yonatan Ben Uziel: “… and the swine .. there is none like it.  The midrash cited here explains the intention of Yonatan Ben Uziel when he says there is none like it.  This midrash is key.

Refer to the commentary of the Or HaChaim on this verse in the Torah:

And the swine .. but cheweth not the cud ..  There is a condition so long as the swine does not chew its cud, it is impure, however, in the future it will chew its cud and return[1] to be kosher.  It will not remain forever an animal that does not chew its cud and become kosher because the Torah does not change[2].

All these words are strange and wondrous.  From where did he find a source for this novel idea?  We do not see anywhere that the nature of animals will change in the future.  Why, out of all of the impure animals, will the swine be permitted?  Albeit true that I heard of a midrash explaining why its name is Hebrew is חזזיר: because it will return to its original permission.  It appears that the Or HaChaim understands this midrash literally.

In truth, no midrash with this language or intent has been found.  There is one midrash in Midrash Rabbah (Parashat Shemini end of section 12) and Kohelet Rabbah (on the verse That which hath been is that which shall be[3]) that refers to a different idea.

The swine refers to the nation of Edom.  Why is it called חזזיר? Because it returns the crown to its owner as the verse says (Obadiah 1:21) And saviours shall come up on mount Zion to judge the mount of Esau; and the kingdom shall be the LORD’S

In other words, through the nation of Edom, the crown will return to Israel.  It is clear that this midrash is primarily allegorical with a different intent.  It is a grave mistake to connect this midrash with permitting the swine in the future as explained.  Refer to Midrash Socher Tov section 146 and the insights of the Rashab thereon[4]

Shocher Tov 146 note 5: The Hebrew, מתיר אסורים, can also mean permitting what was forbidden.  The Midrash says: “Some say that, in the future,  the Holy One Blessed is He will purify all the animals that are impure in this world.  Similarly the verse says (Ecclesiastes 1:9): That which hath been is that which shall be for they were pure before the time of Noah.  Upon leaving the ark, Hashem tells Noah “like vegetation I have given everything to you (Genesis 9:3)”  Just as I gave vegetation to all so to wild and domesticated animals to all.  Hashem forbade them to know who would listen to Him and who would not.  In the future He will permit all He forbade.  Others say He will not permit them in the future as the verse says (Isaiah 66:17): “They that sanctify themselves and purify themselves to go unto the gardens, behind one in the midst, eating swine’s flesh, and the detestable thing, and the mouse, shall be consumed together, saith the LORD.”  If Hashem will destroy those that eat these, he certainly will not permit them in the future…

Editor note: The Torah Temimah does not shy away from controversial topics.  Descended from a family of Torah scholars[5], he shows his halachic side in this comment defending the mitzvoth of the Torah.  He vehemently opposes the idea of nature changing in the time of mashiach, specifically, the swine becoming a kosher animal, yet he respectfully disagrees with the commentary of the Or HaChaim.  Instead of outwardly rejecting the Or HaChaim, he acknowledges hearing about a midrash, on which the Or HaChaim is based, however, he concurs with the printed sources that explain the matter differently.  This should be a model how to approach disagreements in matters of halacha and exegesis.

Leviticus 7:34 “For the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving have I taken of the children of Israel out of their sacrifices of peace-offerings, and have given them unto Aaron the priest and unto his sons as a due for ever from the children of Israel.”

Jerusalem Talmud Tractate Yevamoth Chapter 8 Halachah 1: and have given them… These priestly gifts (the breast and thigh) never return (to those that gave them) as the verse says “and have given them …”.  Just as a gift never returns to the giver, so too these priestly gifts do not return.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #139:

The Jerusalem Talmud explains that the breast and the thigh differ from other priestly gifts such as terumah and the like because there is no food from which terumah is not given to a Cohen[1], unlike the breast and the thigh, that only apply to edible sacrifices offered in the Temple[2], but do not apply to non-sacrificial meat as explained in the previous commentary[3].  The Jerusalem Talmud explicitly states that, were the Israelites (i.e. not Cohanim) worthy, they would take the breast and thigh for themselves from their sacrifices.  Since the Israelites were not worthy[4], the breast and the thigh were taken from them and given to the Cohanim.  Based on this, the Jerusalem Talmud states: “Just as a gift never returns, so too these priestly gifts do not return.”  One might think since, the main reason the Cohanim merited the breast and the thigh was because the Israelites were not worthy, should the Israelites become worthy, the breast and the thigh should be taken from the Cohanim and given back to the Israelites.  Therefore, the Jerusalem Talmud teaches us that they never return from the Cohanim.[5]

Nonetheless, one must explain the necessity of this nuance in that verse explicitly states “as a due forever” which implies an everlasting right.  Furthermore, the comparison from a gift is not completely accurate because a gift returns in the Jubilee year as explained in Tractate Bechorot 52b[6].

It is possible to say that this nuance of the Jerusalem Talmud teaches us that a gift from G-d is not like a gift from one person to another.  Regarding a gift between people, if there is an estimation that shows that the gift was given on condition, the gift can be returned when the reason or condition, upon which, the gift was given becomes void.  One example of this is how we rule based on the Talmud (Ketuvoth 54a) [7].

For a widow, we deduct the value of her clothing from the value of her ketuvah because we assume that he gave them to her to appear before him.

Tosafot on 54b, proposes a similar idea.

The inheritors of a betrothed woman who died do not inherit from money that the husband added to the minimum value of the ketuvah because we say that he only included the increase in order to marry her.[8]

And in Bava Basra 146b

If a person, upon hearing that his son died, gifted his money to someone else, the gift is returned should the son arrive, for the only reason he gifted the money was because he thought that his son was deceased.

There are many similar ideas in the Talmud.

Yet, things do not work this way with respect to the Holy One Blessed is He.  Even if one could determine the reason why G-d made a person worthy, we could not take away what He gave the person should the reason become void.  Perhaps the reason for what is as stated in Makkot 11a “Everything that the Holy One Blessed is He states for the good, even conditionally stated, never changes for the worse.” [Unless there is an explicitly stated condition, such as, “ If ye walk in My statutes…[9]”

From this was can learn the basis for ruling on the basis of estimation.  When a person gives a gift based on a certain condition, one need not explain the condition.  Rather we rule on estimation alone.  See further what is written about this in Leviticus 5:1[10]

Editor’s note: This note also shows his incredible knowledge of the rabbinic sources.  At first glance, one could wonder what the priestly portions have to do with Jewish monetary laws, yet the Torah Temimah clearly shows, based on a difference between gifts from G-d to people and gifts between people that there is a connection.  He brings proof from various monetary cases that show, whenever the court can estimate the intention of the person giving the gift, it is possible to revoke the gift if the intention is no longer valid.  This is not the case by G-d, even if we could possibly determine His intention.  All this from a breast and a thigh!

Exodus 21:35 If one man’s ox hurt his neighbor’s ox so that it dies, then they shall sell the live ox, divide the money of it; and the dead ox they shall also divide.

Bava Kama (37b): [the words] “his neighbor’s” teaches us that if one’s ox gored another ox belonging to the temple or to a non-Jew he would be exempt from payment. But an ox of a non-Jew gored a Jew’s ox, the non-Jew would be liable to pay.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #277:

Behold regarding this principle that a Jew is not liable for damage to a non-Jew’s property has been the cause for much opportunity for haters of Jews to complain about our ancient scriptures saying that this law shows the low value that the Jewish law places on people who are not Jewish. The haters say that Jewish law not only thinks less of non-Jews but also shows that the property of a non-Jew is valued less than the property of a Jew.

This harsh reasoning resurfaces anew like sharp spurs on the lips of those who oppress Jews in every generation. Jewish scholars of every generation have endeavored to explain that certainly the Gemora is referring to non-Jews of early times who lived in wild, lawless countries. It does not refer to non-Jews in our times and in our countries. The result of this fact is that this law is no longer applicable.

What can we say and how can we express if our pain is so great that jealousy or hate corrupt rational thought. We are doubly troubled by our scholars who have tried to offer incomplete/inadequate explanations. Further in this section of the Talmud where the adversaries try make us regretful and lowly of spirit[1]. Because exactly in this place in the Talmud,  this topic explained in such a way that a truly objective reader could see it. Not only does this topic not bring disgrace on the wonderful Talmud, rather it uplifts it to show that all its laws are just and straight. The laws are built on a foundation of humanity and fundamental principles of life in all countries and places and times.

 Here is the exact language of the Talmud on this topic: If the word “neighbor” is to be taken literally, then a non-Jew’s ox should also not have to pay if it gores a Jew’s ox. On the other hand, if the word “neighbor” is not to be taken literally then a Jew’s ox that gores a non-Jew’s ox should also have to pay.  Rabbi Abahu says (Habbakuk 3:6): “He stands and shakes the earth, He beholds and causes the nations to tremble, and the everlasting mountains are dashed to pieces, the eternal hills bow.” Rabbi Abahu says that this posuk alludes to the fact that HaShem saw the seven mitzvot that the nations took upon themselves and since they did not fulfill them, He then made their property hefker for the Jews”.

Everyone knows the content of the Seven Mitzvot: 1. System of Laws 2. Acknowledging God 3. Not serving idols 4. No illicit sexual relations 5. Don’t murder 6. Don’t steal 7. Don’t eat the limb of a live animal. All these commandments are fundamental and essential for the establishment and continuation of human civilization, living in security, and feelings of tranquility and mercy on others.

So, now consider, that people who do not follow these laws but rather do the opposite. They don’t have laws and judgments. They murder and commit sexual immorality. They steal and rob and eat the limb of a live animal. They curse HaShem and they worship trees and stones. How should laws be regarding these types of people? If not like wild animals who destroy civilization and punish civilized people. Behold it is total appropriate for people of character who are concerned with promoting civilization to treat these wild populations in this manner. In fact this is how established kingdoms treat such populations, by denying them their “rights” and keeping them away from civilized locations.

Behold, this just and righteous ruling of the Talmud should be publicized.  Furthermore, we should take pride, knowing that 2,000 years ago when the world was primitive[2], there already existed amongst us righteous laws and just ways to strengthen human society and establish the world.

Refer to Rambam’s commentary on the Mishnah here[3]: “Do not wonder about this [he means to says that an ox of a Jew that gores an ox of an idol worshipper is exempt from damages[ just as you should not be troubled by ritual slaughter of animals, even though the animals did not sin.  For one who does not possess complete human qualities, is not truly considered a person [adam].  His existence is for the benefit of other humans.  Together with that was said above his words are elucidated.

Thus we learn that the Talmud itself, excludes from this ruling all the nations that observe the 7 Noahide laws, which include most of the nations today.  Behold, all of their judgments with us are considered judgments between Jewish parties.  There is no more elucidate.  Also refer to Parashat Kedoshim[4]regarding standing for an elder and Parashat Behar regarding the laws of overcharging[5]regarding the honor that Chazal accorded to all upstanding nations.  As for our discussion here, enough said.

We now return to explain the other half of this exegesis.  Behold it is simply clear that this same ruling apply to temple property.  That is, if an ox of an idol worshiper gores an ox that is temple property the idol worshiper is liable for damages while, if the reverse happens, the temple is exempt from damages.  Because this law is not just coming solely from an exemption based on “his fellow”[6], but also on the status of other nations.  Based on this one can see how precise the Mishnah is regarding this matter (as we cited in short above).

“An ox of an Israelite that gores an ox of temple property and an ox of temple property that gores an ox of an ordinary person[7] is exempt from damages.“   The Mishnah first refers to an Israelite and later refers to an ordinary person, which, at first glance, appears inconsistent, however, what was said before, enlightens the language of the Mishnah.  The opening of the Mishnah refers to an Israelite specifically to exclude the case when an ox of an idol worshiper gores an ox of temple property from being exempt from damages.  Therefore the Mishnah did not refer to an ordinary person, which would include an idol worshiper being exempt from damages.  This is not the case in the end of the Mishnah.  By referring to an ordinary person, the Mishnah includes an idol worshiper.  Take note: Thus the ruling is that an ox of temple property that gores an ox of an idol worshiper is exempt from damages.

Based on this one can see that the emendation of the Bach to this Mishnah, replacing Israelite with ordinary person is unnecessary.  Moreover, the language of the Mishnah shows how great and precise are the words of Chazal.

Editor’s Note: This is a very tough but important topic. The Torah Temimah does not avoid difficult topics. The short explanation of this Torah Temimah note is that he proves that, in the Gemora itself, the making exempt of a Jew for damaging a non-Jew’s property is limited to non-Jewish nations that don’t observe the 7 Noachide laws, which are the basic laws that form the fundamentals of every society. Based on this fact, the Torah Temimah states that the law does not refer to non-Jews in our times and in our countries. This law is no longer applicable because we live in a time of countries governed by the rule of law, unlike the time of the Gemora. In our day, all judgments between Jew and non-Jew are considered the same as judgments between two Jewish parties.