Parsahat צו Leviticus 6:2 –

Leviticus 6:2 “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: This is the law of the burnt-offering: it is that which goeth up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning; and the fire of the altar shall be kept burning thereby. ”

Megilah 21a: “all night unto the morning”.  This teaches that the entire night is fit for burning fats and entrails

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #7:

The Talmud learns this from the extra language in the verse (all night/until the morning).  It would have been sufficient for the verse to state “all night”.  If the verse only stated “all night”, one could infer that all night does not mean the entire night rather only a portion of the night. In truth we see examples where all (כל) indicates a part as in the verse referring to King Saul (Samuel I 28:20): “ Then Saul fell straightway his full length upon the earth, and was sore afraid, because of the words of Samuel; and there was no strength in him; for he had eaten no bread all the day, nor all the night.”  A later verse[1] explains that he did eat at night.  Thus we see that כל can refer to the entirety or to a portion.  Until the morning is not superfluous, rather it teaches us that the burning of fats and entrails is valid the entire night.  Refer to the commentary of the Taz to Orach Chaim Siman תקפח[2]. Refer also to what in written on verse 8.

Refer also to the first Mishnah in Berachot that lists all the things that are valid all night except that the Rabbis enacted a safeguard to prevent one from transgressing by only allowing one to perform these commandments until midnight.  Rashi comments on this Mishanh that the Rabbis did not make this decree regarding the burning of fats and entrails[3]. 

The reason why the Rabbis made an exception for the burning of fats and entrails is unclear.  A possible reason for this is the commentary of the Taz to Yoreh Deah Siman קיז and the Kesef Mishnah: “The Rabbis do not have the power to forbid anything that the Torah permits.”  Because the verse here explicitly permits it as it says “all night until the morning” as explained above, however, Rambam in Chapter four of the laws of sacrifices[4] disagrees with Rashi.  For further insight refer to the Tosafot Yom Tov and Shnot Eliyahu on the first Mishnah in Berachot.

It is clear that the burning of fats and entrails is not obligatory in that they must be burned at night, rather one is permitted to burn them at night for it is sufficient if they were consumed during the day.  Regarding what the Talmud says in the beginning of chapter four of Berachot (26b), that the three daily prayers correspond to the three daily sacrifices.  The evening prayer corresponds to the burning of fats and limb which could b done all night.  What was said above clearly explains why the evening service is optional because it corresponds to an optional sacrifice.  When it says that the fats and entrails are offered at night, it means that that one is allowed to offer them at night.  If they were consumed during the day, there is no obligation to leave them to be offered at night.

Another parallel between the evening service and the burning of the fats and entrails is that the time for both is the entire night.  The Rabbis did not enact a safeguard for the evening service as explained in the Talmud Berachot.  Similarly they did not enact a fence for the burning of fats and entrails to which the evening service corresponds.  See also the Beit Yosef to Orach Chaim 233.

Editors note: The Torah Temimah discusses a fundamental principle of rabbinic law.  The Rabbis do not have the power to forbid what the Torah explicitly permits as in the case discussed here.  Where the Torah does not explicitly permit something, the Rabbis have the power to enact safeguards to prevent one from sinning.  Even in such a case, they cannot prohibit the item or action on a biblical level.  They can place a limitation on the person forbidding them to benefit from the item or performing an action.  For example, when the Rabbis enacted the safeguard of not eating fowl and milk, they did not say that the Torah also refers to birds when it prohibits boiling a calf in its mother’s milk for that would violate the prohibition of adding a law to the Torah.  They placed a restriction on people not to eat fowl and milk together.  Another means, by which, the Rabbis prevent one from performing what the Torah permits is telling the person to refrain from doing the act (שב ואל תעשה) as in the case of not blowing the shofar when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  See Leviticus 12:3 note 14 where he expresses a similar idea with respect to circumcision on Shabbat.

[1] 28:23-25 But he refused, and said: ‘I will not eat.’ But his servants, together with the woman, urged him; and he hearkened unto their voice. So he arose from the earth, and sat upon the bed.  And the woman had a fatted calf in the house; and she made haste, and killed it; and she took flour, and kneaded it, and did bake unleavened bread thereof; and she brought it before Saul, and before his servants; and they did eat. Then they rose up, and went away that night.

[2] Halacha 5  note 5: referring to blowing shofar on Shabbat

[3] O.V. To distance a person from transgressing:  While the Mishnah lists the burning of fats and entrails, Rashi comments that this Mishnah cites it as example of something that is valid all night.  Thus is it not included in the list of acts, which that Rabbis forbade after midnight that follows.  The Talmud in Megilah (20b) also supports this.  Other commentators disagree with Rashi stating the Mishnah in Berachot includes it in the list of things that are forbidden after midnight.

[4] Halacha 2: Any animal whose enablers ( in Hebrew מתיריו) were offered during the day can be brought to the altar all night … In order to distance from transgression, the Rabbis said that one is not allowed to burn the entrails and limbs of the burnt offering until midnight.

Leviticus – 19:11  You shall not steal. You shall not deny falsely. You shall not lie; one man to his fellow.

Gemora: Baba Metziah 61b: What is the need of the injunction, ‘Ye shall not steal’,which the Divine Law wrote? [Couldn’t I have deduced this from other laws?] — For that which was taught: ‘Ye shall not steal,’ [even] in order to [just] cause pain to someone; ‘Don’t steal,’ [even] in order to repay with a double fine.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation Of Comment #60: [In the Gemorah] when it says “in order to just aggravate someone” it means as the Rambam states in the book Sefer HaMitzvot (Lo Taaseh #144) that [the intent of the thief] was just to cause distress to the owner [and the thief actually intended to return it, but just stole it in order to cause pain to the person.]   (See the source of the word ומיקטfrom Job, Chapter 10, Verse 1)

Also note that in the Shittah M’Kubetzet  he brings this opinion [of stealing the object to create emotional distress yet fully intending to return it] in the name of “Some commentators explain” [rather than mentioning Rambam explicitly]. Further the Shittah M’Kubetzet  says that the explanation of [only intending to cause pain] does not make sense since this is something that (people in the observant community) do regularly (without any sense of guilt). Rather, the Shittah M’Kubetzet  explains the phrase “to cause pain” as meaning that the thief did intend to cause pain AND did NOT intend to return the stolen object.

However, in my opinion what Rambam writes is totally appropriate and accurate. The reason [I think this] is because if the intention of the thief is to keep the stolen object, why would you think to not make the thief obligated to pay if he [only] intended to cause emotional pain (rather than having a real interest in obtaining the object)? Isn’t it true that the victim still ends up with a monetary loss? If this is the case, then the Shittah M’Kubetzet’s statement that this is something that happens every day is [basically] irrelevant; and stealing with this intent is still completely forbidden.

Regarding the topic of stealing “in order to repay with a double- fine”, this case relates to a situation where the thief [actually] wants to help the victim but he knows that the victim won’t accept help [charity]. Therefore, the thief would steal something of the victim’s knowing full well that he will then be required to pay back the original item plus a fine of two times or more the value of the object.

In the book Ketzot HaChoshen, Section 348, the author wonders whether the usual law of a onsin would apply to the case of one who steals only to cause pain. [This is the law that states that in a normal case of theft, if the object breaks or is lost while in the possession of the thief, even through no fault of his, he still has to pay back the monetary worth of the item to the original victim. The Ketzot HaChosen contemplates that since the thief did intend to return the object [after some time had elapsed] and his intent was not really to steal the object, perhaps this law of onsin does not apply. After all, the thief did do something wrong, but since it is not ‘pure’ theft maybe he would not be liable for the additional burden of onsin. Further, the Ketzot HaChosen brings support for this possibility from the   Shittah M’Kubetzet (at the end of the Chapter “Hamakpid”).   

It seems to me that [the Ketzot HaChosen is wrong and] the thief, even in this case, would be obligated in onsin. The reason for this is the well-known fact that the reason why a regular thief is not punished with lashes is because he is also obligated to return the object. Because of this additional obligation [to return or pay restitution] the law is also that even in a time when the original stolen object is missing [such as it was stolen from the thief] we still do not punish the thief with lashes, since the thief is liable to replace the object under all circumstances including onsin. All of this being the case, how could you think that a thief who only intended to aggravate the victim is not obligated in onsin? If that were true, then this type of thief who even lost the object that he stole would then be obligated in lashes! This would be the case since he is no longer subject to the obligation to return the object. Yet no one has ever argued that the law for these unusual theft cases is that the thief should receive lashes. Further this would not be the type of detail that the Gemora or later legal authorities would inadvertently leave out, and it would be a forced explanation to say that such thieves are not liable for lashes simply because the Torah chose not to deviate from the standard rule in those potentially exceptional cases. This topic merits further investigation.

 DBS Note: This complex note illustrates a fundamental point of the Torah Temimah. I think that he does not engage in complex legal reasoning separate from his pursuit of justice. I think that the injustice of the robbery victim not receiving restitution in all cases, even a case of onsin, motivated the Torah Temimah to illustrate why such a view was untenable and to include this note in his book.

Leviticus 15:24 – If a man cohabits with her, her menstruation shall be upon him, and he shall be unclean for seven days, and any bedding he lies upon, shall become unclean.

Gemora Yevamos 49b: “Her menstrual period shall be upon him”: We learn in a braita as follow – “from where do we know that if a man marries a woman while she is a niddah [during her menstrual cycle] that the marriage is still valid? From the above biblical verse ‘her menstruation period will be on him’” [implying that the marriage is valid because it will be on him]

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #93:

This phrase of “it is/will be” (   הווייה) is according to the text of the Gemora Kidushin 68a, however in our Gemora Yevamos 49b the text used is “kidushin” [marriage]. (VERIFY THIS TRANSLATION). It appears that the textual wording of “kidushin” is the proper wording. Since the main teaching is from the phrase “her menstrual period will be on him”, even in this time of it happening, still his acquisition and her domain will be his [in other words the marriage is still good even though, actually, having relations with her at this time is subject to the very severe punishment of “excision”, or being cut off spiritually from one’s people.]

 The great teaching from this is that even though having relations with a menstrual woman is punishable by excision and [the general principle is] marriage is not valid if it is with someone with whom you are liable excision (sister, etc) as is explained in the end of parsha Acharei Mot, nevertheless marrying a menstrual woman is not included in this general principle. The logic behind making an exception here is [probably] because other relations that are liable for excision are permanent prohibitions while the prohibition of having relations with a menstrual woman is temporary. Therefore, the ramifications of this prohibition are more lenient than for other relations that are also punishable by excision.

Look into what the Pnei Yehoshua writes in his halachic responsum, Chapter 3, regarding the detail of whether the marriage took place through a) a legal document b) giving money to the woman c) having relations with the woman [which is precisely what is biblically forbidden]. In my opinion, it is simple and clear that the whole point of this teaching is that even if the marriage occurred through having relations [which is forbidden] nevertheless the marriage is still valid and the prohibition is not like the prohibition with having relations with other women for whom the punishment is also excision. There would clearly be no point to the teaching if the marriage took place through the exchange of a document or money since in that case the marriage itself occurred in a permitted fashion, so of course the marriage is valid. The teaching only makes sense if it is understood to teach that even if the marriage occurred through having relations with the woman. This logic seems clear and simple to me.

However, one should note that this teaching appears not to be a clear biblical deduction from the posuk; rather the rabbis used the posuk as a “hook” for their logical deduction. This can be seen from the fact that the posuk isn’t actually about marriage at all. Rather, this teaching is one that the rabbis deduced from their logic since this woman is, in general, permitted to this man; except for the fact that there is a temporary prohibition in place [because of her menstrual status]. Therefore, the prohibition of having relations with her is not strong enough to prevent marriage. They then “hooked” this teaching onto this posuk as is their holy method.

Look also at Rambam, Chapter 18, Halacha #1, in the Laws of Prohibited Relations where he discusses the definition of a “zonah” [prostitute] who is forbidden to marry a Cohen. He answers that any woman is in a category of zonah and prohibited to the Cohen if he is prohibited from having relations with her [such as his sister, for example. Which, by the way, explains by “zonah” cannot be accurately translated as prostitute”] However, Rambam explicitly exempts a menstrual woman from this general category since the Cohen is, in fact, permitted to marry her.

According to our explanation above, Rambam’s words make perfect sense. However the הה”מ toils hard [in his commentary on Rambam] to find the source for Rambam’s ruling. According to our way of thinking, the source for Rambam’s opinion is precisely this Gemora above that marriage with a menstrual woman is halachically valid and she is not considered as being forbidden to marry. Look further above what I write concerning these rulings of Rambam at the beginning of parshat Emor on the posuk regarding a “zonah” and also in parshat Ki Tetzeh on the posuk of לא מביא אתנן זונה

Editor’s note: This note is a good illustration of rabbinic latitude and the use of a verse in the bible as a “hook” for their teaching. Also, note again that the Torah Temimah will write an explicit contrary opinion or critique of earlier teachers. In this case, the Pnei Yehoshua predated him by about 300 years.

Leviticus 12:3 – And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.

Gemora Niddah 31b: And why did the Torah ordain circumcision on the eighth day? In order that the guests  shall not enjoy themselves while his father and mother are not in the mood for festivities [Lit., ‘sad’, on account of the prohibition of intercourse which remains in force until the conclusion of the seventh day.]

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #22:

Rashi explains that everyone would be eating and drinking at the meal, but the father and mother would be sad on account of the prohibition of intercourse. The explanation of this matter is according what we explain shortly that all the blood that a woman sees [soon after] the seventh day would be pure blood and she would be permitted to her husband [from the seventh day on].

It is already well knows the [famous] statement of the Vilna Gaon who uses this point to demonstrate that any [rabbinic] decree that has been made for a particular reason will continue to remain in force even if the reason is no longer in force. In this example here, where it gives one of the reasons for having the circumcision on the eighth day be related to the prohibition on intercourse. However, in our day this reason is no longer applicable [because of the rabbinic degree of waiting an additional 7 days after clean blood]. This being the case, the reason for have the circumcision on the eighth day no longer applies, but nevertheless the law still stands.

Perhaps one can say that this general principle is alluded to in the Tanchuma at the beginning of Parshat Tetzaveh. There, the rabbis ask why the circumcision is on the eighth day. The answer given in the Tanchuma is that the circumcision is on the eighth day because that is when Yitzchak was circumcised. Apparently, neither the question nor the response in the Tanchuma makes sense. Behold, the commandment to do the circumcision on the eighth day is a well known, explicit commandment clearly stated in the Torah itself. Additionally, the time for Yitzchak’s circumcision is also well known and clearly stated. [So, how does the question and the answer of the Tanchuma actually teach us anything that we didn’t already know?]

But according to the Aggadic text of the Gemora Niddah quoted above, [perhaps] we can understand better the text of the Tanchuma and why it is asking about at what age a child should be circumcised in our day. Since the Tanchuma was aware that the reason given for waiting for the eighth day no longer applies, it instead responds that another reason exists that in still in force, namely basing it on when Yitzchak was circumcised. This is especially true since in the time of Yitzchak, prior to the giving of the Torah, there were no laws of Niddah. Therefore, it wasn’t even applicable to wait till the eighth day for the reason given in our Gemora. Nevertheless, they waited till the eighth day anyway for Yitzchak’s circumcision and that is why we also wait till the eighth day.

We should also be aware that the Rambam in his book, Guide for the Perplexed (Chapter 49, Section 2), writes that the reason why the circumcision is done on the eighth day is in order to give the baby’s strength time to grow after the birth. It is an amazing question for the Rambam why he left out mentioning what is written in the Gemora and instead wrote something based on his own logic. [However, we need to keep in mind], that actually the Rambam did not actually originate this idea. Look in the Midrash Rabbah at the beginning of the Parshat Ki Tetzei where it says as follows: “Why is the baby circumcised on the eighth day? Because God had mercy on him and gave time for his strength to grow [after the birth.]” Now you might ask why the Rambam chose this reason to record rather than the reason given in the Gemora, the answer is probably [exactly] because the reason given in the Gemora Niddah cited above is because that reason is no longer applicable due to our observance of the extra stringency of “clean blood”.

Even the reason of the Tanchuma requires further thought. Who set the timeframe of eight days as being sufficient for the baby to gather enough strength for the circumcision? Don’t we find that for an animal we wait seven days to declare him to be in a presumed state of good health while for a person we wait thirty days? This is explained explicitly in the Gemora Shabbos 131b. Perhaps in an aggadic manner one can say that the answer is because in waiting eight days, one is assured that at least one day of Shabbos will occur. Further, as is explained in [various] aggadas, Shabbos has the ability to increase a person’s strength and fortify his nature. This is also explained in other aggadas that before Shabbos was created the world was weak and shuddering, but when Shabbos came the world became strong.

[Parenthetically] keep in mind that we see from the fact that Rashi comments on our Gemora that everyone will be eating and drinking, we see a bit of a source for the obligation to have a festive meal to celebrate the circumcision. This is also alluded to in the Torah itself. The Gemora notes this when it uses the phrase “why does the Torah command the circumcision on the eighth day”. We also have further comments on this issue in Parshat Vaera on the posuk “on the day that Yitzchak was weaned”. Check out my note there.

 Editor’s note: I think it is wonderful that the rabbis in the Gemora ask why the Torah commands that a circumcision be done on the eighth day rather than just saying we have to do it because “it says so”. I believe the Torah Temimah is authentically continuing the wonderful Jewish tradition of questioning and challenging everything, even great previous authorities such as the Rambam.

Parashat שמיני Leviticus 11:7 – Calling a swine a swine

Leviticus 11:7 ” And the swine, because he parteth the hoof, and is cloven-footed, but cheweth not the cud, he is unclean unto you. ”

Hullin 59b: “It was taught in the beth midrash of Rabbi Ishmael: The One who rules over His world knows that the only animal that has split hooves and is impure is the swine.  This is why the verse says he (is unclean to you)”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #21:

See what was said in note 17 regarding a similar midrash referring to the camel and apply it to here.  See also the Aramaic translation of Yonatan Ben Uziel: “… and the swine .. there is none like it.  The midrash cited here explains the intention of Yonatan Ben Uziel when he says there is none like it.  This midrash is key.

Refer to the commentary of the Or HaChaim on this verse in the Torah:

And the swine .. but cheweth not the cud ..  There is a condition so long as the swine does not chew its cud, it is impure, however, in the future it will chew its cud and return[1] to be kosher.  It will not remain forever an animal that does not chew its cud and become kosher because the Torah does not change[2].

All these words are strange and wondrous.  From where did he find a source for this novel idea?  We do not see anywhere that the nature of animals will change in the future.  Why, out of all of the impure animals, will the swine be permitted?  Albeit true that I heard of a midrash explaining why its name is Hebrew is חזזיר: because it will return to its original permission.  It appears that the Or HaChaim understands this midrash literally.

In truth, no midrash with this language or intent has been found.  There is one midrash in Midrash Rabbah (Parashat Shemini end of section 12) and Kohelet Rabbah (on the verse That which hath been is that which shall be[3]) that refers to a different idea.

The swine refers to the nation of Edom.  Why is it called חזזיר? Because it returns the crown to its owner as the verse says (Obadiah 1:21) And saviours shall come up on mount Zion to judge the mount of Esau; and the kingdom shall be the LORD’S

In other words, through the nation of Edom, the crown will return to Israel.  It is clear that this midrash is primarily allegorical with a different intent.  It is a grave mistake to connect this midrash with permitting the swine in the future as explained.  Refer to Midrash Socher Tov section 146 and the insights of the Rashab thereon[4]

Shocher Tov 146 note 5: The Hebrew, מתיר אסורים, can also mean permitting what was forbidden.  The Midrash says: “Some say that, in the future,  the Holy One Blessed is He will purify all the animals that are impure in this world.  Similarly the verse says (Ecclesiastes 1:9): That which hath been is that which shall be for they were pure before the time of Noah.  Upon leaving the ark, Hashem tells Noah “like vegetation I have given everything to you (Genesis 9:3)”  Just as I gave vegetation to all so to wild and domesticated animals to all.  Hashem forbade them to know who would listen to Him and who would not.  In the future He will permit all He forbade.  Others say He will not permit them in the future as the verse says (Isaiah 66:17): “They that sanctify themselves and purify themselves to go unto the gardens, behind one in the midst, eating swine’s flesh, and the detestable thing, and the mouse, shall be consumed together, saith the LORD.”  If Hashem will destroy those that eat these, he certainly will not permit them in the future…

Editor note: The Torah Temimah does not shy away from controversial topics.  Descended from a family of Torah scholars[5], he shows his halachic side in this comment defending the mitzvoth of the Torah.  He vehemently opposes the idea of nature changing in the time of mashiach, specifically, the swine becoming a kosher animal, yet he respectfully disagrees with the commentary of the Or HaChaim.  Instead of outwardly rejecting the Or HaChaim, he acknowledges hearing about a midrash, on which the Or HaChaim is based, however, he concurs with the printed sources that explain the matter differently.  This should be a model how to approach disagreements in matters of halacha and exegesis.

Leviticus 10:3 – Then Moses said to Aaron, “This is what the Lord spoke, [when He said], ‘I will be sanctified through those near to Me, and before all the people I will be glorified.’ “And Aaron was silent.

Gemora Zevachim 115b: And Aaron was silent: Moshe said to Aaron – Aaron, my brother, the only reason your sons died was to sanctify God’s name. Since Aaron knew that his sons were amongst those who knew God, he was quiet and he was rewarded for his silence, as we see from the posuk, “And Aaron was silent.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #3:

It is explained in the Gemora that Moshe knew beforehand that when the Devine Presence would rest on the tabernacle, that it would be sanctified in this manner. This teaching of the Gemora relies on the posuk in Parshat Ki Tetzei when it is telling about the building of the tabernacle, it says “’and I will be sanctified through my honored ones’. Don’t read the word ‘my honored ones’ but rather read it as though it stated ‘those who were honored through Me’”. It was not conveyed to Moshe the identity of those who “would be honored through Me” until Nadav and Avihu died. This is what is meant by the phrase here “the only reason your sons died was to sanctify God’s name”. Furthermore, it is clear from the phrase in our posuk “This is what the Lord spoke, [when He said], ‘I will be sanctified through those near to Me” that we don’t find this exact phrase in the Chumash because it is referencing the above mentioned posuk in Parshat Ki Tetzei. ודו״ק

 However, [even so] this whole teaching needs to be explored further. [What does it mean that Aaron’s sons died to sanctify God’s name?] Doesn’t in say in the previous drasha that they died because they committed the sin of [having the audacity] to teach [others] right in front of Moshe? Note also that in the Gemora and Midrashim other possible reasons are given for their death and all of them attribute their death to some sin that they did. If this is the case, then how can one possibly say that they died for the [holy] purpose of sanctifying God’s name? [Perhaps] the answer that one needs to give is that if it had not been for the purpose of sanctifying God’s name, they would not have died during these days of dedication of the Temple, which were [supposed to be] days of joy. They would not have died during this time, so as not to interrupt the joyous celebration. Additionally, they would not have died precisely inside of the tabernacle, as is shown by the posuk “and they died before HaShem”. Rather, it was precisely to sanctify God’s name that they died during this time and in this exact place [inside the tabernacle.]

Still, though, this issue is still very amazing [hard to understand]. What could have been God’s intent and purpose in dedicating the tabernacle through the death of holy individuals? This question is made stronger by the statement from the Gemora that Moshe knew ahead of time this event would occur. Further, what could it mean that [Moshe] said to Aaron that your sons did not die except to sanctify God’s name? What is the [meaning or] benefit of a sanctification of His name in this manner?

It appears appropriate to attribute a midrashic explanation for this as follows: Everybody knows from Scripture and from Talmud that the purpose of the tabernacle and the dwelling of God’s presence in it, and the bringing of [animal] sacrifices, was to atone for the sins of the Jewish people. Therefore, in order to prevent common people from thinking that since there is a temple [and all the atonement processes] we don’t have to worry anymore about being careful not to transgress and commit sins. [Behold we can  attain atonement in the temple/tabernacle!]  

Therefore, HaShem pro-ordained the event with Nadav and Avihu in order to prevent the common people from thinking this [and acting this way] that there is no longer a need to be careful about one’s behavior. The death of Nadav and Avihu teaches that the tabernacle does not atone for people who transgress on purpose. [The atonement of the tablernacle] only applies if one transgresses accidently or incidently or in a way that could not be prevented, etc.

Even though Nadav and Avihu were righteous and beloved before HaShem, nevertheless when they transgressed a commandment on purpose (and taught halacha right in front of Moshe, their teacher) the holiness of the tabernacle was not there for the purposes of protecting them. Furthermore, they were inside the tabernacle itself for the purposes of establishing the Awe of God in the tabernacle; and Moshe who knew all of the secrets of the ways of the Holy One, did know ahead of time what God would do to teach all inhabitants of the world that they should be careful and avoid transgressions. Moshe only did not know with which individual(s) this event would occur. Then, retroactively, with the death of Nadav and Avihu he saw how what God had planned had, indeed, come about.

With this explanation, all of the aggadas [midrashim] become clearly explained. Also, even though I already explained this in Parshat Ki Tetzei, due to the importance [נחיצת] of this topic in our way of thinking, I did not hesitate to mention it again here.

Note further that what we have explained here that a mourner who silently accepts, in love, what has occurred and does not publicly criticize the ways of HaShem receives a reward. This can explain what is mentioned in Gemora Berachos 6b: “R. Papa says: The merit of attending a house of mourning lies in the silence observed.” Many commentaries here explain that the meaning of this statement is that those who come to comfort the mourner will receive a reward [if they don’t talk too much] and allow for silence. That explanation is not clear, though. What reward should be due to the comforters if they keep silent? Rather, according to our midrash above, we should explain the Gemora Berachos 6b as referring to the one who is in mourning. [Thus the meaning would be:] when the comforters gather together to comfort the mourner and he does not complain about the circumstances and the events that have happened to him, but rather he just sits quietly and accepts freely God’s decree, he will receive a reward for this.

Editor’s note: I appreciated the Torah Temimah’s constant questioning here of the classic explanations for some midrashim and statements in the Gemora. He keeps inquiring and applying his knowledge to derive new explanations that are based on his broad knowledge of other texts.

Leviticus 11:4 – But these you shall not eat among those that bring up the cud and those that have a cloven hoof: the camel, because it brings up its cud, but does not have a [completely] cloven hoof; it is unclean for you.

Gemora Ketubot 60a: Why does it use the phrase “it is unclean”, “it” is unclean; human milk and blood, however, is not unclean but clean.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #18:

The phrase “those who walk on two feet” refers to humans. As for why it didn’t explicitly say “humans”, look at what I have written on note # 9.

It is probable that the comment on our posuk is made regarding the word “hu” [it]. In the adjacent sentences discussing forbidden items, it just says “tamei l’chem” [forbidden to you] which refers to what came before it, including the camel in our posuk. Additionally it does not say “it is forbidden to you”. Since it uses the word “it” here, we can learn that something else is excluded from being forbidden. Truthfully, also in Parshat Re’eh it also lists all the unclean animals together and says “forbidden to you”.

For all these reasons, the lesson is derived from here that milk and blood of humans is permitted. (And as our Sages mention, blood of a person is only permitted where it didn’t separate completely from the person, such as blood between one’s teeth. However, if it did separate [and one were to collect it] into a vessel, it would be forbidden because of “maarat ayin” [permitting something that could be easily misinterpreted] lest people might think that it is the blood of an animal.

Now, see that from this drasha that is permitting the milk and blood of a person to eat, we see a proof to the opinion of the Rambam that we mentioned above in note #9 that eating flesh of a person is a violation of a positive commandment [the commandment that stated explicitly what you should eat. Also, recall that the Ramban and Rashba said that there is no prohibition against eating people.]

Note that there is a general principle that something which derives from a forbidden thing is also forbidden. If eating people were permitted, why would there be a need for a posuk to tell you that it is permitted??!! Of course milk and blood of a person are permitted, behold, even eating people is permitted!

However, from the fact that there is a posuk teaching us that milk and blood are permitted, we can see that obviously it must be that eating people is prohibited. Thus the opinion of the Rambam is supported by our Gemora above.  

Further, the fact that eating human flesh is only forbidden as transgressing a positive commandment [less severe than transgressing a negative commandment], it makes sense that the prohibition would not be strong enough to include what derives from a person [such as a the milk and blood.]

Editor’s note: This note is basically a continuation of note #9. In our note here, the Torah Temimah again applies his creative deductive and rock solid reasoning to show that the Rambam’s opinion is correct.

Leviticus 11:4 – But these you shall not eat among those that bring up the cud and those that have a cloven hoof: the camel, because it brings up its cud, but does not have a [completely] cloven hoof; it is unclean for you.

Torat Cohanim: [Why does it use the limiting word “but”?] I might think that the meat of those who walk on two feet is forbidden, the [limiting word]“but” is used to teach otherwise [that it is permitted]

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #9:

The phrase “those who walk on two feet” refers to humans. It is not clear why it didn’t explicitly say that the “meat of humans” [is permitted]. Rather it chose a flowery phrase of “the meat of those who walk on two feet”. Maybe it is because with this phraseology it is coming also to include flesh of wild savages who lived in previous generations in countries far away, whose human [dignity] had so diminished from them that Yechezkel says (23, 20) “And she lusted for their concubinage, those whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys, and whose issue is the issue of horses.” Look also in Gemora Berachos 25b.

Also look at what the Rambam says in Chapter 2:3 of Forbidden Foods, where he writes that even though there is no prohibition against eating human flesh nevertheless eating people would be a transgression of a positive commandment [since the Torah describes what we are allowed to eat, as we see when the Torah describes the seven types of animals that we are allowed to eat. Then it adds the phrase “of these you should eat”. This shows that eating people is, according to the Rambam in the category of a transgression of a positive commandment since people are not including in the list of animals that one may eat. Thus such a transgression is a positive commandment transgression.

Note that the Ramban and the Rashba disagree with the Rambam. Their opinion is that there is no prohibition at all regarding eating people. Their view is that the Torat Cohanim quoted above is a “general hook” [asmakhta b’alma] rather than an actual source for this prohibition. Also, please look at what I [the Torah Temimah] write in footnote 18 of this chapter regarding a convincing proof that the Rambam is actually correct.

[Lastly] it is obvious that there is a universal ruling that there is a prohibition of deriving any benefit at all from the body of a dead person [so you couldn’t eat it!]. This law is learned from a textual parallelism from the laws of the decapitated calf (Deuteronomy 21:1-9. Also, look in the Gemora Sanhedrin 47b.

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah emphasizes the importance of using the rules of Talmudic logic in a consistent fashion. He is not advocating eating people nor is his saying that any rabbi advocated such a thing. Rather, the Torah Temimah is explaining the legal reasoning behind the prohibition and various rabbis’ opinions. The Torah Temimah’s point of view derives directly from the Torat Cohanim.

[The Torat Cohanim is a midrash written down around the time of the Mishnah.]