Exodus 21:35 If one man’s ox hurt his neighbor’s ox so that it dies, then they shall sell the live ox, divide the money of it; and the dead ox they shall also divide.

Bava Kama (37b): [the words] “his neighbor’s” teaches us that if one’s ox gored another ox belonging to the temple or to a non-Jew he would be exempt from payment. But an ox of a non-Jew gored a Jew’s ox, the non-Jew would be liable to pay.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #277:

Behold regarding this principle that a Jew is not liable for damage to a non-Jew’s property has been the cause for much opportunity for haters of Jews to complain about our ancient scriptures saying that this law shows the low value that the Jewish law places on people who are not Jewish. The haters say that Jewish law not only thinks less of non-Jews but also shows that the property of a non-Jew is valued less than the property of a Jew.

This harsh reasoning resurfaces anew like sharp spurs on the lips of those who oppress Jews in every generation. Jewish scholars of every generation have endeavored to explain that certainly the Gemora is referring to non-Jews of early times who lived in wild, lawless countries. It does not refer to non-Jews in our times and in our countries. The result of this fact is that this law is no longer applicable.

What can we say and how can we express if our pain is so great that jealousy or hate corrupt rational thought. We are doubly troubled by our scholars who have tried to offer incomplete/inadequate explanations. Further in this section of the Talmud where the adversaries try make us regretful and lowly of spirit[1]. Because exactly in this place in the Talmud,  this topic explained in such a way that a truly objective reader could see it. Not only does this topic not bring disgrace on the wonderful Talmud, rather it uplifts it to show that all its laws are just and straight. The laws are built on a foundation of humanity and fundamental principles of life in all countries and places and times.

 Here is the exact language of the Talmud on this topic: If the word “neighbor” is to be taken literally, then a non-Jew’s ox should also not have to pay if it gores a Jew’s ox. On the other hand, if the word “neighbor” is not to be taken literally then a Jew’s ox that gores a non-Jew’s ox should also have to pay.  Rabbi Abahu says (Habbakuk 3:6): “He stands and shakes the earth, He beholds and causes the nations to tremble, and the everlasting mountains are dashed to pieces, the eternal hills bow.” Rabbi Abahu says that this posuk alludes to the fact that HaShem saw the seven mitzvot that the nations took upon themselves and since they did not fulfill them, He then made their property hefker for the Jews”.

Everyone knows the content of the Seven Mitzvot: 1. System of Laws 2. Acknowledging God 3. Not serving idols 4. No illicit sexual relations 5. Don’t murder 6. Don’t steal 7. Don’t eat the limb of a live animal. All these commandments are fundamental and essential for the establishment and continuation of human civilization, living in security, and feelings of tranquility and mercy on others.

So, now consider, that people who do not follow these laws but rather do the opposite. They don’t have laws and judgments. They murder and commit sexual immorality. They steal and rob and eat the limb of a live animal. They curse HaShem and they worship trees and stones. How should laws be regarding these types of people? If not like wild animals who destroy civilization and punish civilized people. Behold it is total appropriate for people of character who are concerned with promoting civilization to treat these wild populations in this manner. In fact this is how established kingdoms treat such populations, by denying them their “rights” and keeping them away from civilized locations.

Behold, this just and righteous ruling of the Talmud should be publicized.  Furthermore, we should take pride, knowing that 2,000 years ago when the world was primitive[2], there already existed amongst us righteous laws and just ways to strengthen human society and establish the world.

Refer to Rambam’s commentary on the Mishnah here[3]: “Do not wonder about this [he means to says that an ox of a Jew that gores an ox of an idol worshipper is exempt from damages[ just as you should not be troubled by ritual slaughter of animals, even though the animals did not sin.  For one who does not possess complete human qualities, is not truly considered a person [adam].  His existence is for the benefit of other humans.  Together with that was said above his words are elucidated.

Thus we learn that the Talmud itself, excludes from this ruling all the nations that observe the 7 Noahide laws, which include most of the nations today.  Behold, all of their judgments with us are considered judgments between Jewish parties.  There is no more elucidate.  Also refer to Parashat Kedoshim[4]regarding standing for an elder and Parashat Behar regarding the laws of overcharging[5]regarding the honor that Chazal accorded to all upstanding nations.  As for our discussion here, enough said.

We now return to explain the other half of this exegesis.  Behold it is simply clear that this same ruling apply to temple property.  That is, if an ox of an idol worshiper gores an ox that is temple property the idol worshiper is liable for damages while, if the reverse happens, the temple is exempt from damages.  Because this law is not just coming solely from an exemption based on “his fellow”[6], but also on the status of other nations.  Based on this one can see how precise the Mishnah is regarding this matter (as we cited in short above).

“An ox of an Israelite that gores an ox of temple property and an ox of temple property that gores an ox of an ordinary person[7] is exempt from damages.“   The Mishnah first refers to an Israelite and later refers to an ordinary person, which, at first glance, appears inconsistent, however, what was said before, enlightens the language of the Mishnah.  The opening of the Mishnah refers to an Israelite specifically to exclude the case when an ox of an idol worshiper gores an ox of temple property from being exempt from damages.  Therefore the Mishnah did not refer to an ordinary person, which would include an idol worshiper being exempt from damages.  This is not the case in the end of the Mishnah.  By referring to an ordinary person, the Mishnah includes an idol worshiper.  Take note: Thus the ruling is that an ox of temple property that gores an ox of an idol worshiper is exempt from damages.

Based on this one can see that the emendation of the Bach to this Mishnah, replacing Israelite with ordinary person is unnecessary.  Moreover, the language of the Mishnah shows how great and precise are the words of Chazal.

Editor’s Note: This is a very tough but important topic. The Torah Temimah does not avoid difficult topics. The short explanation of this Torah Temimah note is that he proves that, in the Gemora itself, the making exempt of a Jew for damaging a non-Jew’s property is limited to non-Jewish nations that don’t observe the 7 Noachide laws, which are the basic laws that form the fundamentals of every society. Based on this fact, the Torah Temimah states that the law does not refer to non-Jews in our times and in our countries. This law is no longer applicable because we live in a time of countries governed by the rule of law, unlike the time of the Gemora. In our day, all judgments between Jew and non-Jew are considered the same as judgments between two Jewish parties.

Exodus 28:38 – It shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the holy things that the children of Israel sanctify, for all their holy gifts. It shall be upon his forehead constantly to make them favorable before the Lord.

Gemora Menachos 7b – “It should be on his forehead constantly” – From this phrase we see [that one who is wearing it] should not remove his concentration from it.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #26:

From here the rabbis learn [in a variety of places in the Gemora] that one who is wearing tefillin should not remove his concentration from them and is obligated to touch them constantly. This is learned from an “a fortiori” deduction from the ceremonial miter [that is the subject of our posuk]. The a fortiori deduction is as follows:

Just like the miter which only has God’s name written on it once, one is required to concentrate on it constantly, certainly this law applies to tefillin that has God’s name mentioned many times.

Tosafot comment in the Gemora noted above that this a fortiori deduction is not a full deduction. The [flaw] with the deduction is that the name of God written on the miter  used is the [full] revealed name while in the tefillin the name of God that is used is the [lesser] covered name.  Therefore, Tosafot conclude, that the prohibition of losing concentration while wearing tefillin is not biblical [ie, not fully based on this posuk above] but rather is from a rabbinic decree [that is loosely based on the above posuk.]

However, many others disagree with this observation of the Tosafot. These other rabbis conclude that it is, in fact, a full a fortiori deduction and that therefore the prohibition of not concentrating on one’s tefillin is biblical in nature and solidly based on our posuk. These dissenting rabbis wonder what practical halachic difference would there be in whether the full name or the covered name of God is used.

My opinion is that the words of Tosafot are correct. We do, in fact, find that many halachic stringencies apply to the miter but don’t apply to the tefellin. [Therefore, this law about concentration would logically only apply to the miter but not the tefillin.] It is logical to conclude that these stringencies that apply to the miter but not to the tefillin are there precisely because the full, revealed name of God is written on the miter.

For example, in the Gemora Kedushin 66a, King Yannai tests the Sages of Israel by wearing the miter. Rashi explains there that the test is to see whether the Sages stand up in honor the miter, since the name of God is written on it.

Notice that we do not find this stringency of needing to stand up for tefillin. One has to conclude that this stringency for the miter is due to the fact that the full, revealed name of God is written on the miter [but not on the tefillin.] Due to this full revealed name of God being there, the miter is due this additional honor.

 Another example is in the Gemora Sota 38a. There is mentions that the priests when they bless the people are supposed to raise their hands above their heads, except for the high priest who is wearing the miter. He is not supposed to raise his hands above the miter. Rashi there explains that the reason for not raising his hands above the miter is because the name of God is written on the miter. Behold, this stringency of not raising one’s hands above one’s head also does not apply to tefillin. Again, one would have to conclude that this stringency is precisely because the miter has the full revealed name of God written on it.

Therefore, it appears obvious that the explanation of the Rosh and the Tur on Or Hachaim Section 28 and also the explanation of the תר’י is correct; that the main fulfillment of the requirement to concentrate on one’s tefillin is done by avoiding idle chatter and frivolity while wearing one’s tefillin. Even though normally the term for concentration should be taken literally, but in this case since the halacha is only rabbinic in nature the rabbis only legislated laws that would lead to a desecration of God’s name if not followed.

The halachic difference between ruling that concentration is biblical versus rabbinic is precisely in this issue of whether one needs to touch them constantly. If, in fact, the requirement of concentration is biblical in nature, then one would need to touch one’s tefillin constantly so that one is constantly mindful of wearing tefillin. But if the requirement of concentration is only rabbinic, then the requirement of touching them is only general in nature. And there are other halachic distinctions that arise from this difference of opinion regarding the exact source of the requirement of concentration, but here is not the place for extending the topic.

 DBS Note: First of all, the Torah Temimah’s knowledge of the entire Talmud shines through in this note. Secondly, this note is a very good introduction to the concept of “a fortiori argument”. I am cutting and pasting a Wikipedia definition of this important concept. If you are new to the concept, read the note above again to see precisely how it applies. Thirdly, this note shows clearly the hierarchy of traditional Judaism in tiers of obligations. Biblical obligations are more important and stringent than rabbinic obligations. Much effort is put into ensuring that we delve into which obligations are of what type and what the resulting halachic ramifications are.

Lastly, it is wonderful how the Torah Temimah weighs in on the arguments of approximately 1,000 years earlier and clearly expresses his opinion of who was right.

DEFINITION OF A FORTIORI:

An a fortiori argument /ˈɑː fɔːrtɪˈoʊriː/^[1] is an “argument from a yet stronger reason.” For example, if it has been established that a person is dead (the stronger reason), then one can with equal or greater certainty argue that the person is not breathing. “Being dead” trumps other arguments that might be made to show that the person is not breathing, such as for instance, not seeing any sign of breathing.

An a fortiori argument draws upon existing confidence in a proposition to argue in favor of a second proposition that is held to be implicit in the first. The second proposition may be considered “weaker,” and therefore the arguer adduces a “stronger” proposition to support it.

Also, here is the link to a Wikipedia article on miter/mitre: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitre

Exodus 28:40 – And for the sons of Aaron you should make coats and you should make belts and turbans shalt thou make for them, for honor and for beauty.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma Chapter 3 Halacha 6 – The Rabbis [Rabbi Yosi?] taught an explanation of the phrase “for the sons of Aaron you should make coats.” From this wording they learned that it is required to have two coats for each cohen.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #30:

Rabbi Yosi thinks that this statement apply to general ‘coats’. In other words, since it says ‘for the sons of Aaron’ that is the reason why it writes ‘coats’ in the plural. Certainly, the intent of the rabbis was not that each cohen should wear two coats. We know that it says in Gemora Zevachim 18a that a cohen who wears two garments of the same type while he’s doing the service in the temple, that service is invalid.

Rather, the intent is that each cohen should have an extra coat in reserve in case he needs it. Further, it is entirely possible that it need not be limited to two, but rather a cohen could have more in reserve if he wanted. The Talmud teaches “two” as the minimal obligation based on the use of the plural form.

Also, it does make sense [ניחה] that the same deduction is not made about belts and turbans that are also written in the plural. Only the coat is worn close to the body and likely to absorb bodily foulness.

Truly though it is not clear to me why the rabbis interpreted this posuk in this way. Certainly the words of Rabbi Yosi are based on logical reasoning rather than on a textural deduction. It does seem that the reason why it writes “coats” in the plural is because the subject is also in the plural (the sons of Aaron); just like belts and turbans are also in the plural. Additionally a similar phrase is using in the Gemora Megilla 7a  where it discusses the requirement to send “gifts to the poor”. [Gifts is written in plural as is the word ‘poor people’.] There, even though the Gemora says it means at least two gifts to at least two poor people, Rashi says that one gift to one poor person would be sufficient for the minimum requirement. He bases this on the fact that even though it does use the plural form for ‘gifts’; nevertheless since it says ‘poor people’ [also in the plural] we can conclude that the minimum requirement is one gift for one poor person.

Take note also that the Rambam in Chapter 8 of the section “Vessels of the Temple” does not mention at all this requirement of having two coats for each cohen.  Even though, as we mention above, it is not clear from the language of the posuk how the deduction is made that one must have two coats, nevertheless, it is clear that this is a deduction that the rabbis have made from the language of the posuk. It certainly has a valid reason and logic to it, even if we don’t understand it. If that is the case, how is it possible for the Rambam just to omit this law entirely? To compound the difficulty, look in the Gemora Chaggigah 3a where it concludes that a person who is deaf in only one ear is exempt from the obligation to go up to Jerusalem during the three pilgrimage festivals. The Gemora there concludes this from the words of the posuk (Parshat Vayelekh) where it says “Read the Torah in their ears”. From the fact that it says “ears” in the plural, the Gemora concludes that if one is deaf in one ear, he is excluded from this command. And the Rambam does include this law! Also, the Gemora Yerushalmi there actually attaches the law about being deaf in one ear to our posuk here about each cohen needing two coats.

Since this is the case, it really makes no sense for the Rambam to omit the law requiring two coats yet include the law exempting a person who is deaf in one ear. This issue requires much further study.  

DBS Note: I appreciate the intense insistence on consistency.  Also, being that I am deaf in one ear, this note has a personal relevancy to me.

Exodus 25:10 – And they shall make for me an ark of shittim wood; two cubits and a half shall be its length and a cubit and a half its breadth and a cubit and half its height.

Gemora Yoma 72b: Rabbi Yochanan contrasted two biblical posukim as follows: in one posuk (Devarim/Deuteronomy 10:1) “you (Moshe) will make for yourself an ark” yet another posuk says (Shmos/Exodus 25:10) “and they shall make for Me an ark.” From here we see that it is fitting for a Torah scholar, that the people of his city do his work for him.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #12:

In other words, the principal commandment to build the ark was commanded to Moshe. The Jewish people actually, therefore, built the ark on his behalf. Additionally even though really only Betzalel and Ahaliav and other wise craftsman were really the only ones who made it, but since (perhaps) due to the fact that they were paid from the communal money that was raised by all the Jews to build the temple, therefore it is considered as if all the Jews, themselves, actually made it.  See also the Gemora Temura 31b.

Also, see what is written in the Gemora Shabbos 114a where it relates as follows: Rabbi Yochanan said “which type of Torah scholar is it for whom the people of his city are commanded to do work for him? One who abandons all his interests and occupies himself with the interests of heaven (G-d).”  

It is not clear what the source is of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling. However in the previous note [where it explains that when Jews do G-d’s work, their own work gets done for them, while when they are not doing G-d’s work, then they must do their own work. This is seen exactly from this posuk where Moshe’s work is being done by others exactly because he is exclusively involved in G-d’s work.] We see that this principle is learned from Moshe. Therefore, Rabbi Yochanan concludes that it is only for a Torah scholar who acts like Moshe that the city is required to do work on his behalf.

A further explanation is appropriate also on Rabbi Yohanan’s question itself. According to the context in the Gemora’s discussion here there are three categories/levels [zirim]. The category of Altar, of Ark and of Table. Aaron [Moshe’s brother] merited the level of Altar and he took it;  [King] David merited the level of Table and he took it; the level of the Ark,  however, is still open and available for anyone who wants to come and take it. The explanation of this is just as it says in [Pirkei] Avot, that the Crown of Torah is available to all of Israel equally. Therefore it is extremely appropriate that it be about the Ark that the posuk should say in the plural “and they made it.” This was precisely to show this point that the Crown of Torah is available for all of Israel. The point of the explanation in the Gemora would be to explain why it doesn’t also say “and they made” [in the plural] in Devarim/Deuteronomy. Further investigation is needed.

Translator Note: In other notes also, the Torah Temimah stresses the value of work.  Specifically, a Torah scholar is not worthy of having others do work for him, unless he has reached the spiritual level of Moshe. The Torah Temimah means by this, I think, that it is never appropriate. We all know at the end of Devarim/Deuteronomy that the Torah itself states that there never will arise anyone of the same level as Moshe.

The Torah Temimah is stressing that everyone should earn a living and that it is not appropriate, as an optimal state, for the congregation to support Wise Sages through community funds. He ends the note with a teaching that stresses the egalitarian vision of learning Torah; it is not reserved for the chosen few, but is available to all who desire to learn.

Exodus 25:8 – And they shall make for me a sanctuary, and I will dwell amongst them.

Avot d’Rabbi Natan: We learn in a braitha: Rabbi Tarfon says, “Great is work as we see that even G-d did not allow His divine presence to dwell on the Jewish people until they did work.” We see this from the posuk: Make for me a sanctuary and I will dwell amongst them.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #9:

It is probable that the Avot d’Rabbi Natan is deducing this lesson from the exact wording of the posuk. The posuk should have said “make for me a sanctuary and I will dwell in it” rather than “I will dwell in them.”  Therefore, Avot d’Rabbi Natan concludes that the concept of a building is not for G-d and it does not pertain to him. This is shown by the posuk in Isaiah Chapter 66:1 “The heavens are my throne and the earth is my footstool, where is the house that you would build for Me?”

From here we see that the reason why G-d wanted the Jews to be involved in the work of the temple for His Name’s sake and He commanded them to build the temple as a way to endear them to Him through their efforts. After this, He caused His divine presence to dwell amongst them, wherever they may be.

It is clear from this that work itself is so great that it can cause G-d’s grace to be shown to the Jewish people through causing his divine presence to dwell amongst them.

DBS Note: In other notes also, the Torah Temimah stresses the value of work.

Exodus 20:1 – And God spoke all these words saying.

Gemora Chagiga: 3(b) [The reason why is says “all” of these words instead of just “these words” is] to instruct the Sages who sit together in groups and occupy themselves in Torah that even though some of them say “impure” and some say “pure”; or some say “invalid” and some say “valid”; or some say “forbidden” and some say “permitted”; nevertheless all of these opinions were given by the One.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #1:

Clearly the Gemora is being careful in its analysis of the word “all”. The text could have just plainly said “and God spoke these words, saying.” This topic is included in the topic of “these and these are the words of the Living God”. Rashi comments and considers in Gemora Ketubot (57a) that the reason why we say all of the opinions derive from the One is because sometimes one opinion is more appropriate while other times the other opinion is more appropriate depending on slight changes in the facts of the case.

Were it not for Rashi’s comment it would be possible to explain that it is precisely through various approaches that different opinions come into being. And through the different opinions [being considered] it is then possible to clarify the truth of a judgment. Were this not the case the sages would have fixed the halacha through their first, immediate intuition. [MUSKAL RISHON]; in this manner it is possible to make a mistake and to err.

This whole approach is according to the Gemora (Jerusalem Talmud: Sanhedrin: Chapter 11: Halacha 1) explanation of the verse in Ecclesiastes (12:11) “ The words of the wise are like spurs, and like nails well driven in are the sayings of the masters of collections, given from the One Shepherd.”  The Gemora there explains that the phrase “masters of collections” refers to the wise sages who sit together in groups and occupy themselves in Torah.

The idea is that through the give and take arguments and the different opinions that naturally occur; that the truth of an issue becomes clarified in a sound, fundamental and lasting manner. The value of the investigation and the discussion is like the well done plowing and the fundamental, lasting manner is analogous to the “nails well driven in”; and the whole purpose of the process is because all the opinions are given by the One Shepherd.   

This same idea is the reasoning for the statement in Gemora Berakos (63b) that the Torah can only be acquired with a group of people. When a wise sage occupies himself in Torah on his own, he becomes increasingly foolish. Also look in Gemora Taanis (7a). [R. Hama b. Hanina said: What is the meaning of the verse, Iron sharpneth iron?  This is to teach you that just as in the case of one iron sharpeneth the other so also do two scholars sharpen each other’s minds by halachah.] That is to say that it is impossible without the company of a fellow student or students to delve into the ultimate depths of an idea and the truth of a Torah teaching.

 We have more lengthy thoughts to say on this from an Aggadic standpoint, but here is not the place for lengthy comments.

DBS Note: This is a  fundamental theme of the Torah Temimah’s and he  never misses a chance to mention it. I also really enjoy when he speaks to the reader such as when he says he has more thoughts on this topic but now is not the place to mention them!

Lastly, again in this note, the Torah Temimah quotes Rashi’s opinion and then respectfully offers his own.

The summary of the Torah Temimah’s comment here is that while Rashi suggests that the reason for multiple opinions is that each is true in different circumstances, the Torah Temimah suggests that the reason for multiple opinions is that each person has a different mind, and therefore no individual can consistently arrive at the unitary truth on his or her own – it is only by comparing, contrasting, and debating the initial positions arrived at through our subjectively limited intuitions that we can discover the single objective truth of Torah. (Thanks to Rabbi Klapper for the succinct summary and to Rabbi Sendor for correcting a significant error I made in this note.)

Exodus 13:19 – Moshe took the bones of Yosef with him because he had made the Children of Israel swear saying that when God will visit you, take out my bones from here with you.

Gemora Yerushalmi Sotah: Chapter 1, Halacha 10: Rabbi Kruspi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Why does it say “with him” [isn’t that superfluous]? It is to teach “with your own self you are doing it.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #74:

This interpretation depends on the earlier interpretation on this same sentence. Because Moshe personally dealt with the matter of bringing Yosef’s bones out of Egypt, Moshe himself then merited to have God himself bury Moshe’s bones. In other words, due to this mitzvah of Moshe, he then merited to the huge honor of having God himself bury him.

Behold, even though we’ve already explained in our commentary in Genesis 46:4 that when God says “I will surely bring you up” [in Hebrew the idea of surely is conveyed by repeating the word: BRING YOU UP]. The word is repeated to teach that the bones of all of Yosef’s brothers were also brought out of Egypt by the Jews when they left. If so, why does Moshe receive a special reward for personally bringing up Yosef’s bones? The answer, as explained in the Gemora Yerushalmi quoted above is that the Egyptians refused to let the Jews take the bones of Yosef.  Perhaps their reason for this was because of what is noted in the Gemora Sotah 13(a) that the Egyptians had placed the casket of Yosef into the Nile River in order that the river be thereby blessed. Also in the Gemora Yerushalmi Avodah Zarah Chapter 3, Halacha 2 it mentions that the people of Kut used to observe a Yosef Festival because God had blessed the House of Egypt on Yosef’s behalf.

So, only Moshe merited a special reward for bringing up Yosef’s bones from Egypt because it involved this extra effort due to the Egyptians refusal to let him do this.

DBS Note: May we all merit large and small rewards for the extra efforts that we put forth in the world.

Shmos  12:27 – You shall say, “It is a Pesach feast offering to HaShem, Who passed over [pasach] the houses of the Children of Israel in Egypt when He smote the Egyptians”

Gemora: Pesachim 147(b): R. Gamliel used to say: Whoever does not mention these three things on Passover does not fulfill his obligation. They are: the Passover Offering, Unleavened Bread and Bitter Herbs[Pesach, Matzoh and Marror]. The Passover Offering is [sacrificed] because HaShem passed over the houses of our fathers in Egypt. As [our] posuk says: “You shall say ‘it is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover, because He passed over the houses…”. The Unleavened Bread is [eaten] because our fathers were redeemed from Egypt, as it is said, “And they baked unleavened cakes of the dough which they brought forth out of Egypt”. The Bitter Herb is [eaten] because the Egyptians embittered the lives of our fathers in Egypt, as it is said, “And they made their lives bitter”.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #203:

It is explained that the phrase “You shall say…” means that this is not the response to the son who is asking a question. Rather, it is an entirely separate mitzvah on its own that you should say [these three things aloud.] We’ve already written in the previous note why this is not a response to the son’s question. Further, these particular three items are chosen because they are the fundamental, foundational aspects of the enslavement to and redemption from Egypt.

Additionally, note that the Mishna in Bikurim (1:4) says that a convert does bring bikurim butdoes not read the “vidui bikurim”because he is not able to say “…the land which HaShem swore to our forefathers to give to us.” The convert cannot say this because he is not of the seed (i.e., a biological descendant) of Israel. Tosafot explain Gemora Baba Kama 81(a) the opinion of Rabbenu Tam is that we follow this position as halakhah, and that because of this Rabbenu Tam also did not allow a convert to say the standard text of the blessing after a meal since the convert is not able to say the phrase, “…. for the land that you caused our forefathers to inherit”. Rabbenu Tam was relying on the Mishnah of Bikurim mentioned above, and he added further that when the convert is praying by himself, he should say “the God of the forefathers of Israel” and when he is in synagogue he should say “the God of your forefathers”.

Amazingly, according to this it becomes apparent that the convert would not be able to fulfill the commandment of retelling the exodus from Egypt using the prescribed language since he is unable to say all of these key phrases:   “…because HaShem passed over the houses of our fathers in Egypt”, “because He redeemed our forefathers”and “because the Egyptians embittered the lives of our forefathers.” Yet saying that a convert is forbidden from saying these phrases in the Passover seder would be a totally new, unheard of opinion.

Consider that regarding the posuk in Parshat “Lech Lecha” describing Abraham as a ‘father of a multitude of nations.” the opinion of both the Rambam and Rabbi Yitzchak the Tosafist is that we do not follow the position of the above-cited Mishna in Bikurim as halakhah.  Rather,their opinionis that a convert does bring bikurim and reads the vidui bikurim exactly because Abraham was the forefather of a multitude of nations. This is also the one of the opinions expressed in the Jerusalem Talmud. According to them this would also apply to the commandments of Passover night, i.e. that a convert says the Haggadah just as a born-Jewish person would.

Additionally, it is amazing that the standard halachic decision makers do not mention this at all.

DBS Note: The final sentence of the Torah Temimah’s note says it all. Not only does he strongly feel that a convert would observe Passover exactly as any Jewish person would, but he feels it is an oversight that this commonly accepted opinion is not publicized more in the classical halachic literature.

Also, huge thanks to my neighbors Ploni Almoni and HaMaivin Yavin who are Torah Temimah enthusiasts. They provided significant editorial assistance in the background for this note.

YaYikra 1:2 – Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When a man from [among] you brings a sacrifice to the Lord; from animals, from cattle or from the flock you shall bring your sacrifice.

Gemora: Kiddushin 36(a): [Regarding] the rites of laying [hands] because it is written: Speak unto the sons of Israel and he shall lay [his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering]: thus the sons of Israel lay [hands], but not the daughters of Israel.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #3:

The above gemora refers to the sacrifices that they [the women] themselves bring. Further the gemora does not mean that it is prohibited for women to [place their hands on the animal to be sacrificed] but rather it means that the women are not obligated to do so [for their own sacrifices].

This is according to the gemora Chagiga 15(b) where it states that women were allowed to perform the ceremonial placing of hands on the animal sacrifice. Note that the Rambam omits to mention this detail explicitly in his Mishnah Torah. However, if the women are bringing the sacrifice as an emissary for their husbands, they are forbidden to place their hands on the sacrifice as is explained further on in VaYikra  1:4 on the posuk “and he lays his hands”. Look also at the Tosafot on Gemora Rosh HaShana 33(a).

Similarly, we find the Gemora here concluding from this that woman are excluded from all the various details of the sacrificial service. They are excluded from the “waving”, “raising”, “kmitzaing” [measuring the flour with 4 fingers], “incense”, “melikut”, “collecting of the blood” and “sprinkling of the blood”. The reason for these exclusions is because in all of them the posuk uses the phrase “the sons of Israel” or “sons of Aaron”. Tosafot ask why the Gemora needed to learn from the wording of the posuk to exclude women, let women be excluded because of the general principle that women are exempt from positive commandments that are time bound as we learn from the posuk at the end of parshat Tzav.

I am astounded by this question of Tosafot. What did they see that caused this question? Behold, the sacrifices themselves are positive commandments that are time bound because they can only be done in the day. (See the same posuk noted above in parshat Tzav.) Since we see that the Torah permitted women to bring sacrifices because of their actual obligation  to bring some sacrifices even though they are a positive commandment bound by time; similarly they should be obligated in all the above listed particulars relating to the sacrifices.  Just as men are in the general commandment and the particulars, so too women should also be obligated regarding the details. There is no logic  at all in exempting women from the particulars if they are obligated in the over-all issue, of bringing sacrifices. Similarly there is no logic to exempt women from eating the Passover sacrifice even though it must be done exclusively at night nor from the commandment of burning them leftovers of the Passover sacrifice even though that must be done exclusively in the day. Due to the fact that women are commanded to observe the overall commandment of Passover, they are therefore automatically commanded in all its particulars.

So too in our case of the sacrifices, if there had not been a “decree from the King” [gezerat ha’katuv] regarding the sacrificial details and the commandment that women should not perform them, I would not have any logical reason to exclude them due to the issue of being positive commandments that are time-bound, since woman are obligated in the commandment of sacrifices.

Regarding this point, that women are obligated in sacrifices in a manner equal to men, the first source of this in from Torat Cohanim on parshat Emor, Leviticus 22:18. That is the first source for the law that women are commanded equally to men in the commandment of bringing sacrifices. The Rambam includes this law in Chapter 3 Halach 2 in the Laws of Sacrifices. The Rambam explicitly says “whether men, women or slaves; all are obligated equally in the commandment of sacrifices.” The Kesef Mishnah supports this view and says as follows “this [halacha mentioned by the Rambam] is obvious since the Torah makes equal men and women regarding its laws. We have already said that women don’t lay hands, perform the waving, etc. These details are done by men not by women. This teaches that women are obligated in the commandment of sacrifices [but not certain particulars.]And any commandment that a women is obligated to do, so also are slaves”.

So we see that, following the source in the Torat Cohanim, it is very amazing that the Kesef Mishna uses so many words for the purpose of finding a source for the words of the Rambam in some phrase in the gemora. In fact the source is clear and very explicit. He [Kesef Mishna] should have just written succinctly, “Torat Cohanim – Parshat Emor” and no further words.

DBS Note: The final sentence of the Torah Temimah here alludes to his key point, as it often does. In this note the Torah Temimah is pointing out that it is logical and has a clear source to say that women are equally commanded in the mitzvah of bringing sacrifices. He sees no need for long explanations of this. The only point that he sees a need for is to explain why women are excluded from certain particulars since there is no logical reason to do so. He concludes that it is simply a “decree from the King” without any particular logic.