Deuteronomy 8:10 – And you will eat and be satisfied, and you shall bless the Lord, your God for the land that he has given you.

Jerusalem Talmud-Berachos Chapter 1, Halacha 1: Women, servants and children are obligated to pray the blessing after meals. This is taught by the verse that says: “and you will eat and be satisfied, and you shall bless the Lord, your God…”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #18:

It appears that the proof from the verse is that since the prayer after eating is only for blessing and thanking God for being satisfied and for the bodily enjoyment [of the food], then apparently there is no distinction between men and women and servants and children. This is similar to what we state at the beginning of Gemora Megila (4a) that women are also obligated in the commandment of reading the Scroll of Esther on Purim because they were also saved during the miracle of Purim. Here also women are included in the requirement to pray the blessing after eating because they are included in the category of having eaten and been satiated.

Note that in the Babylonian Talmud Berachos (20b) there is recorded the discussion between Ravina and Rabba. They were discussing whether the requirement for women to recite the prayer after eating is a biblical obligation or a rabbinic obligation.  Rashi comments there that the doubt arises because on the one hand the commandment appears to be a non-time bound positive commandment which is equally required for men as for women. On the other hand, in the text of the prayer itself reference is made “to the good land that God has given you”. Since women were not included in the allotment of the land, it would stand to reason that their requirement to say this prayer is not equal to a man’s requirement. Tosafot adds to Rashi’s question by adding that the text of the prayer also mentions the covenant that has been stamped on our flesh [circumcision] and on the Torah that you taught us and notes that these phrases also does not apply to women. Tosafot leaves the question as an open question.

On the basis of this discussion in the Babylonian Talmud, the halachic authorities have ruled that the obligation of women to recite the prayer after eating is possibly not biblical in nature. The ramifications of this ruling has many effects. For example, if one is not sure whether one has recited the prayer or not – what to do is affected by this issue. Further, whether a woman could fulfill the obligation for a man and recite the prayer on his behalf is also impacted by this decision.

However, in my opinion, it is astounding that the universal, straightforward opinion stated in the Jerusalem Talmud is pushed aside by the single opinion of one person in the Babylonian Talmud. Isn’t it clear from the section of the Jerusalem Talmud that we have quoted that there is no doubt that women are obligated in the prayer after meals? Further, as we explained and as many early halachic authorities have already ruled, a doubt in the Babylonian Talmud is pushed aside by a universal, certain statement in the Jerusalem Talmud. [See Tosafot in Niddah 68a and also the Rosh in the second chapter 2 of Succah.]

Another point that is astounding to me is that according to the comments of Rashi and Tosafot, the nature of the doubt relates to the phrases in the prayer concerning the division of the land, concerning circumcision and concerning teaching Torah. If so, then these doubts would only apply to the second paragraph of the prayer in which these items are mentioned. However, the first paragraph which doesn’t mention these items rather just thankfulness and praise for the food, certainly women’s obligation would be equal to a man’s. It is amazing that commentators have not focused on this.

Translator Note: I liked this note of the Torah Temimah for several reasons. First of all, he is pointing out the ramifications of deciding to make a woman’s obligation lesser than a man’s. Secondly, he uses his knowledge of traditional halachic methodology to question whether this decision was accurate.

Bamidbar 31:7 – They mounted an attack against Midian, as the Lord had commanded Moses, and they killed every male.

Sifri – they surrounded [Midian] on all four sides [this is the general opinion]; Rabbi Natan’s opinion is that the Israelites [surrounded Midian on three sides and] left a fourth side open so that [anyone who wanted to] could flee

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #9:

That is to say that [according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan] the Israelites left a place so that anyone who wanted to flee, could [in fact] flee. The Rambam is the six chapter of the laws of kings, in halacha seven, writes as follows: “when you siege a city to capture it, don’t surround it [completely] on all four sides, rather surround it on three sides. Leave a place for escape, so that anyone who wants to flee to save his life can do so. This is according to the oral tradition that thus it was commanded as it says in the verse ‘they mounted an attack against Midian, as the Lord had commanded Moses…”

The Kesef Mishna in his commentary on the Rambam cites the above mentioned Sifri as the the source for the Rambam’s ruling. To me, however, this is astounding.

It is not clear why the Rambam decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan against the general opinion. Also Rambam phraseology is not clear when he states “this is according to the oral tradition that thus it was commanded.” Where is this command [of only surrounding on three sides] alluded to? Further, what is the source of Rabbi Natan’s opinion?

It is possible to say that the Rambam was relying on what it says in the Jerusalem Talmud Mesechta Shviis, Chapter 6, Halacha 1. There is says that Joshua sent 3 public pronouncements prior to entering the Land of Israel. One of the pronouncements was that anyone who wanted to flee, was free to do so. So, apparently, it is unclear where Joshua was instructed to do this. One needs to conclude that Joshua learned to do this from [watching] the way Moshe conducted his wars. So, behold this is a proof to the opinion of Rabbi Natan. It is on this beraita [in the Jerusalem Talmud] that Rabbi Natan relied on for his opinion. Also, as it is known that an unattributed beraita is according to Rabbi Natan, it is therefore logical that the Rambam would decide according to Rabbi Natan.

This also explains the Rambam’s phraseology of “according to the oral tradition we learn”. The intent is that according to the way that Joshua conducted himself, we see that thus it was commanded to Moshe.

The reason for leaving the fourth side open is because if one does not do this, the fighters would fight without hope with their last remaining ounce of strength. It would then be more difficult for the Children of Israel to win the war. This would not be the case if a fourth side were left open for the combatants to flee.  

Exodus 23:5  If you see your enemy’s donkey lying under its burden would you refrain from helping him? You shall surely help along with him.

Gemora Pesachim (113b): “your enemy” – who exactly is meant by “your enemy”? Could it mean an “idol worshipper’s” donkey? That can’t be because we learn in a beraita that this teaching refers explicitly to a Jewish enemy. A Jewish enemy? Who gave permission to hate a Jewish person? Doesn’t it say in the Torah (Parshat Kedoshim): “don’t hate your brother in your heart”? It must mean a Jewish person who you saw do an immoral act.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #36:

This is referencing the braita in Gemora in Bava Metzia (32b) where it states that one is not obligated to help the animals of idol worshippers.  That statement [in the gemora] is dealing with the idol worshippers in that day] in previous times who did not keep the seven commandments of the sons of Noah. They were comparable to wild animals and constituted a danger to civil society. This is as I wrote on the verse above regarding a Jew’s ox that gores an ox of a non-Jew (Exodus 21:35).

However, regarding the non-Jews of our day, the financial laws [halacha pertaining to monetary issues] pertaining to them are not different than the financial laws pertaining to Jews. Therefore, certainly one is obligated to help their animals due to the same issues of relieving the suffering of animals [as would apply if it were a Jewish person’s ox.]

Editor’s Note: This is one of several places where the Torah Temimah stresses that in our times, the financial laws pertaining to non-Jews is the same as the financial laws pertaining to Jews.

Exodus 20:2 – I am the Lord, your God, who took you out of the Land of Egypt, from the House of Slavery.

Gemora Shabbos – 108(a): Rabbi Yochanon said, “How do we know that abbreviations are from the Torah? Because the verse says ‘I’ using the letters: אנכי (anochi) – this is actually an abbreviation for ‘I, myself, wrote it [and] gave it.’”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #3:

It is possible to say that the explanation of Rabbi Yochanon’s comment is that this is an allusion to the idea that all the ten commandments were heard by the Jewish people from God through Moshe except for the first two. Only “anochi” and “don’t have any other gods” were heard from the Almighty, himself. This is what is alluded to in the phrase “I, myself, wrote it and gave it.”

One can also say that this phrase relates to a common idea that people say: “One can tell what a person is like and what his characteristics are and the measure of his wisdom from his writings and his books.” Regarding this it is said that the essence of God, so to speak, His Will, His Honor, His Greatness and His Humility are seen and recognized from His Torah. As it says at the end of Megila 31(a), every place where you find God’s Greatness, there also you find His Humility.”

This is what is alluded to in the phrase “I, myself”. It actually means “I, the content of My Soul, wrote and gave it”. I gave it so that [others] can know and recognize me through My writings, through My Torah.

Editor’s Note: This note of the Torah Temimah’s is more poetic and mystical than most of his other notes.

Exodus – 2:13  – He went out on the second day, and behold, two Hebrew men were quarreling, and he said to the evil one, “Why are you going to strike your friend?”

Gemora: Sanhedrin 58(b): Resh Lakish said, “One who raises his hand against his friend, even though he never [actually] hits him, is still called a wicked person”. This is demonstrated by the verse “and he said to the wicked one, ‘why are you going to strike your friend?”  It does not say “why have you hit your friend?” but rather “why are you going to strike your friend?”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #38:

In other words, even though [Moshe] only saw them quarrelling, nevertheless he still said “why will you hit your friend?” {Moshe] said this because he saw the man acting in a way that showed that he would hit his friend; namely that he had lifted his hand. Since Moshe called this person ‘wicked’ we see that one who only raises his hand against his neighbor is called ‘wicked’.

Rashi on this verse writes regarding the phrase “why will you hit your friend” and explains that ‘friend’ implies ‘equal in wickedness to you’. This statement of Rashi needs further explanation [how could one conclude from this verse that the hitter was wicked?]  It appears according to the Responsum of the Mabit (Moshe ben Yosef Trani) that it is permitted to hit an evil person since they are not behaving according to the ways of our people. If that was the case, then clearly one who hits a wicked person is not called wicked. Additionally, since as we see from the previous note that the two people in this story who are quarrelling with one another are the [wicked] Datan and Aviram. If this is the case, how could Moshe call the “hitter” wicked since, indeed, he was hitting a wicked person?

The answer is that one must conclude that it would only be ok to strike a wicked person if one, himself, is [totally] righteous. However, for a wicked person to hit a wicked person is totally forbidden. Therefore, in our case, a wicked person is hitting a wicked person, it is appropriate to call him wicked!

This answers the [apparent] question regarding how Rashi could conclude that someone was wicked just because he was hitting a wicked person. [The answer is that Moshe knew it was Datan and Aviram who were fighting. The proof that the person was wicked or righteous does not lie in the fact that one is hitting an evil person.]

Look also in Choshen Mishpat Section 34: Subsection 4; there the Rema states that anyone who lifts up his hand against another become invalid for testimony in court. The reason for this according to what the Sefer Meir Eineim writes in the name of the Beis Yosef. He writes that even though [lifting up one’s hand to strike another] is forbidden biblically, nevertheless since it does not have the punishment of lashes, the prohibition of such a person giving testimony in court is only rabbinic.  Also, look in the Urim V’Tumim there.

In the book רה”ז he writes that the halachic practical distinction between whether the prohibition is rabbinic or biblical relates to the requirement to publicize the guilt versus no requirement to publicize it. If the guilt is biblical it would not need to be publicized (because everyone would know that this person is not kosher to be a witness) while if the guilt is rabbinic it would require publicizing.  Truly, according the previously cited opinion of the Mabit that lifting one’s hand is a biblical transgression but does not make one liable for lashes, then such a case would not require announcing because everyone would be aware of a biblical transgression.   If so, according to the opinion that we wrote that this prohibition is rabbinic only because it does not have a punishment of lashes but is, in reality, a biblical prohibition – then according to all opinions, announcing would not be required.

Translator’s Note: It is interesting to note that lifting one’s hand against another seems to be a separate prohibition from the prohibition of hitting another person. Further, the Torah Temimah’s main point may be that there is no assumption of righteousness to one who is hitting an evil person. He could very well be as evil as the person he is hitting.

Genesis 42:1 Jacob saw that they were selling [grain] in Egypt, so Jacob said to his sons: Why do you make yourselves [appear] conspicuous?

Gemora Taanit: 10(a) – Jacob said to his sons, don’t make yourselves appear as though you are satiated – don’t do it in front of Esav nor in front of Ishmael – in order that they not be jealous.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #1:

In other words, even though you still have grain in your store houses, nevertheless you should go to Egypt to buy more grain in order that you not appear as satiated [satisfied]. It is possible to say that this homiletic explanation of the word: תתראו   takes it as though it were written:  תתרוו which has the root meaning of “satiated”. This meaning of “satiated” is shown by the verse in Deuteronomy 29:18 (למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה ); also the verse in Psalms 36:9; also the verse in Psalms 91:16: “ואראהו בישועת’” – With length of days I shall satiate (אשביעהו) him, and I shall show (ואראהו) him My salvation. Reading the word “show” as rather meaning “satiate” also fits with the beginning of the verse. [Additionally, the double, parallel sentence structure is a common biblical construction.]

We find [often] that an “aleph” is converted to a “vav”; this is also the case with the letters “aleph”, “heh”, “vav” and “yud” are often switched, as is well known. The Radak makes the same point in his book MIchlol. See also Rashi in his commentary on Parshat Matos (32:24). [Please, dear reader, do check out this Rashi!]

Similarly, we also find that the aleph is often placed instead of a double letter. Examples of this are in Isaiah 18 with the word: בזאו instead of the word בזזו. Also, in Psalms 48 with the word ימאסו instead of the word ימססו – so too here in our verse with the word תתראו instead of the word תתרוו. See also what we have written in our commentary on Parshat Chukas (Numbers 21:14) on the verse “ את והב”.

Regarding the reason why the Rabbis explained the word תתראו beyond its simple meaning is possibly because in most instances the verb “to see” is followed by a noun or the direct object of what is being seen. This occurs in the phrase “seeing the face” and other similar instances. Here [in our verse], however, the verb occurs without an object, which is unusual. That is why they explain the verb תתראו with the meaning of תתרוו – satiated; satiation being a verb that occurs on its own and is reflexive.

Also, one should keep in mind that based on this explanation we derive the law that one who is not fasting on a public fast day for some reason is prohibited to show in front of those who are fasting as though he is satiated. This would cause the people who are fasting to be distressed. Similarly in the Gemora Bava Kama (92b) we find it mentioned that people are often not inclined to show themselves as satiated in order not to arouse jealousy or the evil eye. All this is learned from this advice of Jacob, our father.  

Editor’s Note: In this note, the Torah Temimah is, I think, teaching a moral lesson that he wants to convey. He does, at the same time, display some points of view regarding Hebrew grammar that are not frequently found.

Bereisht 28:20 – And Jacob uttered a vow, saying, “If God will be with me, and He will guard me on this way, upon which I am going, and He will give me bread to eat and a garment to wear; (21) And if I return in peace to my father’s house, and the Lord will be my God; (22) Then this stone, which I have placed as a monument, shall be a house of God, and everything that You give me, I will surely tithe to You.

Tosafot on Hulin 2:2  – The word “saying” [in verse 28:20 above] indicates that [in future generations] we should utter vows in times of trouble.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #20

Even though, in general, we discourage people from uttering oaths and vows in accordance with the verse in Ecclesiates 5:4 “It is better not to utter an vow”, in times of trouble we should make vows. It is further explained in Midrash Rabba and in Tosafot that not only is it permissible to make a vow but it is a commandment to do so in times of trouble. I don’t understand why the Shulchan Aruch in Yoreh Deah Section 203 uses the term ‘permission’ rather than ‘commandment’.

Look also at the Chidushe HaRashba in his comments on Nedarim 9a in his comments regarding the vows of evil people. There the Rashba answers the question of how could Jacob have uttered a vow even though the verse in Ecclesiastes states that it is better not to make a vow. There the Rashba answers that Jacob’s vow was not a true vow but rather a free will offering. I don’t know why the Rashba does not understand the verse in its plain, simple meaning. Further we find that regarding this vow of Jacob’s, God himself refers to it (Bereishit 31:13) as a vow. See also in the adjacent note the comment of the Rambam in Chapter 6 Halacha 33 of Erchin. We find similarly in Midrash Rabba’s comment on VaYikra Chapter 37 that due to Jacob’s delay in fulfilling this vow, Rachel died before her time. (This is in accordance with the text of Gemora Shabbat 30b that in transgression of a man’s vows, a man’s wife [could] die.)   From all these sources we see that Jacob’s vow was considered a real vow.

If there is a desire to answer the question of how Jacob could have made a vow against the words of the verse in Ecclesiastes, it is clear that in times of trouble the ruling is different [and we are actually encouraged to make vows in such a situation.] It would be a forced explanation to say that Jacob’s vow wasn’t really a vow. The text of the verse certainly does not say this and in any event, one needs to conclude that it was a real vow.

Look also in the Responsum of the Ralbach, Section 3, where he mentions that one who vows an oath in times of trouble to fast a certain number of days and it occurs that there is a Yom Tov [Jewish holiday] during those days, he is punished with lashes because he did not explicitly exclude those days from his vow. This would imply that vow was “in force” during the Jewish holiday that occurred. This opinion needs further study [and seems inaccurate] because how could one possibly think that the one who made the oath also included Yom Tov and that the vow should be in force on Yom Tov? Isn’t it explicitly stated in the Gemora Nedarim 66a that one who makes a vow like this is approached and asked whether if he had realized that Shabbat and Yom Tov were included in these days, would you have still made that vow? How is our case any different [than that discussed in the Gemora just mentioned]?

Perhaps one needs to say that since one is making a vow in a time of trouble, he is not particular about the [requirement] of joy during Yom Tov. Rather, he considers the fasting as a joy to the extent that it relieves his sorrow. This is in accordance with what our rabbinic authorities have ruled that one whose soul is afflicted and crying is a benefit [joy] to him, it is permissible for him to cry on Shabbat.

Thus we see why [per the Ralbach’s comments above] the vow is indeed in force on Yom Tov and the one who makes the vow is liable for punishment for not explicitly excluding Yom Tov.

Editor’s Note: In this note, besides the interesting halachic analysis, I think that the Torah Temimah did want to convey the idea that it is permissible to cry on Shabbat if one is in distress.

Genesis 7:10: “And it came to pass after the seven days that the waters of the flood were upon the earth.”

Sanhedrin 108B: “And it came to pass after the seven days… What was the purpose of these 7 days? The Holy One Blesses is He gave them a taste of the world to come.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #7

The toseftah for tractate Sotah (chapter 10) explains this more clearly as follows: “The Holy One Blessed is He gave them 7 days of eating and drinking in order that they should realize what they lost.” Yet, the reason for this benefit is not explained. Perhaps one could explain this based on the Gemara Taanit 21A

The men on watch in the temple did not fast on Sunday so as not to go from rest and pleasure to fasting and pain.

The commentators explain that trouble that comes after pleasure is harder than trouble that comes in an expected time. Therefore, Hashem gave the generation of the flood a period of great pleasure before the flood to that their pain be greater as they perished in the flood.

In another place we explained, based on this, the reason, as we hold, that anyone who eats and drinks on the 9th (of Tishrei), the day before Yom Kippur, it is considered that the person fasted on the 9th and 10th[1]. At first glance this merit is perplexing how can it be that eating and drinking can be counted as fasting? As explained, that a fast that comes after a period of much eating is harder, the increase of eating drinking on the 9th is a preparation for greater affliction on the 10th. Thus it is considered as if one fasted two days. Take note.

As to why Hashem decided seven days for this, one must say that it is revealed to Hashem that it takes seven days for a person to be fully satiated. Since Hashem wanted to satiate the generation of the flood up to the last minute, as explained, He therefore decided on these seven days. According to this, one can say this is the reason for the seven days of feasting for rejoicing newlyweds. Since it is a mitzvah to cheer up the bride and groom as much as possible, they established seven days to ensure maximum joy. This is also the reason for the seven days of a festival [2], on which, one must have extra rejoicing. One can also associate with this the seven days of mourning as it is written: “And I will turn your feasts into mourning[3] …” See also Judges 14:17.[4] We see that the two are juxtaposed. Just as a person will not be fully satisfied until seven days, so too, mourning will not dissipate in less than seven days. Take note. No further explanation is necessary.

One must clarify what is stated in Bava Basra 17a “The Holy One Blesses is He gave three people a taste of the world to come: Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.” Yet, our Midrash states that Hashem also gave the generation of the flood a taste of the world to come. One must say that even though the language is similar the intent is different. Hashem gave the forefathers a taste of the world to come so they would know what they would merit. Thus their pleasure in this world was like the pleasure of the world to come. Not so for the generation of the flood. The Midrash does not mean that the Holy One Blessed is He gave them a hint of the pleasure of the world to come. Certainly, because of the evil ways, they did not believe in the world to come. Nor, did they get a portion thereof as the Gemara explains. He only satiated them with all the pleasures [of this world] as numerous as the pleasures of the world to come. This Midrash describes to us (who understand the pleasure of the world to come) the value and measure of pleasure, with which, He satiated the generation of the flood. They, however, did not understand this; filling themselves with the pleasures of this world so much, that, at the time of their destruction, they would long for those pleasures.

Editor’s note: I find it very interesting how the Torah Temimah extends the ides of the seven days to other areas of Halacha. We should take to heart that our focus should not be on this world, but on the pleasure we can merit in the world to come

[1] Yoma 81b

[2] E.g. Passover or Succoth

[3] Amos 8:10

[4] And she wept before him the seven days, while their feast lasted; and it came to pass on the seventh day, that he told her, because she pressed him sore; and she told the riddle to the children of her people

Genesis: 3:3 But of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, God said, “You shall not eat of it, and you shall not touch it, lest you die.'”

Gemora Sanhedrin 29(a): Chezikaya said from where is the proof that anyone who adds something [ultimately] detracts from it? From our verse which states: “you shall not eat of it and you shall not touch it”.

Torah Temimah – Colloquial translation of Note #2

God did not warn saying “don’t touch it”. Rather, she, herself, added the idea [of not touching it.] Due to that addition she caused a [flaw] detraction. The snake pushed Chava into the tree so that she touched it. Then the snake said to her “look, you didn’t die by touching it and similarly you won’t die from eating it.” See our later comments in Parshat Trumah on the verse “two and a half amot is its width” where there is a similar [rabbinic] observation.

Already many commentators have tried to explain this difficult topic. If the woman [Chava] added the prohibition herself of not touching the tree, she would have already known that it wasn’t God who said not to touch it! If that is the case, how could the snake trick her by saying “just like you didn’t die from touching it, so you won’t die from eating it?” The answer is supplied by the Avot d’Rabbi Natan (Chapter 1) where it explains that when Adam told Chava about God’s commandment concerning not eating from the tree, he [Adam] added a ‘fence’ to God’s commandment and said that it was also forbidden to touch the tree. This was a way to prevent Chava from ever coming to eat from it. This being the case, then Chava truly thought it was God’s commandment not to eat nor touch the tree. Thus we see that the criticism of “all who add, ultimately detract” is not directed against Chava but rather against Adam.

The idea of adding the prohibition against touching was from Adam’s own thought process. So, one could ask, how could Adam actually come to add something from what God had commanded? Don’t we know from our laws of forbidden foods that there is actually no prohibition against touching forbidden foods? Maybe a [halachic] answer can be found according to the reasoning that other commentators use to explain why on Yom Kipur there is no prohibition on touching food but on Passover there is a prohibition regarding touching chametz [leaven]. These commentators explain that on Yom Kipur everything is forbidden and so there is no fear that a person will eat something. While on Passover, one can eat many things but not chametz [which can be eaten the rest of the year.] Therefore, on Passover there is an appropriate halachic fence to not touch chametz. So according to this, since the Tree of Knowledge was in the middle of the Garden amongst other trees whose fruit was permitted, it made sense for Adam to add the prohibition of not touching the tree.

So, if it made sense for Adam to add this prohibition, why do we apply the idea of “all who adds, detracts” to this action; since he actually applied the additional restriction appropriately? It would seem that an appropriate additional restriction should not be termed “detraction” or a “flaw”.

One needs to say that there is a distinction to be made between chametz on Passover [and the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge.] Since leaven on Passover has a period of time when it is permitted [51 weeks out of the year!], so a person is used to handling it. This is not the case with the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge which was forbidden always and had [absolutely] no period of time when it was permitted. Therefore it is more like completely non-kosher food that has no prohibition on touching it. So, Adam was in error in adding this prohibition to the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. This explanation was also written by the Shach in his commentary on Yoreh Deah Section 89; SubSection 4. Even though it is prohibited to put milk foods on the same table as meat foods, there is no prohibition of putting completely non-kosher foods on the same table since people are accustomed to stay away from completely forbidden items.  

Translator Note: I have heard from other sources that Adam’s mistake was not that he added an additional prohibition. Rather, the mistake was that he failed to inform Chava that God said “don’t eat” but I (Adam) say additionally “don’t touch”. If Adam had done that, then Chava would not have been deceived by the snake.