Exodus 18:7 – Moshe went out to greet his father-in-law, and he bowed down to him and he kissed him, and the man asked after his friend’s welfare; and they came to the tent.

Mechilta: I do not know from the verse who bowed down to whom or who kissed whom. However, when the verse says “the man asked after his friend’s welfare” [we have a hint.] Who is called “man”? Moshe is, as in the verse that says “and the man Moshe [was very humble”.] So, from this we see that it was Moshe who bowed down and kissed his father-in-law. From here they [learn]/say that a person is obligated to honor his father-in-law.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #8:

It is not readily apparent why it is so good to be called “man” or what new thing is learned from this. After all, isn’t the word “man” a descriptive term used for all people? Also, behold the verse in Exodus 2:21 states “and Moshe began to dwell with the man”. In that verse the word “man” refers to Yitro. [So, how can we know that in our verse the term “man” applies to Moshe? Maybe it applies to Yitro as in Exodus 2:21!]

It appears that the intended meaning of the Mechilta is to say that when describing Moshe, the Torah [at times] uses the phrase “the man” in place of stating Moshe’s name. The intent at those times is to indicate someone on a higher level; one would not then need to also say the name of the person. It is only concerning Moshe that we find the combination of the description “the man” combined with his explicit name. The purpose of the Torah’s describing Moshe this way is to indicate a higher, more valued level of humanity of Moshe. This is similar to a phrase used in Gemora Yoma 18a, “Ishi – the high priest”.

Additionally, the fact that we learn from this verse that a person is obligated to honor is father-in-law requires greater investigation. It is not clear why the Halacha to honor your father-in-law is not derived from this verse. Rather the Halacha is derived from the Midrash Socher Tov from the verse in Shmuel I: Chapter 24. In that verse King David refers to his father-in-law Shaul as “my father”. See the comment of the Tur on Yoreh Deah (Section 240). Note the Rambam in chapter 6 of Mamrim doesn’t mention this obligation at all. This is amazing considering the phraseology of the Mechilta above implies that this is a well-known and clear Halacha.

 The Bach, commenting on the above Tur writes that the reason why many legal experts omit this law is because they have the opinion that King David was actually speaking to Avner not to Shaul, his father-in-law in the above cited verse. If so, then that would remove the whole source for this law. How can this be so given the above Mechilta whose source is explicitly clear in the Torah and which is taught as a general teaching without anyone disagreeing at all??!! This definitely requires further research.

Also note the opinion of the Bach in his comment on the Tur that even if a person were obligated to honor his father-in-law, the degree of obligation would not be greater than every person’s obligation to honor one’s elders and would not come close to the level of obligation that one has to honor one’s parents. The Bach’s proof for this view is from the wording of the verse in Shmuel I  which he believes implies a slightly less degree of honor than that due one’s father.

However, regarding the actual Halacha, this is not accurate. Behold, here in our verse it says explicitly that Moshe bowed down and kissed his father-in-law and that we should learn from here the obligation to honor one’s father-in-law. Certainly, it is not accurate to say that this is the same amount of honor as is due, in general, to one’s elders.  

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah says two points in this note that are worth emphasizing. First of all, the phrase “man” is a general term that applies to all humanity and in the Torah is used explicitly for Moshe and his non-Jewish father-in-law. Secondly, the Torah Temimah criticizes those legal experts who skip this opportunity to learn the law that one is obligated to honor one’s father-in-law.

Deuteronomy 4:42 ” that the manslayer might flee thither, that slayeth his neighbour unawares, and hated him not in time past; and that fleeing unto one of these cities he might live:”

Sotah 49a: Unawares[1].  Rabbi Ilai the son of Berachya says: “Two scholars, who do not respect each other in halacha, one will die and one will be exiled (to a city of refuge) as the verse says ‘might flee thither, that slayeth his neighbour unawares’.  Knowledge is a reference to Torah as the verse states: ‘My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge[2]'”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #70

The end of the verse in Hosea is “seeing thou hast forgotten the law of thy God”.  This homily explains the juxtaposition of this verse[3] to “And this is the law which Moses set before the children of Israel[4].”  Perhaps they are exacting because the verse does not use the same language as the verse: “that killeth any person through error may flee thither[5]”  Rashi on the gemara explains that one dies at the hand of his friend who accidentally kills him.  The other is exiled to a city of refuge. If there is no actual death, the is a hint of death and exile for one is fitting to die and the other is fitting to be exiled.  This homily still requires a broader explanation.

Were it not for his words, one could explain this as is stated in the tractate Makkoth 10a, which states that Torah learning protects from death and exile, see there.  Behold this clearly refers to learning Torah for its own sake. For, in this manner, the two scholars respect each other since neither has another motive than discovering the truth. As the verse says “And Vhab and Sufah[6]“.  This is not the case when learning Torah not for its own sake.  In this case, they vex one another.  Learning such as this, in any case, will not protect from death and exile.  The intent of this homily is to show that learning Torah, not for its own sake, does not protect from death and exile.  To emphasize the point, the homily states that one dies and the other is exiled.  Take note.

Editor’s note: This note shows the importance of learning Torah for its own sake.  Scholars who do not learn Torah for its own sake are destined to attack one another, sometimes with drastic consequences.  Additionally note the Torah Temimiah’s humility, deferring to Rashi’s opinion before proposing his own.

[1] without knowledge

[2] Hosea 4:6

[3] Deuteronomy 4:42

[4] Deuteronomy 4:44

[5] Numbers 35:11

[6] Numbers 21:14

Deuteronomy 1:1 “These are the words which Moses spoke unto all Israel beyond the Jordan; in the wilderness, in the Arabah, over against Suph, between Paran and Tophel, and Laban, and Hazeroth, and Di-zahav. ”

Berachot 32a: “… And Di Zahav.  What does Di Zahav mean?  They say in the study house of Rabbi Yanai: This is what Moses said before the Holy One Blessed is He: Master of the world, the silver and gold with which You showered the Israelites until they said enough[1] caused them to create the golden calf”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #1:

There is no doubt that this homily and others like were said by way of a hint and support or to help memorize these sayings, for, by the strict letter of the law, it is forbidden to write down that which is oral.  These must be repeated orally. [In these times, however, it is permitted to write them down because of deficiency of knowledge[2]].  They sought methods make it easier for those learning and for their capacity to memorize.  They made mnemonics for everything as the Talmud says (Eruvin 54b): Make markers for the Torah and (Eruvin 21b): And besides that Koheleth was wise, he also taught the people knowledge; yea, he pondered, and sought out, and set in order many proverbs[3] – he taught them by way of signs.  Rashi explains: He established a tradition and sings, be it for the written word or the versions of the Mishnah.  Also see Shabbat 104b regarding making signs for the Torah and the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat chapter 19 Halachah 1): any Torah without a household is not Torah.  This means that any Torah that does not have an example from somewhere else is not Torah, i.e., it will not endure for it will ultimately be forgotten because it has nothing to hold on to for support.  We have discussed this, elsewhere, at length [the end of Parashat Tisa[4] and Parashat Hukath 21:18[5]].  This is the subject of this homily.  Chazal had a tradition that Moses defended the Israelites claiming that the great amount of silver and gold, which He showered upon them, caused them to make the golden calf.   The verse repeats this idea saying: “And Jeshurun waxed fat and rebelled.  They supported this idea based on the hint and mnemonic Di Zahav as explained and as will be explained further.

I investigated and discovered, however, that it is not the way of Chazal to associate homilies, such as this, to the wording of a verse unless they have a specific nuance or remark in the language of the verse, such that, it cannot be explained in the plain sense as we have noted many times in this work and as any wise person, who looks closely at all the places where similar homilies appear, scrutinizing the deep character of the language, the order and the like will discover.

Here, in this homily, it appears that the intent of the question, what is the meaning of Di Zahav, that they were not content to explain it in the plain sense as the name of a place, is based on what is expressed in the Sifrei and other Midrashim.  Every place mentioned here, about which, Moses spoke to the people, is not a reference to the name of the place, rather concerning what occurred to the Israelites there, chastising them for the events.  Only out of reverence for the Israelites did Moses refer to all these events as places as Rashi explains.  The plains refer to the sin of Baal Peor which occurred in the plains of Moab.  Over against Suf refers to the rebellion by the reed sea.  Tophel and Laban refer to Israelites degrading the manna.

Because of this, the Midrash states “what is Di Zahav”, that is, corresponding to which event, did Moses call the place Di Zahav.  Chazal interpreted it as an allusion to the place where the Israelites made the golden calf — where they gave their gold and made it as described in Parashat Tisah.  According to this reason, however, it would suffice to refer to the place only as Zahav.  The reason for referring to it as Di Zahav was expounded in the study house of Rabbi Yanai.  Because of the severity of the act of making the golden calf, Moses defended the people that the abundance of silver and gold that He showered upon the people, until they said enough, caused them to perform this act.  As the Gemara explains: a lion does not roar for of a box of straw — only for a box of meat.  There are other similar proverbs in the Gemara all based on the verse in Parashat Eikev[6]:” then thy heart be lifted up, and thou forget the LORD thy God, who brought thee forth out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage;” and Parashat Haazinu[7]: “But Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked–thou didst wax fat, thou didst grow thick, thou didst become gross–and he forsook God who made him, and contemned the Rock of his salvation.” explaining this idea.

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah shows how important it is to create ways to preserve the Torah so it will be remembered.  Even today, when one is permitted to write down the oral tradition, when everything is available in book and on-line, it is good to employ this technique to remember words of Torah.  The Torah Temimah explains that Rabbi Yanai specifically associated this homily with Di Zahav, the sin of the golden calf, instead of the other events to which Moses alludes, because it was the most severe.  The Midrash explains that while Moses was chastising the people for the events that occurred, he was also defending the people at the same time.  The lesson is that one should never be too quick to judge even when chastising a person, the chastiser should judge the other person favorably.

[1] The name of the place Di Zahab can also be read in Hebrew as Dai (enough) Zahav (gold)

[2] קוצר דעות – literally shortness of knowledge perhaps attributed to the descent of the generations as time progresses from the giving of the Torah at Mt. Sinai

[3] Ecclesiastes 12:9

[4] Exodus 34:27 Note 40:

[5] Note 18

[6] Deuteronomy 8:14

[7] Deuteronomy 32:15

Deuteronomy 1:13 – Prepare for yourselves wise and understanding men, known among your tribes, and I will make them heads over you.

Sifri: “They should be known to you”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #9:

The Sifri explains that it is not appropriate to appoint a judge when it is not known “who he is” even though he may be a great scholar. The Rambam in Chapter 2, Halacha 7 of Sanhedrin explains the phrase “known among your tribes” is in reference to the known saying that a judge must be someone who is pleasing to the people. This is according to the Gemora Sanhedrin 88b that states “Anyone who is wise and pleasing to the people may be appointed as a judge.”

However, it does need to be explained how the Rambam connects the idea of being “known to the tribe” to the idea of being pleasing to the people, especially since the Gemora itself does not use our verse to support this teaching. Perhaps one can say that the idea of “being known” is that people can see the content of his soul and can see his good actions and that through this the [potential] judge is someone beloved to the tribes. This is also alluded to in the previous note where it states that the word “men” means that a judge’s humanity is what needs to be known. [שבאנושיותם יהיו ידועים]  

In other words, the judges need to be righteous, beloved and pleasing to the people.

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah says that one cannot appoint a judge unless his “menshlichkeit” or humanity is known.

Deuteronomy 1:16 –And I commanded your judges at that time, saying, “Hear [disputes] between your brothers and judge justly between a man and his brother, and between his litigant.”

Sanhedrin 7b: Rabbi Yochanan said that [the command referred to here in the verse] was a [corresponding] warning to judges to be careful [zealous] regarding the stick and the strap

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #11:

It says in the book Chiddushei Aggadot that the reason why [Moshe needed to give a special command to the judges regarding punishing people with a stick [or lashes] was because in that generation [of the desert], the Jews then were more stubborn and prone to arguments and quarrels. This is consistent with the verse that mentions Moshe complaining to God (Devarim 1:12) “how can I alone carry their burden, their load and their quarrels”. For this reason the judges at that time were reminded about the corporal punishments with a stick or a strap.

This explanation doesn’t make any sense at all. Behold Moshe commanded many mitzvot at that time. Also the idea that specifically for this reason were the judges commanded then about the stick and the strap also makes no sense. The punishment of corporal punishment was not for just that generation but also for later generations. Also, that is the way of the world, that all court systems include punishments. Additionally, what does the Gemora mean to say when it adds that the judge needs to be extra careful or zealous regarding the stick and the strap? Wouldn’t it have been sufficient to just state that among the tools of a judge are a stick or a strap or a shofar or a sandal (as it is alluded to in the beginning of Parshat Mishpatim). Also, why is there no special care needed for the shofar or the sandal? Lastly, how is the word “corresponding to” appropriate here?

Rather the truth appears that the explanation is in line with that which it says in Psikta Rabbati, Chapter 33. Rabbi Shabbtai says “a judge must be according to the stick or according to the strap or according to whatever punishment he uses. The judge must not be suspect in any way while using a big stick or a big strap.”

The explanation of this is that the judge must not use corporal punishment to rule over others for his own gains. Additionally, it is forbidden for the judge to use a corporal punishment that is beyond the endurance of the convicted person. This is also mentioned in Midrash Rabbah Devarim Chapter 5 as follows “The actions must correspond to the stick and the staff, it must not be that it is the judge who has the need to hit.” In other words, when more lashes than are appropriate are meted out, or if the strap or stick is larger than it should be, then it is the judge, himself, who becomes liable for the punishments.

This idea is also mentioned in the Sifri on Parshat Ki Tetzei on the verse “forty lashes, not more”. [if the verse already mentions “forty” why does it also need to say “not more”?] It is explained there that there are two types of “overdoing” on the punishment. One type is on the number of lashes, and not going beyond thirty nine. The other type of “overdoing” is that if the judge sees that the person can only endure a given lesser number (such as ten) then it is forbidden to give more lashes than that lesser number. This type of extra caution and discernment by the judge is what required the extra degree of warning [mentioned in the Gemora].

Editor’s Note: One who is judging others needs to first measure himself and be sure that he is not meting out punishment for his own needs.

Numbers 32:3 “Ataroth, and Dibon, and Jazer, and Nimrah, and Heshbon, and Elealeh, and Sebam, and Nebo, and Beon,”

Berachot 8a: Ataroth, and Dibon … Rav Huna the son of Judah said in the name of Rabbi Ami: “A person should always complete his weekly Torah portions with the congregation – twice as written (in Hebrew) and once in Targum (in Aramaic translation) even Ataroth, and Dibon.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #1:

Rashi comments: even Ataroth, and Dibon, which have no Targum (they read the same in Hebrew and Aramaic).  Tosafot questions why the gemarah specifically mentions Ataroth, and Dibon as opposed to names such as Reuben, Simon, etc.  This question aside, the verse referring to Ataroth, and Dibon has the Jerusalem Targum[1] [which is also cited by Onkelos on this verse].  Tosafot explain that since Ataroth, and Dibon only have a Jerusalem Targum and no well-known one, one might think that one should read the verse in Hebrew three times.  Therefore the gemarah states that it is better to read it a third time in the Aramaic translation.  This explains the difficulty, albeit, their original question remains unanswered.  The Mesoret Hashas emends the gemarah to refer a verse in at the end of parashat Massei that refers to Dibon and Ataroth.  This verse has no Targum, however, this emendation does not answer the question of Tosafot regarding names.  Many of the commentators tried to explain this.

I wonder what led our rabbis to say that the gemarah was emphasizing once in Targum, for it appears clear to me that the intention equally applies to twice in Hebrew.  The explanation is that this verse (referring to Ataroth and Dibon) is not connected to the previous verses nor to the subsequent ones.  One could skip this verse without detracting from the meaning and continuation of the current section.  Here, one could skip from verse 2 to verse 4 without missing anything as it appears.  They said to Moses … (verse 2). The land which the Lord smote … (verse 4).  One might think that in such cases, there is no obligation to read this verse twice in Hebrew and once in Targum, rather once could skip the verse or read it only once.  The gemarah teaches otherwise, that his verse is like every other verse in the Torah, which one must read three times.

This shows the deep understanding of Chazal and their sensitivity.  Such a verse, which, as described above, has no necessary connection to the current section, such that, by omitting it one detracts nothing from the matter at hand.  Even such a verse is treated as individual and unique in the entire Torah.  Take note.

Editor’s Note: If one skips a word or an entire sentence when publicly reading the Torah, the reader must go back to correct the mistake, even if the omission does not detract from the current section.  A Torah scroll is not kosher if even one letter was omitted.  Lest one think that this does not apply to the daily study of Torah, the Torah Temimah shows the sensitivity of Chazal to every verse in the Torah.  Every verse in the Torah is unique and special.  Even if the verse seems superfluous, one must review it three times: twice in Hebrew and once in translation.

[1] There are two versions of the Jerusalem Targum: a fragmentary one and a more complete one.  The more complete one is sometimes incorrectly associated with the translation of Yonatan Ben Uziel whose translation only accompanies the prophets and Hagiographia.  Both of these provide a more homiletic translation than Onkelos who provides a more literal translation

Numbers 30:2 “And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel, saying: This is the thing which the LORD hath commanded.”

Nedarim 78a: “This is the thing.  A beraita teaches: This is the thing.  A scholar releases a vow and a husband annuls.  Based on this, Rabbi Yochanan says a scholar who uses the language of the husband [annulment] or a husband who uses the language of a scholar [release], his words are ineffective.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #2:

Regarding a husband, the Torah explicitly states in this parasha the language of annulment: “But if her husband make them null and void … (Numbers 30:13).  That a scholar releases vows, we learn from what is written later “he shall not break his word” (number 30:3).  The interpretation is that he who made the vow may not break his word, but others can break his vow for him from the language of secular.  The language of release applies to things that are secular.  The hindrance sited in the beraita is supported on the language of the verse “This is the thing” which implies it must be as written in the Torah.

The Rashbam on Baba Kama 120A, works hard to explain why switching languages does not work to annul a vow, even though the scholar and husband have the intention — to nullify the vow.  It appears simple to me since, when a scholar releases one from a vow, the vow is annulled from the beginning.  Since the scholar tries to find and opening or a reason whereby the person was unable or not allowed to make the vow, he uproots the vow from the beginning as if it never existed.  Not so the husband.  The Torah does not give him the permission to uproot his wife’s vow from the beginning, rather he is allowed to nullify it as the verse states.  The Ran writes on this matter in Nedarim that release implies retroactively uprooting and annulment implies from now henceforth.  According to this, when a scholar uses the language of annulment and a husband uses the language of release, they are using language that the Torah did not grant them, thus their words have no power.  Take Note.

According to this it comes out that only the language of annulment is ineffective for a scholar, but all other language that implies nullification and retroactive release, such as, “permitted to you” and the like, are effective.  That which the Gemara specifies the language of release is because it specified one of the languages that imply retroactive nullification, when in truth, any such language is effective in releasing a vow.

How well this explains the words of the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim chapter 10 halachah 8) that a scholar can release a vow using any of the following language: “there is no vow”, “there is no oath”.  This is as written the all language that implies retroactive annulment is effective in releasing a vow.

The Ran on this matter in Nedarim cites these words of the Jerusalem Talmud.  He states: “it appears from the Jerusalem Talmud that a scholar can also release a vow by saying ‘there is no vow’ or ‘there is no oath'”  The commentary Shirei Korban on the Jerusalem Talmud writes “I find his words [the Ran] difficult, because they imply that a husband can use such language to nullify a vow, but our matter [in the Babylonian Talmud], implies that only a scholar, not a husband, can say “there is no vow”.

I am deeply troubled that a significant Torah Giant, such as him, erred in the words of the Ran, whose intent was clear and simple.  A scholar can also release vows saying “there is no vow”, etc.  The word also was misinterpreted to mean that a scholar also (in addition to the husband) when one should  interpret it that a scholar can also (use similar language).  I would not have written this because of the clarity, only so that a student not err by trying to find meaning in the words of the Shirei Korban who interprets the Ran as allowing to husband to nullify vows status “there is no vow”, which clearly contradicts the widely accepted halachah of the Talmud in Nedarim.

Behold, as we have written, it is clear that a scholar can release a vow using any language that implies release.  Based on this reason the halachah in Yoreh Deah 228:3 explains the process for releasing a vow.  They say three times to the person who made the vow: “permitted to you”, “allowed to you” or “pardoned to you:. The reason for stating this three times is not because the law requires it.  It became customary to say it three times for emphasis.  See the commentaries there.  It appears that the custom of saying “permitted to you, etc.”, three times, when annulling vows on the eve of Rosh Hashanah, fulfills the custom mentioned in the Shulhan Aruch.  Yet, since the release of vows mentions: all is permitted to you, all is allowed to you, all is pardoned to you (many languages of releasing vows), they have released the vow two and threefold.  Take note:

Editor’s note: On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is customary for one to perform the ceremony of releasing any inadvertent vows that one may have made in the previous year.  Three men sit down as a make shift court of law.  One person stands before them requesting that any inadvertent vows made in the previous year be released. After making the request, the three men sitting inform the person that he is released from his inadvertent vows.  After this annulment, the person who was standing sits down.  One of those sitting arises to request that his inadvertent vows be released.  This process repeats until all four have asked that their inadvertent vows be released.  Although this is only a custom, the Torah Temimah shows how this is rooted in the halachah.  Not only do the three men mention the release of vows three times, they also restate this using different phrases that indicate the release of vows.  In this note, the Torah Temimah also shows that halachah need not be complicated.  He clearly explains, based on earlier sources, what other commentaries worked hard to explain.  He also states that one should not overcomplicate matters such that they contradict widely accepted halachic ruling and practice.

Bamidbar 25:13 – It shall be for him [Pinchas] and for his descendants after him [as] an eternal covenant of kehunah [priesthood], because he was zealous for his God and atoned for the children of Israel

Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin, Chapter 9, Halacha 7:  “One who has [public] sex with an Aramean, zealots are allowed to strike him.” This teaching is not in accordance with the will of the Sages and Pinchas [also] did not act according to the will of the Sages. Rabbi Yuda the son of Pazi said that they wanted to put Pinchas in cherem [excommunication.] They would have, were it not for a holy spirit that broke forth and said, “It shall be for him and for his descendants after him as an eternal covenant of priesthood.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #31:

The commentators toiled greatly to explain the above Gemora. However, the truth is that it is very easily explained in a straightforward manner. When the Gemora says that [Pinchas] did not act in accordance with the will of the Sages, it means simply that the law that a zealot can strike/kill one who is having public sex with an Aramean is, [itself], not pleasing to the Sages.

The rationale for the Sages not approving of this law is because the law depends on the zealot who is killing the perpetrator being filled with a genuine and true zealotry on behalf of G-d. That being the case, it is impossible to give a general permission to people to strike/kill someone who is having public sex with an Aramean.

Who would be able to judge the zealot? Perhaps he is doing this for some ulterior [impure] motive and just saying that he is doing this out of a being filled with a genuine zealousness for G-d? In the meantime, he will have killed a person who was not liable for the death penalty according to the law.

This is similar to the law in Gemora Yevamos 39b where it says that it is better to perform the chalitza ceremony rather than marry your deceased brother’s wife. The reason why it is better to do chalitza rather than fulfill the mitzvah of carrying on your brother’s name is because perhaps you would be doing the mitzvah for ulterior [impure] motives. If that were the case, you would then be transgressing the [severe] prohibition of having relations with your brother’s wife!

The question is raised “is it possible that the Sages would criticize a deed that Pinchas did?” The answer is “certainly, yes.” Had it not been for the heavenly spirit breaking forth and saying that Pinchas will have an everlasting covenant because he was a true zealot, they would have actually excommunicated him. Since the Divine Spirit testified on Pinchas’ behalf saying that he was a genuine zealot, he was then exempt from excommunication.

Note that this opinion in the Jerusalem Talmud is not according to the teaching in the Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 82a that teaches that Pinchas actually asked Moshe for permission first. Truly, in the Babylonian Talmud itself there are two opinions as to whether Pinchas asked Moshe permission first or not. The Jerusalem Talmud’s opinion is that he did not ask first.

Note that according to the opinion in the Gemora Sanhedrin [in the Babylonian Talmud] that Pinchas did not ask permission first before killing Zimri, the purpose of the divine spirit [heavenly voice] breaking forth was to show that Pinchas was also not guilty of the sin of “teaching halacha in front of his teacher.” [This is a highly criticized, disrespectful thing to do.]

We see in the Gemora Eruvin 63a that the punishment for teaching halacha in front of one’s teacher is to descend to hell without having any children and further that one is brought down from one’s high position. However, since the heavenly voice came out [and testified on Pinchas’ behalf], therefore he merited to have many children and also greatness. These rewards that Pinchas received correspond exactly to what would have been the punishments if he had been liable for the sin of teaching Halacha in front of his teacher. These two exact rewards are what show that the heavenly voice saved Pinchas from being found guilty of this sin [also].

Editor’s Note: Here the Torah Temimah is explaining to us his opinion as to exactly why the Sages looked down upon Pinchas’ zealotry in killing Zimri for having public sex with an Aramean. Perhaps genuine zealotry is praiseworthy as long as it does not involve injuring anyone else. In a legal system zealotry cannot be part of the equation in judging guilt or innocence. This is because the quality of being a genuine zealot cannot be judged by human beings. Someone who appears a zealot may actually have other motives.