Bamidbar 22:20 – God came to Bilaam [during] the night and said to him, “If these men have come to call for you, arise and go with them, but the word I speak to you-that you shall do.”

Gemora Makot 10b – Rava the son of Rav Huna said, “from this we learn that whichever way a man desires to go, they help him [go that way].  [We see this from the fact that] in verse 22:12 God says “Don’t go with them” and in verse 22:20 He says “Arise, go with them”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #7:

This is in accordance with the saying “Everything is in the hands of heaven except for the fear of heaven.” In this case here, God saw that in Bilaam’s evil heart he wanted to go with them, therefore God permitted him to go.

Look also in Rashi’s explanation on verse 22:18 where Bilaam states that even if Balak were to give him a house full of silver and gold, he [Bilaam] would still not be able to act against God’s will. There Rashi says as follows: “We learn here that Bilaam soul was wide and lusted after other people’s money.”

It is worthwhile to comment on the fact that we see in Pirkei Avot (9:6) as follows: “Rabbi Yosi Ben Kasma says: even if you were to give me all the silver and gold in the world I would not leave and go to a place that is not a place of Torah.” This being the case, how is it possible [for Rashi] to conclude something critical from Bilaam for using similar language?

Truthfully though, these two instances are not similar. In Pirkei Avot the situation was that a person was coming and enticing Rabbi Yosi to go and live in his city and he would be paid thousands of gold dinars for doing so.  Therefore it was appropriate for Rabbi Yosi to respond in a similar way and say that even if he were to be given all the gold in the world, he would not go. Thus we see that Rabbi Yosi responded appropriately and in the same phraseology as the enticement.

This is not the case here with Bilaam, however. In this case, Balak did not entice Bilaam with the enticement of making him rich. Rather he only promised him that he would be greatly honored as it says in verse 22:17, “I will certainly honor you”. Therefore, Bilaam should have responded in the same phraseology as the enticement and said that it wouldn’t matter how much honor Balak granted him, he still would not be able to go against the word of God.

So, why did Bilaam instead respond and say that even if he was to be given a house full of money he wouldn’t be able to go against the word of God? Certainly, this change of phraseology was because really Bilaam desired and lusted after other people’s money [and wanted to be rich.] This is according to the well-known fact that a person’s desires are often on his tongue [ie, people mention frequently the thing that they desire the most.]

Editor’s Note: I believe that the Torah Temimah here is interested in pointing out that the Gemora is not just gratuitously criticizing Bilaam.  Rather, the Gemora is pointing out how, from the wording of the Chumash itself, we see Bilaam’s lust for money.

Parsahat קרח- Numbers 18:15 A simple change

Numbers 18:15 “Every thing that openeth the womb, of all flesh which they offer unto the Lord, both of man and beast, shall be thine; howbeit the first-born of man shalt thou surely redeem, and the firstling of unclean beasts shalt thou redeem”

Kiddushin 29: “A woman is not commanded to redeem her [first born] son as the verse says ‘you shall redeem’ You shall redeem: any one commanded to redeem oneself (if not already redeemed) is commanded to redeem others.  One who is no not commanded to redeem oneself is not commanded to redeem others.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #51:

A woman is not obligated to redeem herself as will be explained in the next note. The commentators have worked hard to explain the double language in the Talmud: תפדה תפדה (you shall surely redeem)  Rashi on the Talmud explains vocalize you shall redeem (tifdeh) in the passive (tipadeh) – shall be redeemed.  There is no explanation for this.  See Maharsha and Mahashal who state that, aside from Rashi’s explanation being unclear, why not learn this ruling from the superfluous language in the verse “תפדה פדה“ – you shall surely redeem as in the way of Chazal to explain superfluous language such as this?  Another question is that the Rif brings the explanation cited by Rashi regarding a different matter — that a first born must redeem himself if his father did not redeem him as noted in the previous exegesis.

It appears to me that everything can be clarified with a simple change to Rashi’s explanation.  His comment ” vocalize you shall redeem (tifdeh) in the passive (tipadeh) – shall be redeemed” does not apply to this ruling regarding a woman redeeming her son.  Rather, it applies to the previous ruling that a first born, who was not redeemed, must redeem himself.  Instead of attributing his commentary to the statement in the Talmud תפדה תפדה, apply it to the statement תפדה פדה, which applies to the previous ruling that a first born who was not redeemed must redeem himself.  Thus everything makes sense and Rashi and the Rif agree.  [To recap]: One learns from vocalizing you shall redeem (tifdeh) in the passive (tipadeh) that a first born, who was not redeemed, must redeem himself.  From the superfluous language in the verse “תפדה פדה“, one learns that a woman is not obligated to redeem her son.  Another way to explain this is that the Talmud associates תפדה תפדה with תפדהפדהmeaning: one should compare the different rulings of redemption because of the repeating language in the verse.  All is clear if you investigate this.

Editor’s note: This note shows the Torah Temimah’s vast knowledge of Talmud and the commentaries.  It is another example of his resolving conflicting sources as  he does many times with seemingly conflicting midrashim.  The Talmud derives three laws from this verse, each due to how these uses the verb redeem.

1) The previous exegesis: a first born who was not redeemed must redeem himself.  The Talmud learns this  from the word תפדה (shall redeem) vocalized as tipadeh (shall be redeemed)

2) This exegesis: a woman is not commanded to redeem her son  The Talmud learns this from the repetition of the verb תפדהפדה (you shall surely redeem – both in the masculine conjugation)

3) The next exegesis: A woman is not obligated to redeem herself because the verse says תפדה(you shall redeem- in the masculine conjugation).  The Torah Temimah explains in the next exegesis that a woman is not obligated to redeem herself because no one is commanded to redeem her as derived from the verse Exodus 34:20 “And the firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break its neck. All the first-born of thy sons thou shalt redeem. And none shall appear before Me empty.”

Bamidbar 19:14: This is the law: if a man {adam] dies in a tent, anyone entering the tent and anything in the tent shall be unclean for seven days.

Gemora Yevamot 61a: We learn in a Beraitha that Shimon Bar Yochai says that the graves of non-Jews do not impart levitical uncleanness by an ohel [tent methodology], for it is said, [In Ezekiel 34] “And ye My sheep the sheep of My pasture, are men”; you are called men but the non-Jews are not called men.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #67:

Many commentators had difficulty explaining this Gemora. Tosafot additionally asks [how this Gemora can make sense] regarding the many places [in the Gemora] where the word “adam” specifically does include non-Jews. Further, Tosafot ask [a challenge to this Gemora] based on the Gemora in Sanhedrin 59a where it says that even a non-Jew who occupies himself with [the study of] is as great as a high priest (Cohen). We learn this teaching from the verse that says “these are the commandments that the man (ha’adam) should do, that he may live through them”. The teaching continues that the verse does not say, “That the Cohanim, Leviim or Israelim should do them rather it says “ha’adam” to teach that even a non-Jew who learns Torah is as great as a high priest”. Tosafot then answer their question by quoting Rabbenu Tam and stating that there is a distinction between the word “adam” [man] and the word “ha’adam” [the man] and they state that the word “ha’adam” [the man] would include non-Jews [but the word “adam” would not.] Apparently these words of Tosafot are only based on a tradition that they heard, since how can this distinction make sense logically? Many commenters have already tried to understand this explanation of the Tosafot; the commenters have toiled and labored to find a source for the Tosafot’s opinion.

It is [perhaps] possible to explain that the word “the” doesn’t apply [or make sense] when applied to a proper noun such as “the Moshe” or “the Aaron”. On the other hand the word “the” does make sense when applied to a word that includes a general category such as “the city”, “the river”, “the mountain”, “the valley”. This being the case it is possible to say that when “man” is written without “the”, it describes a particular noun, Israel [Jews] while when it is written “the man”, it includes a more general category such as the nations of the world. This explanation is a little forced.

This previous paragraph I have written just as an effort to explain and make sense of the words of Rabbenu Tam, which are apparently very astounding [and difficult to understand]. However, according to the truth, it appears that the simple understanding of the Gemora is not to imply that non-Jews are not included in the word “man”. How could that make sense? Behold this word is used to discuss the health of the body and the soul of the human species. Further, we find in many many verses where the word “man” even describes only non-Jews.

Rather, what our Gemora is saying is that in the places where God is speaking to the Jews regarding Torah and [ritual] commandments and He uses the word “man”, it is to be understood as meaning Jews and not non-Jews since they are not included in the [ritual] commandments. The Gemora then utilizes the verse in Ezekiel to say that the Jews are called “man”. However, this verse is not brought as a proof text rather as a hint or general allusion. This is also the opinion of the “Gritz Chiyut”. The particulars of the laws regarding levitical uncleanliness and non-Jews are explained in Yoreh Deah Section 372.

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah, in this note, discusses Jewish views regarding non-Jews. In other notes, he makes the point, emphatically, that the term idolaters used the Gemora does not apply to the non-Jews of modern times but rather to the “wild people of Africa and other faraway places” who have not accepted the Seven Noachide Laws. The Torah Temimah equates the Seven Noachide Laws as an acceptance of the basic social contract that binds society together. Thus, he makes the statement that for civil laws in the modern era, Halacha regarding Jews and non-Jews is equal. For religious laws, he says that it is logical that Jewish ritual law distinguishes between Jew and non-Jew.

Bamidbar 16:6 and 16:7:

6. Do this, Korah and his company: Take for yourselves censers.

7. Place fire into them and put incense upon them before the Lord tomorrow, and the man whom the Lord chooses he is the holy one; you have taken too much upon yourselves, sons of Levi.

Sotah 13b: “You have taken too much upon yourselves” – We learn in a Beraita that Rabbi Levi says: with the phrase “too much” Moshe informed Korah and with the phrase “too much” was Moshe himself informed. [In our verse] Moshe said “too much” to Korah. In [Parshat Vetechanan when Moshe is praying to God a lot to be allowed to enter Israel] HaShem responds to Moshe “you have prayed enough” [this is how God informed Moshe that he would not be allowed to enter Israel.]

Torah Temimah ColloquialTranslation on Note #7:

The commentators explain at great length the appropriateness of this “measure for measure” manner in which HaShem responded to Moshe when he (Moshe) asked to be allowed to enter Israel. HaShem responded by using the [exact same phrase] “too much” [and said to Moshe] don’t pray anymore, Rashi comments on this and says that God used the exact same phrase “too much”. God is very exacting with His righteous and punishes them in a ‘measure for measure’ manner. All the commenters agree that Moshe sinned by using this phrase but they don’t explain what the sin was.

It appears to me that Moshe did not sin at all in using this phrase with Korah. The implication of the phrase is to say “too much” to the sons of Levi [which both Korah and Moshe were descended from Levi]to basically say to them “you have enough honor and greatness”. Since Moshe himself was from the tribe of Levi, so he automatically included himself in the statement. That is why God, Himself, when Moshe was praying [too] much to God about himself that he should be allowed to enter Israel, God responded with the same phrase. That is, as though God were saying, “I have heeded you many times” and just as you, yourself, said, “too much [enough] is given to you, sons of Levi” therefore, don’t continue to speak and ask this of Me. We find similarly in the Aggada of CHALAK 111a that God used the thoughts of Moshe when Moshe went up to heaven, he saw God writing “be patient”. Moshe said to God, “Master of the world, be patient with the righteous.” God responded, “even with the evil-doers”. Moshe replied [quoting Psalms], “evil doers will perish”. Then when the Children of Israel sinned and Moshe prayed for them saying “God, God, be patient with them”, God responded “didn’t you tell me to [just] be patient with the righteous”? Here also when Moshe is saying that [the Bnei Levi] have enough, God reminds him of that.

Editor’s note: This is one of several places where the Torah Temimah quotes lesser known Gemoras that quote well known episodes in less than perfect light. In this Gemora, the well-known phrase that Moshe uses to critique Korah and his followers comes back to haunt him when Moshe prays to be allowed to enter Israel.

Bamidbar:15:23 – All that the Lord commanded you through Moses, from the day on which the Lord commanded and from then on, for all generations.

Gemora Kiddushin 29a: The School of R. Ishmael taught: whenever ‘command’ (צו) is stated its only purpose is to denote exhortation for that time and for all time. [Just for that time is shown by the verse in Parshat VeEtchanan:] “But command (צו) Joshua, and encourage him, and strengthen him.” Then and for all time [is shown by the verse in Bamidbar 15:23] ” as it is written, from the day on which the Lord commanded and from then on, for all generations.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #61:

The Gemora is not trying to say that the verb ‘to command’ (צו) implies that the command is an eternal command [as opposed to a command just for that time and place.] Behold, we see places where the verb “command” is used for just that time and place as in the verse “he commanded Yosef regarding his household” [Bereishis-44:1] or the verse “and Pharaoh commanded all his people”  [Shmos-1:22] and other many similar verses.

Rather, the Gemora is saying that when the verb “command” is used regarding laws and ordinances from God, then the verb “to command” is using to show that the commandment is eternal. The reason why the verb ‘command’ is different when used by God versus when used by a man is simple. A human being doesn’t have the power to command something forever; because he, himself, is not eternal. Additionally, over time the circumstances regarding whatever the particular person commanded will change and there will no longer be a need for that commandment. Or, on the other hand the circumstances would change and there would be a need to change the commandment. This, however, is not the case with the Holy One, Blessed be He. He exists forever and ever. Also, every single thing that emanated from His mouth [so to speak] is something that has eternal existence and strength.

It does merit further investigation, however, why the Gemora mentioned the verses that it does mention to prove its point. First it mentions the word “command” regarding Joshua that he should be encouraged and strengthened. Then the Gemora mentions our verse where it uses the word “command” and says explicitly “…for all generations”. [This is not a good proof because] it implies that if our verse had not added the words “…for all generations”, then the word “command” would not have  been sufficient for me to know that the commandment was for all generations. If this is the case, how can this verse be used as a proof for the statement that the word ‘command’ implies for all generations?

The explanation is that one time [is sufficient] for the Torah to reveal the fact that the word “command” when used regarding laws and ordinances [signifies forever] and it is leveraged to teach the use of the word in all other places. This teaching in our Gemora is using the “gezerat sheva” methodology as follows: “just as it says here the word ‘command’ and it means for generations, so similarly when it uses the word ‘command’ in any other place, it also means for all generations.

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah insightfully points out that the verse that the Gemora uses actually seems to prove the exact opposite of the Gemora’s point. It seems to me that the Torah Temimah thinks critically about every statement in the Gemora and accepts nothing at face value without analyzing it. In this case, he shows that the Gemora’s logic is comparable to a gezerah shavah and it is valid when viewed from that perspective.

Here is an excerpt from the Wikipedia article on gezerah shavah: The gezerah shavah (“Similar laws, similar verdicts”) is the second rule of Hillel and of Rabbi Ishmael, and the seventh of Eliezer ben Jose HaGelili. This may be described as argument by analogy, which infers from the similarity of two cases that the legal decision given for the one holds good for the other also. The term “gezerah shavah” originally included arguments based on analogies either in word or in fact. Before long, however, the latter class was designated as “hekkesh,” while the phrase “gezerah shavah” was limited to analogy in the case of two different Biblical laws containing a word common to both. The gezerah shavah was originally restricted to a δὶς λεγόμενον, i.e., a word occurring only in the two passages offering the analogy. Since such a word is found nowhere else, there is no reason to assume that it bears different meanings in the two passages. The gezerah shavah consequently attaches to the word in the one passage the entire sequence of ideas which it bears in the other.

Bamidbar: 6:23 – Speak to Aaron and his sons, saying: Thus shall you shall bless the children of Israel, saying to them:

Ketubos 24b: A non-Cohen who “lifts up his hands” [to do the priestly blessing] transgresses a positive commandment as it says “thus shall you bless…” – You but not a non-Cohen; A prohibition that comes due to a positive command is a “positive prohibition”.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #131:

The issue of a stranger [non-Cohen] ”lifting his hands” is that when a Cohen goes up to ‘duchan’ [raised platform]to bless Israel with the blessing of the Cohanim. That is why when we often refer to the blessing of the Cohanim we use the phrase “lifting the hands” This, thereby, distinguishes it from the general blessings that certainly one cannot say are solely allowed to the Cohanim. Every person is permitted to bless and give blessings to his neighbor. Even a non-Cohen can give blessings. The essential unique aspect of the Priestly Blessing is in this aspect of “lifting hands” as we will examine shortly.

It is appropriate to investigate the common practice that we see of people blessing each other by placing their hands on the head of the person they are blessing, as we see is the general custom in weddings, etc. How can this be the custom given what we just explained that this is something set aside only for the Cohanim? Also, as noted above, a non-Cohen doing this would transgress a implied  prohibition [there is no direct prohibition, rather it is an inferred prohibition by the fact that the Torah explicitly states that the Cohanim should bless the people.] It wouldn’t be plausible to say that the restriction of only having the Cohanim do this only applies in the Temple. I’ve never seen nor heard anyone propose that explanation and it would be an amazing proposal. Further, it would be implausible to say that the exclusivity of the Cohen for ‘lifting of hands’ only applies in a congregation of 10 men since it is a “holy service”. This is implausible because lifting of hands is only in the category of “alluded to” rather than a clear “law” as the RaN explains in Chapter 3 of Megillah.

Further, it appears to me that even for a Cohen, he is not permitted the bless this special blessing of “lifting the hands” in a time or place that is not set aside for this. The proof for this comes from the Gemora Megilla 27b where they ask Rabbi Eliezer ben Shamua what merit he had to enable him to live a long life. He replied, “I never did ‘lifting of hands’ without a blessing”. On the face of it, this story is hard to understand what great merit that would be for Rabbi Eliezer ben Shamua. Rather, one is forced to say that the explanation of the story is that Rabbi Eliezer ben Shamua never just did the ‘lifting of hands’ but rather only did it is the time that it was a mitzvah and when he was obligated to do it with a blessing.

Note also that in the Gemora Shabbos 118b it says as follows: “Rabbi Yossi says, ‘I never opposed the words of my friends [fellow rabbis]. I know about myself that I am not a Cohen but when my friends said to me to go up to the duchan I would go up.” Tosafot comments that Rabbi Yossi didn’t know what prohibition there would be involved in him [listening to his fellow rabbis to go up to the duchan] other than the [rabbinic prohibition] of making a needless blessing [that only the Cohanim are allowed to say for the ‘lifting of hands’. By the way, it was explained to this translator that perhaps Rabbi Yossi’s “friends”, the fellow rabbis, would have the authority to override something that was just a rabbinic prohibition.]Note that these few words of Tosafot have caused much rabbinic literature to be written amongst the Rishonim and Acharonim to attempt to explain these words of Tosafot. How can they say that the only prohibition would be on making a needless blessing? Isn’t a non-Cohen who does “lifting of hands” transgressing a “positive prohibition”? Also, the words of the Rabbi Yossi himself in the Gemora are extremely hard to understand. How could it be that he himself was not concerned about transgressing this prohibition of “lifting the hands” by a non-Cohen? In all the words of the commentators on this question, I have not found a satisfactory explanation.

[Therefore], I won’t restrain myself from explaining this in a new and amazing way that I saw in the introduction to the book by Rav Yerucham. He quotes this story of Rabbi Yossi but instead of the phrase “I know about myself that I am not a Cohen” amends the wording to be “I know about myself that I am not worthy”.

According to this way of reading the text when it says that his friends wanted him to go up to the raised platform, it was not to give the priestly blessing but rather to go up to the raised platform where the great sages would give speeches to the people. The duchan was a place that was high and stood out similar to an “itstabah”. As it says in the Gemora Baba Basra 21a: “they sat at the head of the “duchna”. Also the “Aruch” it notes that in the language of Ishmaelim, they call an “itztabah” a “duchan”. This is why in Gemora Megilla 3a and it other places it mentions the Leviim in their “duchans”.

If this is the case, then the issue with Rabbi Yossi was not about “lifting of hands” but rather about him [not wanting to go up, but ultimately listening to his friends to indeed] go up to the raised platform to give a speech to the people. The text of the Gemora merely needs amendation to “kedai” from “kohen”

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah’s enthusiasm and excitement at not restraining himself from explaining the story of Rabbi Yossi in a new and amazing way is contagious.

Parashat במדברNumbers 4:3 –No student left behind

Numbers 12:3 “from thirty years old and upward even until fifty years old, all that enter upon the service, to do work in the tent of meeting ”

Hullin 24a: “25 years old to learn and 30 years old to serve.  From here we learn that a student that did not see positive signs in his learning after five years will never see them”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #2:

The Torah specified these five years for learning because these are the last stage.  Thus, one who does not see positive signs in learning, during these years, will never see them.  Based on this, one can explain why the Tanah of the Mishnah in Ethics of the Fathers (5:21) lists the ages for learning in increments of five years (5 years old for scripture, 10 years old for Mishnah, 15 years old for Gemara.  Therefore, if a nine year old student does not see positive signs in his scripture, one is obligated to work with him one more year because there is still hope that the student will improve in scripture.  The same applies to all of the stages mentioned in the Mishnah.

See also the comment of on Nachmanides on this midrash in his Torah commentary (Parashat Behaalotecha – Numbers 8:24)

I do not know if this opinion is according to all the Rabbis for I have seen this statement in the Sifrei attributed to Rabbi Natan.

I do not know how to interpret Nachmanides because both the Gemara and the Sifrei that we have quote this learning anonymously[1].

Editor’s note:

The Torah Temimah stresses how important it is never to give up on students who are slow learners. Here Torah, here gives the Levites five years to learn the trade, as it were.  The Mishnah he cites gives five years for each stage of learning.  He stresses that it is most import to work with the student toward the end while there is still hope for the student to progress.  This is usually long after most teachers have given up in despair.

Many times, the Torah Temimah tries to resolve contradictory versions in the sources.  Here, he admits, that ,based the sources available, he is unable to interpret Nachmanide’s comment.

[1] Nachmanide’s copy of Sifrei mentions Rabbi Natan.  See Torat Chaim note 24 on the commentary of Nachmanides.  The Horrowitz edition of Sifrei mentions that there are versions that do not mention Rabbi Natan, implying that some do.

Leviticus: 27:34 These are the commandments that God commanded Moshe to [tell] the Children of Israel

Shabbos 104a: “these are the commandments” – from here [we learn] that henceforth a prophet may not declare any new laws.

Translation of Torah Temimah’s Comment in Note 216: Moshe was the only legislator of the Torah in its essence. All the prophets after him only came to explain and to exhort [the people to follow] the Torah of Moshe. This is also according to the translation of the Targum Yonatan who translated “These are the laws that God commanded Moshe, it is no longer possible to command new laws from their מדעם [their own thinking].

It appears at first [superficial] glance that a prophet is not allowed to create new laws, but if he were reinstituting an old law that had been forgotten for many years, then this prohibition would not apply due to the fact that actually this particular law had been essentially commanded through Moshe. However, this is not the case. We see this in the Gemora Temurah 16a where it mentions the fact that 3,000 laws were forgotten in the days during which the Jews were mourning the death of Moshe. [After the mourning period ended] the people requested that Joshua ask the Urim and Tumim [for the laws]. Joshua responded that the Torah is not in heaven. [Later], the people asked Shmuel to ask [the Urim and Tumim] and Shmuel responded to them “these are the commandments; a prophet may not declare any new laws”. Behold, [the Gemora] explicitly states, therefore, that even to renew laws that had been forgotten is not permitted. Perhaps one can explain the inclusion of these types of laws in the prohibition as being due to the fact that we no longer know the exact root of these laws, and since the new law is now coming to use fundamentally through the thought of the new prophet, it is therefore considering in the category of a “new law”.

On the other hand, see the discussion in Gemora Megilla 3, where it is discussing this issue of prophets declaring new laws. In that Gemora, it asks how it can be since “a prophet may not declare any new laws”. In Megilla, the response is that these laws are different since they were forgotten and the prophet is not only returning and re-establishing them. In other words, since the prophet is not decreeing totally new laws, only re-establishing old ones, they are not included in the prohibition mentioned above. Apparently this is a complete contradiction from the Gemora Temurah that we quoted above where it says that reinstituting old laws is included in this prohibition!

In order to reconcile these two Gemoras, one needs to explain as follows: There are two methods for a prophet to reinstitute old, forgotten laws. One method is through prophesy and the other method is through the general methods of Torah analysis and logic as with any other Torah scholar. This being the case, this issue now becomes clear. Returning old, forgotten laws through the general methods of Torah analysis and logic certainly would be permitted since a prophet is not less competent than any other scholar who knows the wisdom of Torah. In this method there is not even a hint of prohibition. Only through returning old laws through prophesy is there a prohibition.

Therefore, according to this explanation, the Gemora in Tractate Megilla [which said it is permissible] is dealing with the case where a prophet renewed old laws through the methods and principles of Torah analysis which is certainly a permissible approach. In the Gemora in Tractate Temurah, the situation is one where the prophet is attempting to restore an old law through prophesy. This is shown by the fact that they asked Joshua and Shmuel to ask the Urim and Tumim. This explanation is slightly forced.

Also, keep in mind that which it says in many places in the Gemora, “when Eliyahu comes, the exact law will be made clear”. The intent of this statement is not that Eliyahu will reveal the law through prophesy. This can’t be the case since he would have no permission to do this, as we just explained. Rather, the intent is that through the heavenly spirit that is resting on him, the depths of wisdom will be revealed and Eliyahu will then clarify the law through the general methods and principles of Torah. Eliyahu will thus remove arguments and mistakes; this will result in an ability to truly clarify the law. This explanation also helps explain the intent of the Mishna at the end of Ediyot where it says “Eliyahu is not coming to clarify what is pure vs. what is impure; rather he is coming to bring peace to the world”. That is to say, Eliyahu will not reveal laws to teach about purity and impurity through is prophetic powers. Instead he will make peace between [groups] that argue. He will do this by clarifying the logical arguments behind the disagreements to such an extent that each group of scholars will admit [to the wisdom] of the others. After that happens, automatically everything will be clarified and the true law will come as a result.

See what is written in Gemora Yoma 75a as follows: “Our Rabbis taught: ‘Gad’ i.e., the manna resembled the seed of flax in its capsules. Others say: ‘Gad’ i.e., it was like a tale, which draws the heart of man, even like water.Another [Baraitha] taught: ‘Gad’, because it revealed to Israel whether the child was one of nine months’ pregnancy from the first husband, or of seven months’ [pregnancy] from the second.‘White’,because it makes white [cleanses] the sins of Israel. It was taught: R. Jose said: Even as the prophet would tell Israel what is to be found in clefts or holes so would the manna reveal to Israel what is to ‘be found in clefts or holes’. How that? If, e.g.,two men came before Moses with a law-suit, one saying: You have stolen my servant, the other saying: You have sold him to me, Moses would say to them: Tomorrow judgment will be pronounced. Tomorrow, then: If his [the slave’s] ‘omer was found in the house of his first master, it was evidence that the other one had stolen him; if it was found in the house of his second master, that was proof that the former had sold him to the latter.”

The book Kafot Tamarim asks how it is possible in the above Gemora that Moshe relied on this heavenly clarification. Doesn’t this go against the principle of “Torah is not in heaven”? Further, doesn’t it say in Gemora Yevamos 102b that if Eliyahu would come and declare that it is permitted to do halitzah with a sandal that we should not listen to him due to the principle of “Torah is not in heaven”.

However, in my opinion all of these questions are not even close to valid questions. The prohibition of a prophet not creating new laws only applies in the cases where there is a doubt as to what the law is or in cases as we explained above. But in situations of clarifying a fact or revealing a situation, certainly it would be permitted to rely on a prophet. We find this situation in the Gemora Bechoros 24a, the following sentences: “And, moreover, if it is according to the Rabbis, why ‘Until he come and teaches righteousness to you’? ‘Until it be known to you’ is what is required?” Rashi there explains that this means that the Messiah will come and reveal the facts of the case. It is clear from this Rashi that we can rely on a prophet to reveal facts and situations. Also, look in the book “Meleches Machshavos” where he writes in Chapter 9 at the end of Halacha 6 of Ishut what he writes on this matter. What he writes there is not clear and according to our opinion this is simple and clear.

In addition to what is above, according to our explanation of the statement that a prophet is not allowed to create any new laws [that is to say, from the time of Moshe and onwards], Moshe however certainly could do this. This being the case, the Gemora brought above from Yoma took place through Moshe. That being the case, there should be no question at all about the reasoning behind that Gemora.

Know, further, that clearly all the ‘fences’ and ‘decrees’ [that prophets and sages have decreed] do not fit into this category of a ‘prophet is not allowed to create new laws’. Quite the opposite, actually. Rather, these decrees and ‘fences’ are fulfilling a commandment straight from the Torah itself as it says in Leviticus 18:30: “You shall diligently guard my charge…” This is taken to mean “you should make a protection for my protections”. Therefore, this [Torah] commandment is the reason why we find that, in fact, many decrees and fences were decreed [even] by prophets.

Examine the Rambam in Chapter 9:1 in the Book “Principles of the Torah” (התורה  יסודי) where he explains at great length regarding this particular principle (of a prophet not being able to decree new laws through prophecy.) It is astounding that the Rambam brings as a support for this principle the posuk of “Torah is not in heaven” as opposed to mentioning our posuk “these are the commandments” which is explicitly cited many times in the Gemora as the source for this principle. Investigate further what the Lechem Mishna says. Additionally, one can also say that included in his words are the concepts of “not adding nor subtracting from the Torah” as is explained in Parshat VeEtchanan. The Ramban in his commentary writes that the prohibition of “not adding nor subtracting from the Torah” relates to the particulars of known commandments. For example, [such items as the following would be included] – don’t have 5 strings in tzitzit or 5 parchments in the tefillin. However, according to the Ramban, our posuk of “these are the commandments” is specifically talking about the prohibition of creating new laws that have never been known before [at all].

In the opinion of the Rambam [who is disagreeing with the Ramban in this particular point], he feels that [creating new laws and adding to or subtracting details from existing laws] are really [different aspects] of one principle. It is merely [a happenstance] that the Torat Cohanim attributes this principle to the posuk of “these are the commandments” while in the Mishnah Torah (Sefer Devarim) [this same principle] is attributed to the posuk of “thou shalt not add or subtract from the commandments”. This difference in attributing principles to different posukim [or changing of phraseology] between the Torat Cohanim and the Mishnah Torah occurs a lot in various wordings and teachings. We need not lengthen this discussion any further.

Editor’s note: Besides being a long note, this essay of the Torah Temimah contains a wonderful exposition on the purpose and value of the Messiah coming. The Torah Temimah quotes the famous Mishnah that the Messiah is not coming to clarify laws and details relating to ritual purity and impurity but rather to bring peace to the world.

Leviticus 25:36 “Take thou no interest of him or increase; but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee”

Bava Metzia 62a: “… that thy brother may live with thee – It was learnt in a braita: Rabbi Elazar says that one can demand a repayment of explicit interest in court whereas one may not demand repayment of that that hints of interest[i].  What is the reason for this?  Because the verse says Take thou no interest of him or increase … so that thy brother may live with thee.  Only that by which your brother lives can be demanded in court.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #192:

The specifics of the laws regarding interest, even though they are numerous and differ one from the other, they all stem from a single foundation as explained in Bava Metzia 65b:

The main principle of interest is: any payment for safeguarding [money] is forbidden.

This means, any extra payment regarding money whether it be a loan or a sale.  For example, it is forbidden for the seller to say to the buyer: “If you pay cash up front, it will cost you $100, but if you pay you up to such and such date[ii] it will cost you $120.  There is a difference, however, between the two types of interest. Charging interest by way of a loan is interest that pertains something fixed.  This type of interest, referred to as explicit interest, is forbidden by the Torah.  Interest by way of a purchase, however, is only forbidden rabbinically.  It is also called a hint of interest.  The law regarding this type of interest is that one is forbidden from charging this interest, but the court does not force the seller to repay any interest charged in this manner.  Thus if the buyer complains, the court does not extract payment from seller unless the seller wishes to go above and beyond.  This is what is discussed here.

It is well known that in recent times, it is permitted for one to charge interest with respect to business transactions as will be explained.  This is very perplexing for there is not even the slightest hint in the Torah for allowing this.  Furthermore, the basis upon which Chazal saw fit to permit this is unclear.

It appears that our Sages saw a basis and a need for permitting this on the whole.  They investigated the matter until the crux of the prohibition, its basis and essence in the Torah, built and founded upon the principle of “that thy brother may live with thee”.  In the time when Torah was given, the main livelihood and business of the Jews was working the land. This was the basis for their wealth and stature.  One who had a lot of produce[iii] was considered wealthy.  Money was not an integral part of one’s livelihood.  When they loaned money it was not for business nor for acquisitions rather to allow one who was lacking to procure food and clothing just as one would procure these from the profit of his field or his work.  It is understandable that the poor borrower had no intention to pay back the loan with interest.  There was also no recognizable loss to the wealthy lender who loaned without charging interest.  Because they had no financial business, the principle of  thy brother living with thee did not apply.  In the middle ages, when the Israel lost its portion in working the land,  it remained a nation that thrived only on finance.  They could no longer continue the prohibition of loaning without interest now that money was the main basis for their livelihood and commerce, making the matter of interest equal for both the borrower and lender..  Thus the Sages saw fit to permit this.  Because of this principle, they reasoned that the Torah did not completely forbid charging interest.  Thus it appear to me.

The practice for loaning with interest was to write in the legal document that the lender is giving the money to the borrow for the purpose of business as explained in Yoreh Deah 167:1 and 177:2.  The borrower is permitted to invest the money for the profit of the lender based on the estimated gains. The estimated gains went to the lender.  Any profit above the estimated gains would go to the borrower.  If the borrower lost money on the investment, it was forbidden for the lender to collect the estimated gains. 

On the other hand, interest by way of sale, as described above, is very commonplace despite the lack of any provision for a leniency.  This leniency is stated the Tosefta (Bava Metzia 6:4)

A buyer purchasing goods with the intent to pay within 12 months is allowed to ask the seller to reduce the price if the buyer pays the entire amount up front.  In this case there is no concern of interest.[iv]

It requires further study how this is permitted.  There is to say that valuating the transaction if sold immediately as opposed to on credit[v] transforms the sale into a business transaction.

The Nimukei Yosef writes: since “that thy brother may live with thee” is a positive commandment, the court forces the lender to return the explicit interest in the same way the court can force a person to perform any positive commandment.  This is done by beating the person until one agrees to perform the commandment. The court, however, does not have the authority touch one’s assets because subjugation of assets does not apply in this case.  Similarly, this is explained in Yoreh Deah 161:5.  I find it troubling that the court can physically coerce a person, but cannot monetarily coerce the person to return the interest.  After all, if all the ways of Torah are pleasantness (Proverbs 3:17), how can physically coercing a person until one’s soul departs be called pleasant when the court could spare the person at the expense of one’s assets?  I did not find this law in Maimonides code of laws.  The words of the RaN, as cited by the Nimukei Yosef that one physically coerces a person until one’s soul departs (he dies), but cannot touch one’s assets, are extremely troubling to me.  In the first chapter of Ketuvoth, the RaN writes the opposite:

Just as one can physically coerce a person to perform a positive commandment, one can monetarily coerce a person.

Also for charity, the rule is that the court can touch a person’s assets when a person refuses to give charity.  Therefore, it seems to me that this law as it pertains to interest requires in depth study.

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah was a bookkeeper by profession.  Thus the laws of interest were not only abstract halachah but part of his daily job.  Knowing the particulars of finance and halachah he demonstrates how and when loaning with interest is permitted in our day.  This note also shows his sensitivity.  He is troubled by the those authorities who rule that one may only physically coerce a person to return explicit interest whereas, with respect to fulfilling other positive commandments, one may coerce a person monetarily.  Out of respect to the Shulchan Aruch and the earlier authorities who rule this way he does not dismiss this halachah, yet he notes that further study is required.  There are opinions that hold the halachah represents the will of Hashem.  If one finds a particular law troubling, the problem is not with the halachah rather with the person’s understanding of the halachah.  Here the Torah Temimah shows that is acceptable to question when one finds a particular halachah troubling.  This is not grounds for amending or abolishing the halachah.  Further in depth study is required to make a decision.

Second editor’s note: In this note, the Torah Temimah quotes the RaN as saying that if you illegally took interest from a person, the court can force you to return the money through lashes, even to the point where you might die from the lashes. The RaN also states that in this instance, however, the court cannot put a lien on your property.

The Torah Temimah has two objections to this opinion of the RaN. First of all, it is said about the Torah that “all its ways are ways of pleasantness”. This isn’t pleasant at all! Secondly, the RaN actually contradicts himself in a comment on Ketubos, Chapter 10.

Personally, I find these two objections wonderful. I find it wonderful that the Torah Temimah objects to the RaN’s interpretation because it would violate a “meta” principle that the Torah’s ways must be ways of pleasantness. SECONDLY, there are various technical reasons for rejecting the RaN’s approach. The Torah Temimah is dedicated to promoting and projecting a vision of Torah that is just and “whole”.

[i] אבק ריבית literally the dust of interest

[ii] Whether the buyer pays in installments until the specified date or whether the buyer pays the entire sum at that date

[iii] תבואה literally wheat, but also biblically refers to all produce from the field

[iv] As noted above, the seller may not charge a higher price for paying on credit vs. immediate payment.  Here the buyer is allowed to ask for a reduced price if the seller agrees.  There is no hint of interest in that the seller is losing money on the sale.

[v] הקפה could also be translated as deferred payment

Leviticus 23:3  [For] six days, work may be performed, but on the seventh day, it is a complete rest day, a holy occasion; you shall not perform any work. It is a Shabbos to the Lord in all your dwelling places

Gemora Yerushalmi Shabbos, Chapter 15, Halacha 3 – We learned in a Beraita: one posuk says “It is a Sabbath to the Lord” and [yet] another posuk says (in Parshat Pinchas, Numbers 29:35) “It shall be a convocation for you.” How can this be possible? Give a portion to Torah and a portion for eating and drinking.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #10:

[At first glance] this Gemora is difficult to understand because one posuk is dealing with Shabbos and the other is discussing Yom Tov (Jewish holiday). [Therefore the fact that there is an inconsistency between them would not be surprising.] It is well known, for example, that the holiness of Shabbos is greater than the holiness of Yom Tov. [This would explain why it says that Shabbos is for God but Yom Tov is for you.] However, in fact, this Gemora can be explained if we consider what it says in Gemora Pesachim 68b, as follows: Rabba said “everyone agrees that Shabbos must also contain an aspect of ‘For you’ because of the posuk that says “You shall call Shabbos a pleasure.” [Isaiah 58:13] This being the case, the Gemora’s question is based on “a fortiori” logic as follows –  “Yom Tov, which has a commandment to be ‘for you’, even though it has no commandment for it to be a ‘pleasure’ THEN Shabbos which DOES have a commandment that it should be a pleasure certainly must also have a requirement that it be “for you’”.

Also, keep in mind that, at first glance, the expression “It is a Shabbos for the Lord” would seem to imply that it should be completely for the Lord.

Look more deeply into the disagreement that is recorded in this section of the Jerusalem Talmud. One rabbi stated that Shabbos and Yom Tov were only given for the sake of eating and drinking. Another rabbi states that Shabbos and Yom Tov were only given for the sake of studying Torah. Clearly the use of the phrase “only” in this disagreement should not be taken literally. It would not make sense to say that Shabbos should only be for studying Torah without eating at all because everyone admits that it is forbidden to fast on Shabbos and Yom Tov. Rather the word “only” here is used to emphasize which aspect should have the vast majority of emphasis. In other words, for example, the one who says “only eating and drinking” really means “the majority of the time should be spent eating and drinking…” In the Midrash Tanchuma it seeks a sort of “compromise” between these two rabbinic opinions. The only who thinks that the time should be spent primarily on eating and drinking is discussing Torah Scholars who toil all week long studying Torah. These scholars need to enjoy Shabbos and Yom Tov even more than the average person [because of the way they spend their week.] On the other hand, the rabbinic opinion that states that Shabbos and Yom Tov should be spent studying Torah primarily are dealing with the average workers and the general populace who spend their time during the week earning a living. They should spend their Shabbos and Yom Tov involved in studying Torah.

Further, it appears that the Tanchuma relies on the phrasing in our posuk for this observation. In our posuk it says, “six days you shall work, on the seventh it will be for God, don’t do any work”. The inference in the posuk is that if you work for six days, then the seventh day should be for God. Additionally note that the phrase “don’t do any work” is out of place. The proper place for it is in Parshat Yitro [with the ten commandments including ‘observe Shabbos’] and in fact in Parshat Yitro it does clarify and explain there the law about resting [and not doing work] on Shabbos. Rather, here in our posuk it mentions not doing work to hint to the fact that these people who work all week long at their jobs, they should make the Shabbos day holy [almost] entirely for God and make it a day of study.

Look also at the Beit Yosef on the Tur Orach Chaim at the beginning of section 288 and in the Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim section 290. See also what I write regarding this in Parshat Yitro.

Editor’s Note: I think that the Torah Temimah is often discussing the issues relating to the ‘common man’. In fact, I think he wrote his book for the common man who wants a deeper understanding of the Bible, which often is as far as the common man had time to study. This note is directed to the common man and how he should spend his Shabbos.