Leviticus: 6:2 – Command (צו) Aaron and his sons saying: This is the law of the elevation offering [it is it that stays] on the flame, on the Altar, all night until the morning, and the fire of the Altar should be kept aflame on it.

Tosefet Bracha: Rashi here quotes the Torat Cohanim as follows: The word “command” [‘tvav’ / צו] is used to mean ‘exhort to perform diligently now and for generations to come’. Rabbi Shimon states that the extra exhortation is needed in cases where [performing the commandment] involves a monetary loss.

It is worthwhile to consider more thoughtfully the reason why command/tvav implies extra diligence. It is possible to explain this idea according to the idea that is mentioned frequently in the Gemora “Greater is one who is commanded to perform a mitzvah and does it, than one who is not commanded to perform it, but does it anyway”.

As, for example, a blind person who is exempt from performing mitzvot, but who does them anyway. The reason why one who is commanded is ‘greater’ is explained by Tosafot in the Gemora Kiddushin 31a. It is because the one who issues the command is worried that perhaps the commanded one won’t heed the command and perform the mitzvah. [Note: the root of mitvah is “tzav” – commandment.] This issue [of the Commander’s expectations] is not present for one who is not commanded; in that case there is no worry. Since there is no command, if the person does not voluntarily perform the deed, he does not transgress a command in any way.

Therefore, this person who is commanded, he actually does need more exhortation to perform the commandment. Since, perhaps, it may not be convenient for him to perform it. This is the connection between the concept of commandment and extra exhortation. Together with accepting the command comes an extra need for exhortation and diligence.

Let us also consider more deeply why the word command/tzav also implies “for now and for generations”. The emphasis isn’t on the verb “command” per se but rather circumstance of God doing the commanding. When God commands, He means for now and for generations to come. Behold we find many instances where the verb “command” is used only for a short period of time. Examples are: 1. In the beginning of Parshat VaYishlach (Genesis 32:5) “He (Jacob) commanded them” 2. Parshat VaYichi (Genesis 40:2) “Joseph commanded his servants”  3. Parshat Shmot (Exodus 5:6) “Pharaoh commanded the taskmasters…” There are many other examples. These, however, are examples of people commanding others. Commandments from God, however, are for now and for generations to come.

The reason why there is a difference between God’s commands and people’s commands is obvious. People, since they only exist temporarily, cannot issue commands for eternity – who knows, perhaps the situation will change. This is not so with God. Since He is Eternal, He can issue commands that apply forever.

This approach is the approach that we took to explain one aspect of the liturgy for Rosh HaShana [the New Year]. “All believe that He exists forever and He is Good and does good to evildoers and to good people.”

[וכל מאמינים שהוא חי וקים, הטוב ומטיב לרעים ולטובים]

It is not clear how God’s existing forever is related to His aspect of doing good to evildoers and to good people. However, it can be explained as follows: People, who do not live forever, when they want to exact payment or revenge from on who hates them, they cannot tarry and wait. Since their days are short and they don’t know when their end will come. God, however, He exists forever. He does not need to hurry to exact judgement from those who hate Him. He can be sure that that day will come. Alternatively, the evildoer might repent and change his ways. Either way, God has done a good thing for the evildoer.

Let us also consider more deeply why exhortation is more needed when there is a monetary loss involved. Rabbi Shimon’s intent here is that this statement applies to the “elevation offering” of which the Cohanim [the descendants of Aaron] don’t get any share in it at all. The concern is that perhaps they may weaken a bit in their diligence for this mitzvah. It seems improbable to say this to a group referred to as God’s special messengers. (See Gemora Kiddushin 23b)

Further, besides our use of the word “command” here, this word appears many times in the Torah and there is no special exhortation or diligence required. As it often says “Command the Children of Israel saying…” Or “Command Joshua…” in Deuteronomy. There are many other examples where the word is used without any extra diligence being meant.

Also we need to consider the adjacent phrase in the verse “it is it that stays on the flame all night long”. This phraseology of “it is it…” is not usual nor does it flow well. It should have just continued with the details of the commandment “this is the Torah of the elevation offering, it will burn all night…” as is the usual phraseology used in the Torah.

Therefore, it appears possible to say that the verse itself explains why extra exhortation and diligence is required for this commandment of the elevation offering. The explanation is in accordance with the first Mishna in the Tractate of Brachot where it states that “Burning the fats and organs [of the sacrifices, on the Temple altar] — this precept [can be performed] until the break of dawn….If this is so, why did the Sages say ‘until midnight’? To distance a person from transgression.”

The explanation of this Mishna is that it is the nature of man when it is possible to perform a mitzvah throughout the entire night, he can tarry and weaken and think that he still has enough time left. With this type of thinking, he might then actually come to a transgression [since one dawn comes, he has missed the time and may not perform the commandment.] That is why our verse uses the word commandment with the implication of extra exhortation and diligence. Since the verse is commanding specifically regarding the elevation offering that can burn on the alter all night [but not longer] there was a concern that the Cohanim could weaken and therefore needed extra exhortation.

Thus, one can conclude that the phrase “the word ‘command’ always means extra exhortation” is not exact but rather is a contraction of its total meaning. The total phrase should be “the word ‘command’ IN THIS CASE means extra exhortation”. The average meaning of the word ‘command’ is ‘appoint’ or ‘designate’.

In this exact same manner do we explain the Gemora Berachot 9b explaining the verse in Exodus, Parshat Bo. There is says “say ‘please’ [na] into the ears of the people”. There the Gemora comments “the word ‘na’ always means ‘request’”. The truth is that there are many examples where the word ‘na’ is used without any reference to ‘request’. Rather, the meaning is the same as noted above “IN THIS CASE” the word ‘na’ means only ‘request’.

Similarly, we find in the beginning of Parshat BeShalach when it says “it was that when Pharaoh ‘sent’ [shlach] the people…” The Mechilta when commenting on this verse says “the word ‘sent’ always meaning ‘accompany’…” Again, we find many examples where the word ‘sent’ does not mean ‘accompany’. Thus, we see that the intent of this phrase in the Gemora is to say “in this case” rather than “in all cases”. See also the Gemora Makot 8a where more examples are given.

Also, note that further along in our chapter (Chapter 6, verse 7) it says “This is the law of the meal offering…”. According to what Rashi writes at the beginning of Leviticus that anywhere where a verse is missing the words “speak to”, “say to” or “command”, that verse relies on the command from the previous commands. Thus, this “command” in our verse, with the extra exhortation, also applies to the meal offering. We need to search and find a reason why extra diligence is also required with the meal offering because the explanation of “all night long” does not apply to the meal offering.

Perhaps one can say that the explanation is according to the Gemora Menachot 55a. There is states that all the meal offerings were mixed with warm water and one needs to be careful that they not become leavened bread. This may be the explanation: that extra diligence is required to ensure that the meal offerings do not become leavened bread.

It is also likely to quote the often-repeated refrain: “Cohanim are diligent”. The reason they are diligent is because they have been commanded all of these commandments and they have many obligations. This is another instance of the connection of the idea of being diligent and the idea of commanded.

Editor’s note: Certainly, the topic of why ‘one who is commanded is greater’ is an important topic for many people. It is wonderful that the Torah Temimah gives us an opportunity to discuss it.

Parsahat צו Leviticus 6:2 –

Leviticus 6:2 “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: This is the law of the burnt-offering: it is that which goeth up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning; and the fire of the altar shall be kept burning thereby. ”

Megilah 21a: “all night unto the morning”.  This teaches that the entire night is fit for burning fats and entrails

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #7:

The Talmud learns this from the extra language in the verse (all night/until the morning).  It would have been sufficient for the verse to state “all night”.  If the verse only stated “all night”, one could infer that all night does not mean the entire night rather only a portion of the night. In truth we see examples where all (כל) indicates a part as in the verse referring to King Saul (Samuel I 28:20): “ Then Saul fell straightway his full length upon the earth, and was sore afraid, because of the words of Samuel; and there was no strength in him; for he had eaten no bread all the day, nor all the night.”  A later verse[1] explains that he did eat at night.  Thus we see that כל can refer to the entirety or to a portion.  Until the morning is not superfluous, rather it teaches us that the burning of fats and entrails is valid the entire night.  Refer to the commentary of the Taz to Orach Chaim Siman תקפח[2]. Refer also to what in written on verse 8.

Refer also to the first Mishnah in Berachot that lists all the things that are valid all night except that the Rabbis enacted a safeguard to prevent one from transgressing by only allowing one to perform these commandments until midnight.  Rashi comments on this Mishanh that the Rabbis did not make this decree regarding the burning of fats and entrails[3]. 

The reason why the Rabbis made an exception for the burning of fats and entrails is unclear.  A possible reason for this is the commentary of the Taz to Yoreh Deah Siman קיז and the Kesef Mishnah: “The Rabbis do not have the power to forbid anything that the Torah permits.”  Because the verse here explicitly permits it as it says “all night until the morning” as explained above, however, Rambam in Chapter four of the laws of sacrifices[4] disagrees with Rashi.  For further insight refer to the Tosafot Yom Tov and Shnot Eliyahu on the first Mishnah in Berachot.

It is clear that the burning of fats and entrails is not obligatory in that they must be burned at night, rather one is permitted to burn them at night for it is sufficient if they were consumed during the day.  Regarding what the Talmud says in the beginning of chapter four of Berachot (26b), that the three daily prayers correspond to the three daily sacrifices.  The evening prayer corresponds to the burning of fats and limb which could b done all night.  What was said above clearly explains why the evening service is optional because it corresponds to an optional sacrifice.  When it says that the fats and entrails are offered at night, it means that that one is allowed to offer them at night.  If they were consumed during the day, there is no obligation to leave them to be offered at night.

Another parallel between the evening service and the burning of the fats and entrails is that the time for both is the entire night.  The Rabbis did not enact a safeguard for the evening service as explained in the Talmud Berachot.  Similarly they did not enact a fence for the burning of fats and entrails to which the evening service corresponds.  See also the Beit Yosef to Orach Chaim 233.

Editors note: The Torah Temimah discusses a fundamental principle of rabbinic law.  The Rabbis do not have the power to forbid what the Torah explicitly permits as in the case discussed here.  Where the Torah does not explicitly permit something, the Rabbis have the power to enact safeguards to prevent one from sinning.  Even in such a case, they cannot prohibit the item or action on a biblical level.  They can place a limitation on the person forbidding them to benefit from the item or performing an action.  For example, when the Rabbis enacted the safeguard of not eating fowl and milk, they did not say that the Torah also refers to birds when it prohibits boiling a calf in its mother’s milk for that would violate the prohibition of adding a law to the Torah.  They placed a restriction on people not to eat fowl and milk together.  Another means, by which, the Rabbis prevent one from performing what the Torah permits is telling the person to refrain from doing the act (שב ואל תעשה) as in the case of not blowing the shofar when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  See Leviticus 12:3 note 14 where he expresses a similar idea with respect to circumcision on Shabbat.

 

[1] 28:23-25 But he refused, and said: ‘I will not eat.’ But his servants, together with the woman, urged him; and he hearkened unto their voice. So he arose from the earth, and sat upon the bed.  And the woman had a fatted calf in the house; and she made haste, and killed it; and she took flour, and kneaded it, and did bake unleavened bread thereof; and she brought it before Saul, and before his servants; and they did eat. Then they rose up, and went away that night.

[2] Halacha 5  note 5: referring to blowing shofar on Shabbat

[3] O.V. To distance a person from transgressing:  While the Mishnah lists the burning of fats and entrails, Rashi comments that this Mishnah cites it as example of something that is valid all night.  Thus is it not included in the list of acts, which that Rabbis forbade after midnight that follows.  The Talmud in Megilah (20b) also supports this.  Other commentators disagree with Rashi stating the Mishnah in Berachot includes it in the list of things that are forbidden after midnight.

[4] Halacha 2: Any animal whose enablers ( in Hebrew מתיריו) were offered during the day can be brought to the altar all night … In order to distance from transgression, the Rabbis said that one is not allowed to burn the entrails and limbs of the burnt offering until midnight.

Leviticus 7:34 “For the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving have I taken of the children of Israel out of their sacrifices of peace-offerings, and have given them unto Aaron the priest and unto his sons as a due for ever from the children of Israel.”

Jerusalem Talmud Tractate Yevamoth Chapter 8 Halachah 1: and have given them… These priestly gifts (the breast and thigh) never return (to those that gave them) as the verse says “and have given them …”.  Just as a gift never returns to the giver, so too these priestly gifts do not return.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #139:

The Jerusalem Talmud explains that the breast and the thigh differ from other priestly gifts such as terumah and the like because there is no food from which terumah is not given to a Cohen[1], unlike the breast and the thigh, that only apply to edible sacrifices offered in the Temple[2], but do not apply to non-sacrificial meat as explained in the previous commentary[3].  The Jerusalem Talmud explicitly states that, were the Israelites (i.e. not Cohanim) worthy, they would take the breast and thigh for themselves from their sacrifices.  Since the Israelites were not worthy[4], the breast and the thigh were taken from them and given to the Cohanim.  Based on this, the Jerusalem Talmud states: “Just as a gift never returns, so too these priestly gifts do not return.”  One might think since, the main reason the Cohanim merited the breast and the thigh was because the Israelites were not worthy, should the Israelites become worthy, the breast and the thigh should be taken from the Cohanim and given back to the Israelites.  Therefore, the Jerusalem Talmud teaches us that they never return from the Cohanim.[5]

Nonetheless, one must explain the necessity of this nuance in that verse explicitly states “as a due forever” which implies an everlasting right.  Furthermore, the comparison from a gift is not completely accurate because a gift returns in the Jubilee year as explained in Tractate Bechorot 52b[6].

It is possible to say that this nuance of the Jerusalem Talmud teaches us that a gift from G-d is not like a gift from one person to another.  Regarding a gift between people, if there is an estimation that shows that the gift was given on condition, the gift can be returned when the reason or condition, upon which, the gift was given becomes void.  One example of this is how we rule based on the Talmud (Ketuvoth 54a) [7].

For a widow, we deduct the value of her clothing from the value of her ketuvah because we assume that he gave them to her to appear before him.

Tosafot on 54b, proposes a similar idea.

The inheritors of a betrothed woman who died do not inherit from money that the husband added to the minimum value of the ketuvah because we say that he only included the increase in order to marry her.[8]

And in Bava Basra 146b

If a person, upon hearing that his son died, gifted his money to someone else, the gift is returned should the son arrive, for the only reason he gifted the money was because he thought that his son was deceased.

There are many similar ideas in the Talmud.

Yet, things do not work this way with respect to the Holy One Blessed is He.  Even if one could determine the reason why G-d made a person worthy, we could not take away what He gave the person should the reason become void.  Perhaps the reason for what is as stated in Makkot 11a “Everything that the Holy One Blessed is He states for the good, even conditionally stated, never changes for the worse.” [Unless there is an explicitly stated condition, such as, “ If ye walk in My statutes…[9]”

From this was can learn the basis for ruling on the basis of estimation.  When a person gives a gift based on a certain condition, one need not explain the condition.  Rather we rule on estimation alone.  See further what is written about this in Leviticus 5:1[10]

Editor’s note: This note also shows his incredible knowledge of the rabbinic sources.  At first glance, one could wonder what the priestly portions have to do with Jewish monetary laws, yet the Torah Temimah clearly shows, based on a difference between gifts from G-d to people and gifts between people that there is a connection.  He brings proof from various monetary cases that show, whenever the court can estimate the intention of the person giving the gift, it is possible to revoke the gift if the intention is no longer valid.  This is not the case by G-d, even if we could possibly determine His intention.  All this from a breast and a thigh!