Leviticus 11:4 – But these you shall not eat among those that bring up the cud and those that have a cloven hoof: the camel, because it brings up its cud, but does not have a [completely] cloven hoof; it is unclean for you.

Gemora Ketubot 60a: Why does it use the phrase “it is unclean”, “it” is unclean; human milk and blood, however, is not unclean but clean.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #18:

The phrase “those who walk on two feet” refers to humans. As for why it didn’t explicitly say “humans”, look at what I have written on note # 9.

It is probable that the comment on our posuk is made regarding the word “hu” [it]. In the adjacent sentences discussing forbidden items, it just says “tamei l’chem” [forbidden to you] which refers to what came before it, including the camel in our posuk. Additionally it does not say “it is forbidden to you”. Since it uses the word “it” here, we can learn that something else is excluded from being forbidden. Truthfully, also in Parshat Re’eh it also lists all the unclean animals together and says “forbidden to you”.

For all these reasons, the lesson is derived from here that milk and blood of humans is permitted. (And as our Sages mention, blood of a person is only permitted where it didn’t separate completely from the person, such as blood between one’s teeth. However, if it did separate [and one were to collect it] into a vessel, it would be forbidden because of “maarat ayin” [permitting something that could be easily misinterpreted] lest people might think that it is the blood of an animal.

Now, see that from this drasha that is permitting the milk and blood of a person to eat, we see a proof to the opinion of the Rambam that we mentioned above in note #9 that eating flesh of a person is a violation of a positive commandment [the commandment that stated explicitly what you should eat. Also, recall that the Ramban and Rashba said that there is no prohibition against eating people.]

Note that there is a general principle that something which derives from a forbidden thing is also forbidden. If eating people were permitted, why would there be a need for a posuk to tell you that it is permitted??!! Of course milk and blood of a person are permitted, behold, even eating people is permitted!

However, from the fact that there is a posuk teaching us that milk and blood are permitted, we can see that obviously it must be that eating people is prohibited. Thus the opinion of the Rambam is supported by our Gemora above.  

Further, the fact that eating human flesh is only forbidden as transgressing a positive commandment [less severe than transgressing a negative commandment], it makes sense that the prohibition would not be strong enough to include what derives from a person [such as a the milk and blood.]

Editor’s note: This note is basically a continuation of note #9. In our note here, the Torah Temimah again applies his creative deductive and rock solid reasoning to show that the Rambam’s opinion is correct.

Leviticus 11:4 – But these you shall not eat among those that bring up the cud and those that have a cloven hoof: the camel, because it brings up its cud, but does not have a [completely] cloven hoof; it is unclean for you.

Torat Cohanim: [Why does it use the limiting word “but”?] I might think that the meat of those who walk on two feet is forbidden, the [limiting word]“but” is used to teach otherwise [that it is permitted]

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #9:

The phrase “those who walk on two feet” refers to humans. It is not clear why it didn’t explicitly say that the “meat of humans” [is permitted]. Rather it chose a flowery phrase of “the meat of those who walk on two feet”. Maybe it is because with this phraseology it is coming also to include flesh of wild savages who lived in previous generations in countries far away, whose human [dignity] had so diminished from them that Yechezkel says (23, 20) “And she lusted for their concubinage, those whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys, and whose issue is the issue of horses.” Look also in Gemora Berachos 25b.

Also look at what the Rambam says in Chapter 2:3 of Forbidden Foods, where he writes that even though there is no prohibition against eating human flesh nevertheless eating people would be a transgression of a positive commandment [since the Torah describes what we are allowed to eat, as we see when the Torah describes the seven types of animals that we are allowed to eat. Then it adds the phrase “of these you should eat”. This shows that eating people is, according to the Rambam in the category of a transgression of a positive commandment since people are not including in the list of animals that one may eat. Thus such a transgression is a positive commandment transgression.

Note that the Ramban and the Rashba disagree with the Rambam. Their opinion is that there is no prohibition at all regarding eating people. Their view is that the Torat Cohanim quoted above is a “general hook” [asmakhta b’alma] rather than an actual source for this prohibition. Also, please look at what I [the Torah Temimah] write in footnote 18 of this chapter regarding a convincing proof that the Rambam is actually correct.

[Lastly] it is obvious that there is a universal ruling that there is a prohibition of deriving any benefit at all from the body of a dead person [so you couldn’t eat it!]. This law is learned from a textual parallelism from the laws of the decapitated calf (Deuteronomy 21:1-9. Also, look in the Gemora Sanhedrin 47b.

Editor’s note: The Torah Temimah emphasizes the importance of using the rules of Talmudic logic in a consistent fashion. He is not advocating eating people nor is his saying that any rabbi advocated such a thing. Rather, the Torah Temimah is explaining the legal reasoning behind the prohibition and various rabbis’ opinions. The Torah Temimah’s point of view derives directly from the Torat Cohanim.

[The Torat Cohanim is a midrash written down around the time of the Mishnah.]

Leviticus 7:34 “For the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving have I taken of the children of Israel out of their sacrifices of peace-offerings, and have given them unto Aaron the priest and unto his sons as a due for ever from the children of Israel.”

Jerusalem Talmud Tractate Yevamoth Chapter 8 Halachah 1: and have given them… These priestly gifts (the breast and thigh) never return (to those that gave them) as the verse says “and have given them …”.  Just as a gift never returns to the giver, so too these priestly gifts do not return.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #139:

The Jerusalem Talmud explains that the breast and the thigh differ from other priestly gifts such as terumah and the like because there is no food from which terumah is not given to a Cohen[1], unlike the breast and the thigh, that only apply to edible sacrifices offered in the Temple[2], but do not apply to non-sacrificial meat as explained in the previous commentary[3].  The Jerusalem Talmud explicitly states that, were the Israelites (i.e. not Cohanim) worthy, they would take the breast and thigh for themselves from their sacrifices.  Since the Israelites were not worthy[4], the breast and the thigh were taken from them and given to the Cohanim.  Based on this, the Jerusalem Talmud states: “Just as a gift never returns, so too these priestly gifts do not return.”  One might think since, the main reason the Cohanim merited the breast and the thigh was because the Israelites were not worthy, should the Israelites become worthy, the breast and the thigh should be taken from the Cohanim and given back to the Israelites.  Therefore, the Jerusalem Talmud teaches us that they never return from the Cohanim.[5]

Nonetheless, one must explain the necessity of this nuance in that verse explicitly states “as a due forever” which implies an everlasting right.  Furthermore, the comparison from a gift is not completely accurate because a gift returns in the Jubilee year as explained in Tractate Bechorot 52b[6].

It is possible to say that this nuance of the Jerusalem Talmud teaches us that a gift from G-d is not like a gift from one person to another.  Regarding a gift between people, if there is an estimation that shows that the gift was given on condition, the gift can be returned when the reason or condition, upon which, the gift was given becomes void.  One example of this is how we rule based on the Talmud (Ketuvoth 54a) [7].

For a widow, we deduct the value of her clothing from the value of her ketuvah because we assume that he gave them to her to appear before him.

Tosafot on 54b, proposes a similar idea.

The inheritors of a betrothed woman who died do not inherit from money that the husband added to the minimum value of the ketuvah because we say that he only included the increase in order to marry her.[8]

And in Bava Basra 146b

If a person, upon hearing that his son died, gifted his money to someone else, the gift is returned should the son arrive, for the only reason he gifted the money was because he thought that his son was deceased.

There are many similar ideas in the Talmud.

Yet, things do not work this way with respect to the Holy One Blessed is He.  Even if one could determine the reason why G-d made a person worthy, we could not take away what He gave the person should the reason become void.  Perhaps the reason for what is as stated in Makkot 11a “Everything that the Holy One Blessed is He states for the good, even conditionally stated, never changes for the worse.” [Unless there is an explicitly stated condition, such as, “ If ye walk in My statutes…[9]”

From this was can learn the basis for ruling on the basis of estimation.  When a person gives a gift based on a certain condition, one need not explain the condition.  Rather we rule on estimation alone.  See further what is written about this in Leviticus 5:1[10]

Editor’s note: This note also shows his incredible knowledge of the rabbinic sources.  At first glance, one could wonder what the priestly portions have to do with Jewish monetary laws, yet the Torah Temimah clearly shows, based on a difference between gifts from G-d to people and gifts between people that there is a connection.  He brings proof from various monetary cases that show, whenever the court can estimate the intention of the person giving the gift, it is possible to revoke the gift if the intention is no longer valid.  This is not the case by G-d, even if we could possibly determine His intention.  All this from a breast and a thigh!

Leviticus 5:1 And if a person sins and hears the demand for an oath, and he is [a] witness – has either seen or known of it – so that if he does not speak out, he shall bear his sin.

Gemora Baba Kama 56a: He shall bear his sin – vis-à-vis heavenly justice [he is guilty] but in terms of human courts he is not liable.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #27:

The reason why he is not liable in human courts is because [the witness who does not testify] is not directly causing the loss to the victim [by his not testifying]. The Gemora’s conclusion is that even a single witness is indeed still obligated to come forward and testify about what he knows. The commentaries explain that even though a single witness who does not come forward is exempt from the punishment of bringing a sacrifice [korban shavua] since, by himself, his testimony would not have been enough to convict the perpetrator; nevertheless he is still obligated to come forward and give testimony anyway. This is because his single testimony would be enough to cause the suspected perpetrator to have to undergo a biblical oath to protest his innocence. Sometimes, the suspected perpetrator would prefer to pay [the amount that the single witness claims is owed] rather than undergo such an oath. Therefore, we see that even a single witness could provide relief to the victim, even though failure to testify would not make him culpable for any punishment.

Nevertheless, this issue is still difficult to understand. The reason why this explanation above is difficult to understand is because the Gemora understands this posuk to refer to a case of two witnesses. This would include the whole posuk, even the second part that says “and he shall bear his sin”. (This is explained in the previous commentary that the whole posuk is dealing with a case of two witnesses.) If this is the case, then how could one possibly deduce from some type of forced logic that a single witness also has to testify since the perpetrator might not want to swear, etc. The commentaries have, in fact, toiled hard to explain this. See the notes of the Choshen Mishpat, Section 28.

[Consequently], it seems to me that the true obligation of a single witness to testify is not because of the section in our posuk where it says “he will bear his sin”. Rather the source of the requirement for a single witness to testify is actually from a different lesson in Torat Cohanim on Parshat Kedoshim on the posuk “do not stand idly by while your brother’s blood is spilt”. There the Torat Cohanim comments “from where do we know that if you have knowledge, that it is not appropriate for you to keep silent? [The source] is from this posuk: don’t stand idly by while your brother’s blood is spilt”.

The issue is that everyone is obligated to save his friend from any trouble that he may be in. This applies whether the trouble is physical danger or monetary trouble. Therefore, since even a single witness can bring some [relief] to the victim. As we explained above this would be through requiring the suspected perpetrator to take a biblical oath, and perhaps the person would rather pay than swear. It is therefore clear that even a single witness has some ability to assist a victim. Due to this fact, he is, [of course] required to testify.

Additionally, it is clear in my eyes that even though the Gemora doesn’t mention this posuk in Parshat Kedoshim, nevertheless I am practically positive that the main source for the single witness to testify is from the posuk in Parshat Kedoshim [about not standing idly by] and from the lesson learned from that posuk by Torat Cohanim. We already know about similar lessons derived from this same posuk in Parshat Kedoshim. For example, in Gemora Sanhedrin 73a where it asks “from where do we know that a person who sees his friend drowning in the sea or he sees that thieves are about to come upon his friend, that one is obligated to save him? The answer is: Don’t stand idly by while your brother’s blood is spilt.”

[Keep in mind] that the word “blood” also can mean “money”. This is how we know that our posuk of not standing idly by is also the source of the law requiring one to help if one sees someone attempting to steal from one’s friend through false statements.

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah takes this opportunity to bring a lesson from another parsha to remind us that the commandment to “not stand idly by” applies to every possible difficulty and issue in which you can perhaps assist your friend. You are guilty in the eyes of heaven if you could have assisted and you didn’t.

Leviticus 1:2 Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When a man [adam] from [among] you brings a sacrifice to the Lord; from animals, from cattle or from the flock you shall bring your sacrifice.

Yerushalmi Shekalim, Chapter 1, Halacha 4:  The word “Man” [adam]is used to include converts

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #6:

This same drasha is mentioned in the Toras Cohanim on this posuk. The commentaries worked hard to explain in what way the word “man” comes to include converts. The common [thought] in all their comments is an effort to find a differentiation between the uses of the word “person” [ish] with the use of the word “man” [adam]. [It could be thought] that the word “person” [ish] implies someone of a higher level while the use of the word “man” [adam] implies just any man. Therefore, [one might say] that from the fact that it uses the word “man” [adam] here and not “person” [ish], that is how we can conclude that it implies converts. Look in the book “HaTorah v’haMitzvah” to see the examples that he brings and the great length to which he discusses this.

However, note that there are proofs to the opposite that are contained in the words of our sages. For example, when Scripture says “And you are called ‘man’” [adam] [referring to the Jewish people] [VALIDATE WHERE THIS IS FROM] In the Zohar on Parshas Tazriah it mentions various levels of people, “bar nash”, “adam”, “gever”, “enosh”, “ish” and it says there that the highest level is “man” [adam]. This is alluded to in the posuk (Genesis 5:2) where it says, “He called their name “Man” [adam] on the day He created them”. Similarly the Zohar comments in Deuteronomy [VALIDATE WHERE THIS IS FROM] that a wise scholar is called “man” [adam] while an ignorant person is not called “man” [adam]. ThIt also seems logical that the term “man” [adam] is more honorific [than the term “ish”] since “man” [adam] alludes to the higher similarity [with God] as it says in the posuk “let us make “man”[adam]  in Our image”. Further we find that non-Jews are labeled with the term “person” [ish] as it says in Parshas Emor “a person” [ish] who makes a vow; and this is taken to include non-Jews. And so too with many further examples [showing “ish” referring to non-Jews].

But were it not for the words of these [previous] commentaries, I would perhaps say that the drasha to include converts from the wording in our posuk is not exclusively from the use of the word “adam” but actually more from the entire phrase of the posuk. [Our posuk is actually an example of a misplaced modifier.] Instead of saying [as it actually does in Hebrew] “a man who sacrifices from amongst you”, it should have actually said “”a man from amongst you who sacrifices…” If it had used this later phrase, I would be able to understand the posuk to only refer to Jewish people. However, since the words “from you” come to be not in their proper place we then know that the posuk [even] refers to people who are converts.

However, apparently, the whole drash needs further investigating. The fact that converts can bring sacrifices should be obvious from the fact that non-Jews can also bring sacrifices. If a non-Jew can bring sacrifices, then certainly a convert can. Perhaps the answer to this question is that non-Jews are only allowed to bring “Olot” sacrifices [burnt offerings where the whole sacrifice is burned on the altar], as is explained in Parshas Emor (22:18). From converts, on the other hand, we accept any type of sacrificial offering [because they are treated fully as Jews]

Editor’s Note: Read this one carefully between the lines. The Torah Temimah is defending non-Jews and converts. Further, he is defending the Torah itself from the idea that it refers to non-Jews or converts as being in a lower level than Jews.

Again, it is always fantastic to hear the Torah Temimah say “were it not for the previous scholars, I would say as follows…” and then we listen as he proceeds to give his opinion.

Leviticus 1:1 And He called to Moses, and God spoke to him from the Tent of Meeting saying

Gemora Yoma 4b:  And He called to Moses, and God spoke to him; why does Scripture mention the call before the speech? — The Torah teaches us good manners: a man should not address his neighbor without having first called him.

 Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #1:

In other words, one should not begin to speak [to one’s friend] suddenly. The reason for this is to allow the listener [some time] to prepare himself to listen. This is similar to what it writes in Gemora Nidda 16b that God hates one who enters the house of his friend suddenly. Further, in Meseket Derek Eretz, Chapter 5, it says that one should learn proper behavior from God. God stood outside the Garden of Eden and He called to Adam, as the posuk says (Genesis 3:9) “And God called to the man [Adam] and He said, Where are you”.

The reason why our Gemora quotes our posuk here [in Leviticus] instead of the posuk in Genesis, is perhaps because the Gemora wanted to learn the greatest lesson. Even with someone who God recognized and brought close to Himself with the greatest love and affection [such as Moses], God nevertheless [displays good manners and proper behavior] by not suddenly beginning to speak with him. It is about Moses that God testifies and says “in all My house he is faithful” and “plainly and not in riddles do I speak to him.” Even here He prepared him [Moses] to speak before He spoke with him.

Editor’s Note: The Torah Temimah wants to emphasize, I think, that even God displays proper manners and proper behavior. Further, this proper behavior should be towards everyone, even someone whom you love dearly and with whom you are very familiar

Exodus 35:30 Moses said to the children of Israel, see God has called on Betzalel  the son of Uri the son of Hur from the tribe of Yehuda

Gemora Brachos 55a:  R. Isaac said: We must not appoint a leader over a Community without first consulting it, as it says: See, the Lord hath called by name Bezalel, the son of Uri. The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses: Do you consider Bezalel suitable? He replied: Sovereign of the Universe, if Thou thinkest him suitable, surely I must also! Said [God] to him: All the same, go and consult them. He went and asked Israel: Do you consider Bezalel suitable? They replied: If the Holy One, blessed be He, and you consider him suitable, surely we must!

 Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #22:

Note what the Tashbetz writes in section 155 regarding the resulting halacha from this text. The Tashbetz states that a king who appoints a ruler for the Jews without consulting them will cause that ruler to not have authority to enact laws against their consent. Further, for such a ruler the Jews are exempt from making payments if the ruler’s calculations are decided by an expert to be erroneous.

This is the lesson that we see from the fact that even the Holy One, Blessed Be He, consulted with the congregation prior to appointing a ruler over them.

Note also what is written in the Orach Hayim section 153.

Editor’s Note: In this note, the Torah Temimah is defending the practice of gaining the consent of the governed.

Exodus 35:27 And the princes [nisi’im] brought the shoham stones and filling stones for the ephod and for the choshen;

Gemora Yoma 75a:  Actual clouds [nisi’im] as it says in Proverbs 25:14 “clouds [nisi’im] and wind”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #20:

In other words “nisi’im” refers to actual clouds. The reason for taking this posuk out of its simple meaning and explaining it in a forced manner like this, perhaps is because in all the places where it mentions the princes (nisi’im) it specifies them with a particular proper noun. Examples of such phrases are: “princes of Israel” or “prinices of the congregation” or “princes of the tribes” or “princes of the forefathers”. Here, [in our posuk] it just mentions the word “princes” [without any clarification of which princes]. This drasha also includes within it the interpretation of the next posuk where it says the phrase “in the morning, in the morning”. That when the manna fell from heaven, precious stones and pearls fell with it. The manna fell from the place of the clouds [nisi’im]. These are the clouds, therefore, referred to in our posuk as having brought the precious stones.  

However, it does require further investigation as to how the nisi’im in our posuk could possibly mean clouds. Note that it also says that they brought the oil for the menorah. And we hold that [halachically] the oil for the menorah must be olive oil. This is explained in the beginning of parsha Ki Tetze and in the Gemora Menachos 89a. Clearly it would be impossible for the clouds to bring the olive oil. Perhaps one could possibly say that the answer is related to the answer also in Menachos 89a that actually wheat fell from the clouds. See what Rashi and Tosafot say over there in that Gemora.

In general, however, we don’t learn [laws] from miracles and there is no requirement to answer questions relating to aggada.

Editor’s Note: It is wonderful how the Torah Temimah explains why the Gemora chooses to take the word “nisi’im” out of its clear meaning. On the other hand, when the Torah Temimah delves into that answer he runs into unanswerable questions. This being aggadic material however, these questions are not cause for alarm.

Exodus 38:22 And Bezalel the son of Uri the son of Hur from the tribe of Yehudah made all that God had commanded Moshe.

Gemora Yerushalmi Peah, Perek 1, Halacha 1 – It does not say “According to all that Moshe commended him to do” but rather according to “all that God commanded Moshe”. From this we learn that [Bezalel] set his mind [in agreement] to do even things that he had not heard from the mouth of his teacher, as it says “To Moshe on Mount Sinai”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #4:

This [gemora] hints to the fact that if a person does an action with the intention of fulfilling God’s will and for the sake of heaven, he’ll receive [divine] assistance, because he intended it in a true way.

This principle is also alluded to in the aggada in the Gemora Brachos 55a where it says as follows:

R. Samuel b. Nahmani said in the name of R. Johanan: Bezalel [the name literally means “in the shadow of God”] was so called on account of his wisdom. At the time when the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses; Go and tell Bezalel to make me a tabernacle, an ark and vessels, Moses went and reversed the order, saying, Make an ark and vessels and a tabernacle. Bezalel said to him: Moses, our Teacher, as a rule a man first builds a house and then brings vessels into it; but you say, Make me an ark and vessels and a tabernacle. Where shall I put the vessels that I am to make? Can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, said to you, Make a tabernacle, an ark and vessels? Moses replied: Perhaps you were in the shadow of God and knew!

This is also alluded to in the posuk Exodus 31:2. This shows that Bezalel did everything for the sake of heaven and his intention was to fulfill God’s will. In this way, he set his thought to match God’s thoughts even in matters that he did not hear from Moshe.

Also, see what it says similar to this at the end of parshas Haazinu [Deuternomy 32:16] where the Gemora Yerushalmi [Peah Chapter 1, Halacha 1] says as follows:

R. Mana says “It is not something that is far from you”. If you find that it is far, it is from you [because of you.] Why would this be so? Because you did not toil hard enough to understand it. It is from here that we know that any issue that Beis Din [the Court] deliberates intensely over will, in the end, stand.

Editor’s Note: The freedom and encouragement to use one’s own ability to think and to even disagree with one’s teachers is built into the Gemora.