Deuteronomy – 16:18 – You shall set up judges and law enforcement officials for yourself in all your cities that the Lord, your God, is giving you, for your tribes, and they shall judge the people [with] righteous judgment.

Gemora Sanhedrin 16:2 – this verse teaches that it is an obligation to set up judges and law enforcement officials in each city.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation of note #76
In a nearby Gemora on the same page an opinion is stated to set up judges and law enforcement officials for each tribe. Tosafot writes that if there is in a given city people from two tribes, then there is an obligation to set up two court systems; one for each tribe in that city.

It appears that Tosafot are answering the apparent contradiction of how one can set up a court system [simultaneously] in each city and also one for each tribe. For that reason, they explain that sometimes it is necessary to set up two court systems in one city if there are members of two tribes in that city.

However, in my opinion, that is a forced explanation. According to that line of thinking if one were to have a city with inhabitants from ten tribes, it would be necessary to set up ten court systems in [just] one city. Being that it was common to have more than one tribe in a given city, it would [often] be necessary to set up ten court systems in a single city. Logic does not incline towards such an explanation.

Therefore, it appears that the explanation is as follows: in addition to the requirement to set up a court system in each city, it is also required to set up one central court system per tribe (no matter what city they are in) to cover the entire land of Israel. This central court, for a given tribe, would have jurisdiction over tribal matters even though the members of that tribe may be scattered in many different cities. With this method, it comes out that each Jewish person in Israel would be under the jurisdiction of two court systems – one for his city and one for his tribe. Perhaps this is the intent of Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel’s statement that it is a commandment for each tribe to judge its own.

DBS Note: I found this note amazing because the Torah Temimah is basically rejecting an opinion that pre-dated him by approximately 800 years because it didn’t seem logical to him. Usually, I think he cites other commentators to support his critique but in this note he does not do that.

Deuteronomy 11:14 – I will give the rain of your land at its time, the early rain and the latter rain, and you will gather in your grain, your wine, and your oil.

Babylonian Talmud-Berachos 35b –  Rabbi Ishmael asked – what is this verse coming to teach us? He answered – because it says in Hosea (Chapter 1) “the words of this book will never depart from your mouth” might be understood plainly as written. This verse states “and you will gather in your grain” to teach [the importance of] conducting oneself according to the way of the world.

Jerusalem Talmud – Berachos Chapter 1, Halacha 5: Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai said – is it possible for a person to thresh in the time of threshing, to sow in the time of sowing and reap in the time of reaping? What would become of the Torah? Rather when Israel does the will of God, their work is done by others as it says in Isaiah (Chapter 61:5) “And strangers shall stand and pasture your sheep”. But when Israel is not doing the will of God, they will do their own work as it says in our verse “and you will gather in your grain.”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #25:

Note the commentary of the Maharsha and many of the commentators of homiletics and aggadot who all ask how it is possible to explain our verse as discussing a time when the Jews are not doing the will of God. Behold it state explicitly at the beginning of this section “and it will be that if you follow the will of God…”

Rather it is the case that Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochoi, who is expressing this point of view, is following his consistently expressed point of view. It is his opinion that the verse in Hosea (Chapter 1) of “the words of this book will never depart from your mouth and you will [study] them day and night” are to be taken [exactly] literally. (Thus Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochoi disagrees explicitly with Rabbi Ishmael in the previous note.) This difference of opinion is explained in this section of the Gemora and in Menachos (99b). Thus according to Rabbi Shimon, as long as Israel is not clinging to this attribute of [only] studying Torah day and night, by definition they are not following the will of God, even though, in general, they are following the commandments of the Torah.

Translator Note: This note of the Torah Temimah does not, per se, shed new light on this well known disagreement. I do appreciate, however, the Torah Temimah’s emphasizing and pointing out that many commentators have noted that Rabbi Shimon’s opinion seems to go against a plain reading of the verse.

Deuteronomy 8:10 – And you will eat and be satisfied, and you shall bless the Lord, your God for the land that he has given you.

Jerusalem Talmud-Berachos Chapter 1, Halacha 1: Women, servants and children are obligated to pray the blessing after meals. This is taught by the verse that says: “and you will eat and be satisfied, and you shall bless the Lord, your God…”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #18:

It appears that the proof from the verse is that since the prayer after eating is only for blessing and thanking God for being satisfied and for the bodily enjoyment [of the food], then apparently there is no distinction between men and women and servants and children. This is similar to what we state at the beginning of Gemora Megila (4a) that women are also obligated in the commandment of reading the Scroll of Esther on Purim because they were also saved during the miracle of Purim. Here also women are included in the requirement to pray the blessing after eating because they are included in the category of having eaten and been satiated.

Note that in the Babylonian Talmud Berachos (20b) there is recorded the discussion between Ravina and Rabba. They were discussing whether the requirement for women to recite the prayer after eating is a biblical obligation or a rabbinic obligation.  Rashi comments there that the doubt arises because on the one hand the commandment appears to be a non-time bound positive commandment which is equally required for men as for women. On the other hand, in the text of the prayer itself reference is made “to the good land that God has given you”. Since women were not included in the allotment of the land, it would stand to reason that their requirement to say this prayer is not equal to a man’s requirement. Tosafot adds to Rashi’s question by adding that the text of the prayer also mentions the covenant that has been stamped on our flesh [circumcision] and on the Torah that you taught us and notes that these phrases also does not apply to women. Tosafot leaves the question as an open question.

On the basis of this discussion in the Babylonian Talmud, the halachic authorities have ruled that the obligation of women to recite the prayer after eating is possibly not biblical in nature. The ramifications of this ruling has many effects. For example, if one is not sure whether one has recited the prayer or not – what to do is affected by this issue. Further, whether a woman could fulfill the obligation for a man and recite the prayer on his behalf is also impacted by this decision.

However, in my opinion, it is astounding that the universal, straightforward opinion stated in the Jerusalem Talmud is pushed aside by the single opinion of one person in the Babylonian Talmud. Isn’t it clear from the section of the Jerusalem Talmud that we have quoted that there is no doubt that women are obligated in the prayer after meals? Further, as we explained and as many early halachic authorities have already ruled, a doubt in the Babylonian Talmud is pushed aside by a universal, certain statement in the Jerusalem Talmud. [See Tosafot in Niddah 68a and also the Rosh in the second chapter 2 of Succah.]

Another point that is astounding to me is that according to the comments of Rashi and Tosafot, the nature of the doubt relates to the phrases in the prayer concerning the division of the land, concerning circumcision and concerning teaching Torah. If so, then these doubts would only apply to the second paragraph of the prayer in which these items are mentioned. However, the first paragraph which doesn’t mention these items rather just thankfulness and praise for the food, certainly women’s obligation would be equal to a man’s. It is amazing that commentators have not focused on this.

Translator Note: I liked this note of the Torah Temimah for several reasons. First of all, he is pointing out the ramifications of deciding to make a woman’s obligation lesser than a man’s. Secondly, he uses his knowledge of traditional halachic methodology to question whether this decision was accurate.

Bamidbar 31:7 – They mounted an attack against Midian, as the Lord had commanded Moses, and they killed every male.

Sifri – they surrounded [Midian] on all four sides [this is the general opinion]; Rabbi Natan’s opinion is that the Israelites [surrounded Midian on three sides and] left a fourth side open so that [anyone who wanted to] could flee

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #9:

That is to say that [according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan] the Israelites left a place so that anyone who wanted to flee, could [in fact] flee. The Rambam is the six chapter of the laws of kings, in halacha seven, writes as follows: “when you siege a city to capture it, don’t surround it [completely] on all four sides, rather surround it on three sides. Leave a place for escape, so that anyone who wants to flee to save his life can do so. This is according to the oral tradition that thus it was commanded as it says in the verse ‘they mounted an attack against Midian, as the Lord had commanded Moses…”

The Kesef Mishna in his commentary on the Rambam cites the above mentioned Sifri as the the source for the Rambam’s ruling. To me, however, this is astounding.

It is not clear why the Rambam decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan against the general opinion. Also Rambam phraseology is not clear when he states “this is according to the oral tradition that thus it was commanded.” Where is this command [of only surrounding on three sides] alluded to? Further, what is the source of Rabbi Natan’s opinion?

It is possible to say that the Rambam was relying on what it says in the Jerusalem Talmud Mesechta Shviis, Chapter 6, Halacha 1. There is says that Joshua sent 3 public pronouncements prior to entering the Land of Israel. One of the pronouncements was that anyone who wanted to flee, was free to do so. So, apparently, it is unclear where Joshua was instructed to do this. One needs to conclude that Joshua learned to do this from [watching] the way Moshe conducted his wars. So, behold this is a proof to the opinion of Rabbi Natan. It is on this beraita [in the Jerusalem Talmud] that Rabbi Natan relied on for his opinion. Also, as it is known that an unattributed beraita is according to Rabbi Natan, it is therefore logical that the Rambam would decide according to Rabbi Natan.

This also explains the Rambam’s phraseology of “according to the oral tradition we learn”. The intent is that according to the way that Joshua conducted himself, we see that thus it was commanded to Moshe.

The reason for leaving the fourth side open is because if one does not do this, the fighters would fight without hope with their last remaining ounce of strength. It would then be more difficult for the Children of Israel to win the war. This would not be the case if a fourth side were left open for the combatants to flee.  

Exodus 23:5  If you see your enemy’s donkey lying under its burden would you refrain from helping him? You shall surely help along with him.

Gemora Pesachim (113b): “your enemy” – who exactly is meant by “your enemy”? Could it mean an “idol worshipper’s” donkey? That can’t be because we learn in a beraita that this teaching refers explicitly to a Jewish enemy. A Jewish enemy? Who gave permission to hate a Jewish person? Doesn’t it say in the Torah (Parshat Kedoshim): “don’t hate your brother in your heart”? It must mean a Jewish person who you saw do an immoral act.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #36:

This is referencing the braita in Gemora in Bava Metzia (32b) where it states that one is not obligated to help the animals of idol worshippers.  That statement [in the gemora] is dealing with the idol worshippers in that day] in previous times who did not keep the seven commandments of the sons of Noah. They were comparable to wild animals and constituted a danger to civil society. This is as I wrote on the verse above regarding a Jew’s ox that gores an ox of a non-Jew (Exodus 21:35).

However, regarding the non-Jews of our day, the financial laws [halacha pertaining to monetary issues] pertaining to them are not different than the financial laws pertaining to Jews. Therefore, certainly one is obligated to help their animals due to the same issues of relieving the suffering of animals [as would apply if it were a Jewish person’s ox.]

Editor’s Note: This is one of several places where the Torah Temimah stresses that in our times, the financial laws pertaining to non-Jews is the same as the financial laws pertaining to Jews.

Exodus 20:2 – I am the Lord, your God, who took you out of the Land of Egypt, from the House of Slavery.

Gemora Shabbos – 108(a): Rabbi Yochanon said, “How do we know that abbreviations are from the Torah? Because the verse says ‘I’ using the letters: אנכי (anochi) – this is actually an abbreviation for ‘I, myself, wrote it [and] gave it.’”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #3:

It is possible to say that the explanation of Rabbi Yochanon’s comment is that this is an allusion to the idea that all the ten commandments were heard by the Jewish people from God through Moshe except for the first two. Only “anochi” and “don’t have any other gods” were heard from the Almighty, himself. This is what is alluded to in the phrase “I, myself, wrote it and gave it.”

One can also say that this phrase relates to a common idea that people say: “One can tell what a person is like and what his characteristics are and the measure of his wisdom from his writings and his books.” Regarding this it is said that the essence of God, so to speak, His Will, His Honor, His Greatness and His Humility are seen and recognized from His Torah. As it says at the end of Megila 31(a), every place where you find God’s Greatness, there also you find His Humility.”

This is what is alluded to in the phrase “I, myself”. It actually means “I, the content of My Soul, wrote and gave it”. I gave it so that [others] can know and recognize me through My writings, through My Torah.

Editor’s Note: This note of the Torah Temimah’s is more poetic and mystical than most of his other notes.

Exodus – 2:13  – He went out on the second day, and behold, two Hebrew men were quarreling, and he said to the evil one, “Why are you going to strike your friend?”

Gemora: Sanhedrin 58(b): Resh Lakish said, “One who raises his hand against his friend, even though he never [actually] hits him, is still called a wicked person”. This is demonstrated by the verse “and he said to the wicked one, ‘why are you going to strike your friend?”  It does not say “why have you hit your friend?” but rather “why are you going to strike your friend?”

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #38:

In other words, even though [Moshe] only saw them quarrelling, nevertheless he still said “why will you hit your friend?” {Moshe] said this because he saw the man acting in a way that showed that he would hit his friend; namely that he had lifted his hand. Since Moshe called this person ‘wicked’ we see that one who only raises his hand against his neighbor is called ‘wicked’.

Rashi on this verse writes regarding the phrase “why will you hit your friend” and explains that ‘friend’ implies ‘equal in wickedness to you’. This statement of Rashi needs further explanation [how could one conclude from this verse that the hitter was wicked?]  It appears according to the Responsum of the Mabit (Moshe ben Yosef Trani) that it is permitted to hit an evil person since they are not behaving according to the ways of our people. If that was the case, then clearly one who hits a wicked person is not called wicked. Additionally, since as we see from the previous note that the two people in this story who are quarrelling with one another are the [wicked] Datan and Aviram. If this is the case, how could Moshe call the “hitter” wicked since, indeed, he was hitting a wicked person?

The answer is that one must conclude that it would only be ok to strike a wicked person if one, himself, is [totally] righteous. However, for a wicked person to hit a wicked person is totally forbidden. Therefore, in our case, a wicked person is hitting a wicked person, it is appropriate to call him wicked!

This answers the [apparent] question regarding how Rashi could conclude that someone was wicked just because he was hitting a wicked person. [The answer is that Moshe knew it was Datan and Aviram who were fighting. The proof that the person was wicked or righteous does not lie in the fact that one is hitting an evil person.]

Look also in Choshen Mishpat Section 34: Subsection 4; there the Rema states that anyone who lifts up his hand against another become invalid for testimony in court. The reason for this according to what the Sefer Meir Eineim writes in the name of the Beis Yosef. He writes that even though [lifting up one’s hand to strike another] is forbidden biblically, nevertheless since it does not have the punishment of lashes, the prohibition of such a person giving testimony in court is only rabbinic.  Also, look in the Urim V’Tumim there.

In the book רה”ז he writes that the halachic practical distinction between whether the prohibition is rabbinic or biblical relates to the requirement to publicize the guilt versus no requirement to publicize it. If the guilt is biblical it would not need to be publicized (because everyone would know that this person is not kosher to be a witness) while if the guilt is rabbinic it would require publicizing.  Truly, according the previously cited opinion of the Mabit that lifting one’s hand is a biblical transgression but does not make one liable for lashes, then such a case would not require announcing because everyone would be aware of a biblical transgression.   If so, according to the opinion that we wrote that this prohibition is rabbinic only because it does not have a punishment of lashes but is, in reality, a biblical prohibition – then according to all opinions, announcing would not be required.

Translator’s Note: It is interesting to note that lifting one’s hand against another seems to be a separate prohibition from the prohibition of hitting another person. Further, the Torah Temimah’s main point may be that there is no assumption of righteousness to one who is hitting an evil person. He could very well be as evil as the person he is hitting.

Genesis 42:1 Jacob saw that they were selling [grain] in Egypt, so Jacob said to his sons: Why do you make yourselves [appear] conspicuous?

Gemora Taanit: 10(a) – Jacob said to his sons, don’t make yourselves appear as though you are satiated – don’t do it in front of Esav nor in front of Ishmael – in order that they not be jealous.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #1:

In other words, even though you still have grain in your store houses, nevertheless you should go to Egypt to buy more grain in order that you not appear as satiated [satisfied]. It is possible to say that this homiletic explanation of the word: תתראו   takes it as though it were written:  תתרוו which has the root meaning of “satiated”. This meaning of “satiated” is shown by the verse in Deuteronomy 29:18 (למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה ); also the verse in Psalms 36:9; also the verse in Psalms 91:16: “ואראהו בישועת’” – With length of days I shall satiate (אשביעהו) him, and I shall show (ואראהו) him My salvation. Reading the word “show” as rather meaning “satiate” also fits with the beginning of the verse. [Additionally, the double, parallel sentence structure is a common biblical construction.]

We find [often] that an “aleph” is converted to a “vav”; this is also the case with the letters “aleph”, “heh”, “vav” and “yud” are often switched, as is well known. The Radak makes the same point in his book MIchlol. See also Rashi in his commentary on Parshat Matos (32:24). [Please, dear reader, do check out this Rashi!]

Similarly, we also find that the aleph is often placed instead of a double letter. Examples of this are in Isaiah 18 with the word: בזאו instead of the word בזזו. Also, in Psalms 48 with the word ימאסו instead of the word ימססו – so too here in our verse with the word תתראו instead of the word תתרוו. See also what we have written in our commentary on Parshat Chukas (Numbers 21:14) on the verse “ את והב”.

Regarding the reason why the Rabbis explained the word תתראו beyond its simple meaning is possibly because in most instances the verb “to see” is followed by a noun or the direct object of what is being seen. This occurs in the phrase “seeing the face” and other similar instances. Here [in our verse], however, the verb occurs without an object, which is unusual. That is why they explain the verb תתראו with the meaning of תתרוו – satiated; satiation being a verb that occurs on its own and is reflexive.

Also, one should keep in mind that based on this explanation we derive the law that one who is not fasting on a public fast day for some reason is prohibited to show in front of those who are fasting as though he is satiated. This would cause the people who are fasting to be distressed. Similarly in the Gemora Bava Kama (92b) we find it mentioned that people are often not inclined to show themselves as satiated in order not to arouse jealousy or the evil eye. All this is learned from this advice of Jacob, our father.  

Editor’s Note: In this note, the Torah Temimah is, I think, teaching a moral lesson that he wants to convey. He does, at the same time, display some points of view regarding Hebrew grammar that are not frequently found.

Bereisht 28:20 – And Jacob uttered a vow, saying, “If God will be with me, and He will guard me on this way, upon which I am going, and He will give me bread to eat and a garment to wear; (21) And if I return in peace to my father’s house, and the Lord will be my God; (22) Then this stone, which I have placed as a monument, shall be a house of God, and everything that You give me, I will surely tithe to You.

Tosafot on Hulin 2:2  – The word “saying” [in verse 28:20 above] indicates that [in future generations] we should utter vows in times of trouble.

Torah Temimah Colloquial Translation on Note #20

Even though, in general, we discourage people from uttering oaths and vows in accordance with the verse in Ecclesiates 5:4 “It is better not to utter an vow”, in times of trouble we should make vows. It is further explained in Midrash Rabba and in Tosafot that not only is it permissible to make a vow but it is a commandment to do so in times of trouble. I don’t understand why the Shulchan Aruch in Yoreh Deah Section 203 uses the term ‘permission’ rather than ‘commandment’.

Look also at the Chidushe HaRashba in his comments on Nedarim 9a in his comments regarding the vows of evil people. There the Rashba answers the question of how could Jacob have uttered a vow even though the verse in Ecclesiastes states that it is better not to make a vow. There the Rashba answers that Jacob’s vow was not a true vow but rather a free will offering. I don’t know why the Rashba does not understand the verse in its plain, simple meaning. Further we find that regarding this vow of Jacob’s, God himself refers to it (Bereishit 31:13) as a vow. See also in the adjacent note the comment of the Rambam in Chapter 6 Halacha 33 of Erchin. We find similarly in Midrash Rabba’s comment on VaYikra Chapter 37 that due to Jacob’s delay in fulfilling this vow, Rachel died before her time. (This is in accordance with the text of Gemora Shabbat 30b that in transgression of a man’s vows, a man’s wife [could] die.)   From all these sources we see that Jacob’s vow was considered a real vow.

If there is a desire to answer the question of how Jacob could have made a vow against the words of the verse in Ecclesiastes, it is clear that in times of trouble the ruling is different [and we are actually encouraged to make vows in such a situation.] It would be a forced explanation to say that Jacob’s vow wasn’t really a vow. The text of the verse certainly does not say this and in any event, one needs to conclude that it was a real vow.

Look also in the Responsum of the Ralbach, Section 3, where he mentions that one who vows an oath in times of trouble to fast a certain number of days and it occurs that there is a Yom Tov [Jewish holiday] during those days, he is punished with lashes because he did not explicitly exclude those days from his vow. This would imply that vow was “in force” during the Jewish holiday that occurred. This opinion needs further study [and seems inaccurate] because how could one possibly think that the one who made the oath also included Yom Tov and that the vow should be in force on Yom Tov? Isn’t it explicitly stated in the Gemora Nedarim 66a that one who makes a vow like this is approached and asked whether if he had realized that Shabbat and Yom Tov were included in these days, would you have still made that vow? How is our case any different [than that discussed in the Gemora just mentioned]?

Perhaps one needs to say that since one is making a vow in a time of trouble, he is not particular about the [requirement] of joy during Yom Tov. Rather, he considers the fasting as a joy to the extent that it relieves his sorrow. This is in accordance with what our rabbinic authorities have ruled that one whose soul is afflicted and crying is a benefit [joy] to him, it is permissible for him to cry on Shabbat.

Thus we see why [per the Ralbach’s comments above] the vow is indeed in force on Yom Tov and the one who makes the vow is liable for punishment for not explicitly excluding Yom Tov.

Editor’s Note: In this note, besides the interesting halachic analysis, I think that the Torah Temimah did want to convey the idea that it is permissible to cry on Shabbat if one is in distress.